Policy coordination in relation to land use planning in Taiwan: A neo-institutionalist perspective by Cheng, An-Ting
POLICY COORDINATON IN RELATION TO 
LAND USE PLANNING IN TAIWAN:
A NEO-INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE
By
An-Ting Cheng
Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy of Cardiff University
Cardiff School of City and Regional Planning 
December 2008
UMI Number: U584343
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U584343
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
>rm: PGR_Submission_200701
OTICE OF SUBMISSION OF THESIS FORM: 
3STGRADUATE RESEARCH
PENDIX1:
lecimen layout for Thesis Summary and Declaration/Statements page to be Included in a 
lesis
ECLARATION
lis work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently 
bmitted in candidature for any degree.
lis thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
PhD..................... „jipsefH^Ch^MD, MPhil, PhD etc, as appropriate)
Date . O . S .....
TATEMENT 2
lis thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated, 
ther sources are acknowledged bv^xplicrt references.
.LA.,.gned /.Ur..^:..........    (candidate)
TATEMENT 1
Date rl
igned (candidate)
igned
TATEMENT 3
(candidate) Date
hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter- 
irary loan, and for the title andgummary to be made available to outside organisations.
igned (candidate) Date
TATEMENT 4: PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BAR ON ACCESS
hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter- 
Drary bans after expiry of a bar on access previously approved by the Graduate 
evefopment Committee.
igned A (candidate) Date C/r.
a
Acknowledgements
These acknowledgements cannot adequately thank those whose assistance I received 
during the course o f my Ph.D. research. However, I would like to present my thanks 
to those people without whom this thesis would not have been possible. Their 
encouragement, suggestions and kindness led me to overcome every difficulty that I 
encountered over the past few years.
I must firstly thank Mr. Huw Thomas for supervising my thesis with endless patience 
and enthusiasm. His support helped me build up the conceptual framework and his 
professional advice offered a clear direction every time that I was lost. I would also 
like to thank two panel members: Professor Jeremy Alden and Dr. Neil Harris who did 
not hesitate to give useful comments and help me clarify my research focus and 
research questions.
I wish to thank the interviewees who kindly agreed to be interviewed and provided the 
valuable material for this research. In particular. Dr. Lih-Horng Chen, as the first 
interviewee in the snowball process approach, enthusiastically introduced this 
researcher to access to subsequent informants and contributed to the success o f  the 
snowball strategy adopted in this research.
I also thank my friends Richard Yu. Raymond Kao and Roger Lo who always inspire 
me when I am depressed, and 1 also thank Margaret who offered so many suggestions 
on the writing.
Finally, families are always my solid supporters, especially my wife, Chin-Hui and 
my baby son. Jyun-Sheng. Without the encouragement from my wife, 1 would not 
have been possible to complete this long-term study.
My apologies to anyone who offered assistance but is not acknowledged. It is purely 
there are too many kind persons providing their help to be indicated in this page.
Summary
The issue o f policy coordination is inevitably viewed in discourses surrounding 
fragmented planning and the integration o f the plan making process. This even more 
so in Taiwan since the 1990s. a period that has seen the significant institutional 
change, while economic globalisation has impacted on the developmental state 
strategy adopted over previous decades, and the movement towards democratisation 
has led to the collapse o f  political authoritarianism.
This thesis attempts to explore the dynamic relationship between different sectors 
through an understanding o f  policy coordination between economic planning and the 
land use planning system. It adopts a neo-institutionalist perspective as an approach to 
explore how coordination works and to explain how the roles in planning have altered 
during a period o f  institutional change. The emphasis o f this study is on the practices 
in the plan making processes, and the relationships between actors/agencies during 
this process, at the regional level, through which cross-sectoral policy are supposed to 
be coordinated.
Based on the findings o f  three case studies, the thesis argues that the policy making 
process has been affected by the institutional changes and suggests this has led to a 
weakening role o f  the central planning authority and the rise o f local authority powers. 
In spite o f  the change, it also finds that primary planning policy has remained on track 
owing to the solid personal network behind the formal planning system. The 
significant role o f personal factors which are embedded in the cultural context is 
noticeable and can be viewed as a part o f the informal institutional factors in policy 
coordination process.
Accordingly, the thesis finally emphasises the importance o f informal institutional 
elements and suggests the personal factor, including the relationship and the network 
must be taken into account in any research on planning process in Taiwan.
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Chapter One Introduction
1.1 Policy Coordination in Taiwanese Planning
1.1.1 The coordination issues in planning
Policy coordination has gradually been put at the centre o f  the study o f governance 
because o f  the attention paid to policy fragmentation, which has mainly resulted from 
the effect o f departmentalism. That is because the increasing complexity o f  the 
governance o f  society leads to more divisions and departments in order to deal with 
specific affairs, and since each individual department has its own concerns, 
departmentalism has therefore appeared. Departmentalism results in a fragmented 
structure or authority and makes intergovernmental coordination less possible 
(Agranoff. 1988. p.540). The need for coordination is therefore found when the 
collective effort is not obtained (Lam, 2005. p.634). In brief, as long as there is a need 
for cooperation between agencies, issues o f coordination will be important.
Planning is thought o f  as an activity highly dependent on coordinative actions (Healey, 
1997a; 1997b). since the plan making is located within a series o f alliances and 
networks o f governance activities, where networks may be understood as complex 
sets o f  social relations (Hillier. 2000, p.33). As a result o f that context, it is argued the 
planning process is rooted in the coordination across sectors and participants.
Coordination issues have many facets and descriptions. For instance, applied to the 
governmental structure, coordination may be regarded as *joined-up* government, and
with regard to planning, it may be viewed as integrated planning. Although all these 
implications stress coordinative actions, their focus is different according to the 
context. Some theories about coordination will be introduced in Section 2.2 and 
relevant issues with reference to policy coordination in Taiwan will be revealed in 
Section 3.5. This thesis will then explore the operation o f  policy coordination in the 
case study chapters (see Chapters Five to Seven).
1.1.2 Land use planning in the developmental state
It is argued that after the Second World War until the early 1980s, Taiwan had adopted 
a clear developmental state strategy which regarded economic growth as the state's 
priority policy and it was the responsibility o f all other sectors to support economic 
planning (Chang, J-S.. 1988). In the context o f the developmental state, urban and 
regional plans are seen as basic infrastructures serving the construction o f economic 
planning (Ibid.).
The developmental state strategy was adopted also in the 1990s when the impact o f 
economic globalisation affected the role o f  the state in economic development and 
Taiwan's economy was inevitably affected (Lee, Lan, and Juang, 2005, p.87). Some 
even argue that the Taiwanese government focuses solely on economic policy and the 
remaining sectors were neglected, even though there were relevant orders and plans 
(Hsia. 1993).
The dominance o f economic planning has also been reflected in the National 
Comprehensive Development Plan (NCDP) drawn in the middle 1990s and the 
Challenge 2008- National Development Plan (CEPD, 1996; 2002). Both Development 
Plans highlight the government's concerns, mainly relating to economic development.
and illustrate the function o f  land use planning as an instrument to achieve the stated 
goals. It implies that even in the new century, centralised planning and developmental 
state strategy still shape land use planning in Taiwan (Lee, Lan, and Juang, 2005).
The feature o f  state intervention in planning can be found ranging from local planning 
(e.g. the world city formation plan for Taipei City), to the state level development plan 
(e.g. the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Centre) (Wang, J-H.. 2004). Based on the 
concept o f developmental state strategy adopted by the Taiwanese government over 
decades, such centralised planning power appeared in the land use planning system 
(Chou, T., 1997). Connected with the national economic development plan, the land 
use planning system in Taiwan therefore became an accessory offering economic 
development constructions necessary supports and land use planning policies. That is 
to say. regional plans and urban plans came to be seen as technical tools for the 
implementation o f state developmental strategy (Sun. 1988).
1.1.3 T he relationship  between economic planning and land use planning sectors 
With regard to the developmental state strategy adopted in Taiwan, economic 
development has been put at the centre o f  governmental policies. In such 
circumstance, a question is therefore generated regarding the relationship between 
economic planning and land use planning sectors.
There is not a lack o f  research on the coordination between governmental agencies in 
Taiwan, particularly the central-local government relation (see Chao, Y., 2002; Chi, 
C-C., 2004a; and Chiang. T-S., 2001). Some studies have examined vertical 
coordination related to land use planning from the perspective o f intergovernmental 
management (see Chao, Y., 2003), while others have investigated the horizontal
coordination for economic competitiveness and pointed to the significance o f reform 
o f  the planning administrative system (Chen, M-T., 1997), or even the establishment 
o f  cross-border planning agency, i.e. regional government (Chi, 2004a) and the 
reorganisation o f  local divisions (Chen, H-S., 2001).
In spite o f  the number o f  studies on intergovernmental relationships and cross-border 
integrated planning, few studies have focused on cross-sectoral policy coordination. 
This might result from the continuing adoption o f the developmental state strategy in 
which the economic strategy has taken a priority over other policies in Taiwan over 
the decades, so that few doubt the domination o f the economic planning sector (Chang, 
J-S.. 1988). Due to the developmental state strategy, planning in Taiwan has been 
limited to activities relating to the allocation o f  land use and the making o f land use 
plans (Hua, 1994). and as an instrument for economic development plan 
implementation (Chou. T.. 1999). Such limitation has led to a lack o f research on the 
relationship between land use planning and other sectoral planning (Kong, 2000).
However, the 1990s saw two significant changes o f circumstance: the movement 
towards democratisation had a significant impact on Taiwan's politics (Lin, C-L., 
2000) and economic globalisation impacted on the role o f the state in economic 
development policy (Castells, 2000, p.334). These shifts have inevitably affected the 
policy making process and generated an interest in exploring the relationship between 
sectors in relation to land use planning. Given the first change since 1949 of central 
political power in 2000, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) ended the 
Kuomintang's (KMT) half century rule, the impact o f this institutional change on the 
operation o f policy coordination is also another concern in this thesis.
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1.2 The Scope and Focus of the Thesis
1.2.1 The motivation for conducting the study
As mentioned in Section 1.1.3, in spite o f  plenty o f research investigating 
intergovernmental relationships, most accounts o f  coordination have focused on the 
redistribution o f  power between administrative bodies in terms o f local government 
restructuring and the decentralisation o f power. Such accounts stress cross-territory 
cooperation or the integration o f governmental organisations (see Section 1.1.3). The 
scarcity o f  academic discussions in relation to cross-sectoral coordination and the lack 
o f  studies on the relationship between land use planning and other sectors provided 
the motivation for this thesis.
A series o f institutional changes which took place through the 1990s, in particular the 
streamlining o f  Taiwan Provincial Government, and the first regime shift after the 
DPP won the 2000 Presidential Election Campaign also motivated this thesis. While 
the former event has led to a political power vacuum between central and local 
governments and affected the operation o f regional planning (Chiang, T-S.. 1999), the 
latter had an overall impact on all policy making processes, including the plan 
planning making process. The last decade witnessed institutional change in Taiwan's 
politics and it also stimulated a curiosity in the researcher to explore the impact o f this 
change on the changing landscape o f  Taiwanese planning.
As result o f  such motivations, the emphasis o f this study is on the practices o f the plan 
making process and the relationships between actors/agencies during this process at 
regional level through which crosscutting policy will be coordinated. It also attempts 
to discover the impact o f institutional change on policy coordination in relation to
land use planning.
1.2.2 The understanding of the policy making process and policy implementation
Policy coordination in relation to land use planning is the main concern o f this thesis 
which intends to explore the relationship between economic planning and land use 
planning through an understanding o f the policy making process.
It should be noted that the policy making process in this thesis in fact comprises both 
policy making and policy implementation. In other words, coordination undertaken in 
the plan making process and the implementation o f policy are all taken into account in 
this thesis.
It has been argued that there is a difference between policy making and 
implementation. However, this implies the assumption o f the existence o f hierarchical 
relations between policy making and implementation, that is to say, policy making 
directs policy implementation. According to van Meter and van Horn (1975, p.445), 
policy implementation is 'those actions by public or private individuals (or groups) 
that are directed at the achievement o f  objectives set fo rth  in prior policy  ’.
Nevertheless, today, policy making, including the plan making process, stresses the 
importance o f negotiation and interaction, and policy implementation is therefore seen 
as a continuing part o f the policy process, as indicated by Barrett (2004, p.253):
It was argued implementation should be regarded as an integral and 
continuing part o f the political policy process rather than an administrative 
follow-on, and seen as a policy-action dialectic involving negotiation and
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bargaining between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon 
whom action depends
The findings derived from the studies in this thesis confirm the above point and 
suggest that even policy makers find it difficult to separate the two parts, since they 
view policy making and implementation as a negotiation rather than a linear process 
(see Sections 5.7. 6.7 and 7.7). This fact proves that today it is difficult to separate 
policy making and implementation and indicates policy can be made through 
implementation.
With regard to the administrative or institutional feature, there has been a long history 
o f  strong bureaucratic administration in Chinese-culture society. It is argued the key 
factor determining policy coordination is neither organisation nor sector but 
bureaucracy (Cheng, T-J., 2005 p.90: see also Section 3.22). As a result o f the 
characteristic culture, this thesis hence suggests that taking policy coordination during 
implementation into account benefits the exploration o f relationships between sectors.
1.2.3 The employment of a neo-institutionalist perspective
This thesis employs the neo-institutional perspective as an approach to explore the 
operation o f policy coordination in Taiwanese planning. The initial reason for 
adopting a neo-institutional approach is its contribution to "bringing the state back in' 
(Evans. Rueschemeyer and Skocpol. 1985). As mentioned, Taiwan has adopted the 
developmental state strategy over decades, and points out that the state has played a 
considerable role in the plan making process. Due to the significance o f state 
institutions in this process, the neo-institutionalist perspective is an appropriate 
approach to use to explore planning issues in Taiwan.
The broad definition offered by neo-institutionalism also benefits the research. Unlike 
traditional institutionalism, which mainly focuses on formal institutions, 
neo-institutionalism is a theory which focuses on developing a sociological view o f 
institutions and the relationship between institutions. It not only recognises the effect 
o f  interactions between institutions but also admits the individual's influence on the 
institution he/she is within.
Recognition o f  the informal institutional elements, such as the social context and 
culture, is the strength o f  the neo-institutional approach and reinforces its suitability in 
a study stressing the embeddedness o f institutions. It is argued that society comprises 
‘a web o f  interlocking networks o f  affiliation and interaction which are structured 
around a multiplicity’ o f  institutions, form al and informal ’ (Amin and Hausner, 1997, 
p. 10). Therefore, some emphasise the importance o f  networks within institutions and 
argue that networks are relational links through which people can obtain access to 
material resources, knowledge, and power ’ (Hillier, 2000, p.35). The findings o f the 
thesis confirm the importance o f the personal network in the policy making process 
(see Section 8.3.3) consistent with findings reported by Healey (1998, p.62) and 
Hillier (2000, p.51).
Although some criticise the vague definition o f  the institutions in the neo-institutional 
approach (John, 1998), the thesis suggests it is just the broad definition adopted by 
this approach has in fact been useful for this study since it has enabled it to take more 
factors into account, i.e. the social context and political culture. Without a broad and 
flexible definition, this study may have neglected some valuable elements. Unlike 
other Western theories, neo-institutionalism leaves room for the researcher to identify
which factors should be taken into account and which elements should be identified as 
part o f the institution. For the success o f  this thesis, which focuses on Taiwanese 
society which has been moulded by Confucianism thought and Chinese cultural 
practices, a flexible attitude is necessary to discover the underlying relationships 
beneath the formal planning structure.
1.2.4 The focus of the research
The relationship between different governmental sectors is the main interest o f the 
study. It selected land use planning as the sector through which it explores policy 
coordination because the researcher was a planner in charge o f  the County 
Comprehensive Development Plan o f Hualien County, Taiwan between 2001 and 
2002 and has devoted many years to studying planning issues.
As result o f the developmental state strategy, the economic planning sector has been 
seen as the predominant sector over decades and it has influenced the planning system 
in Taiwan (see Section 3.3.2). In addition, institutional change, i.e. the streamlining o f 
Taiwan Provincial Government and regime shift, in the late 1990s is another interest 
o f the study. Based on the neo-institutionalist perspective, such institutional change 
inevitably had an impact on the policy making process. The purpose o f this thesis is 
therefore to discover the interactions between the land use planning and economic 
planning sectors through an exploration o f  policy coordination in three economic 
projects, and to evaluate the changes after 2000.
To accomplish the research purposes, several questions were generated which this 
study sought to answer: 'how does coordination operate between the land use 
planning and economic planning sectors? ‘how have roles changed in the planning
sector, given institutional change? ’, ‘after the significant institutional changes in the 
late 1990s, has there been any change in bureaucratic operation in relation to 
coordination then and now \  and ‘what is the interaction between policy 
participants?  The conceptual framework o f the thesis is presented in Figure 1.1.
1.3 The Structure and Organisation of the Thesis
The thesis is concerned with the relationship between land use planning and economic 
planning sectors. While the operation o f coordination is the primary focus o f  the 
thesis, the impact o f institutional change on the plan making process is also an 
important concern.
In Chapter Two. there is a critical review o f the academic literatures in relation to the 
neo-institutional approach and the coordination issue, while Chapter Three illustrates 
the planning context, and presents relevant research and debate in Taiwan. The two 
chapters will explain why the topic o f  coordination is valuable and will generate the 
research questions for this thesis. The research strategy and methods o f data collection 
and analysis used in the study will be set out and discussed in Chapter Four. A case 
study approach using a snowball sampling strategy to identify key interviewees is 
explained and justified.
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Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework
Changing
circumstance
<=> The need o f  coordination 
for planning
Context
Approach
Culture & convention lead 
to specific institutional
design
Institutional approach as a 
perspective for seeing this 
process
Spatial Planning 
regarded as a solution 
in Taiwan
O '
Preliminary generation of research
question
1. How does coordination operate between the 
land use planning and economic planning 
sectors?
2. How have roles changed in the planning 
sector, given institutional change?
3. What is the interaction between policy 
participants among and within institutions 
and how can it affect policy outcome?
After the significant institutional changes in 
the late 1990s, has there been any change in 
bureaucratic operation in relation to 
coordination then and now?
Case study research (TSP, KSP and KMFCTP)
Overview of findings and implications
Institutional change in the 1990s affected the policy coordination process in 
Taiwan.
The personal factor is important in the coordination process.
Political intervention plays a role in the coordination.
The informal network is very important due to the lack of an effective formal 
coordination mechanism.
11
Chapter Five, Six Seven present the three case studies and the results obtained from 
the field work and the findings o f each case. The analysis o f  case studies revealed 
variety within cases and different approaches used by actors to achieve policy 
coordination. It is suggested that the differences might result from the context where 
individual case existed and the time when each project was undertaken. However, it is 
worth noting that despite the divergence found between the three cases, there were 
some similarities, for instance, the significance o f informal networks and personal 
factors. A discussion and evaluation o f findings will be presented in the final chapter.
Finally, the original contribution o f the thesis is threefold:
the discussion o f the contemporary planning institution and tensions within them 
in Taiwan (Chapter Three)
the exploration o f  how cross-sectoral coordination involving land use planning is 
actually achieved in Taiwan (Chapter Five to Chapter Eight) 
the examination o f how much change there has been in cross-sectoral coordination 
given the institutional change in the 1990s (Chapter Five to Chapter Eight).
More discussions about the points above will be presented in the following chapters.
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Chapter Two Policy Coordination in Relation to Land Use 
Planning
2.1 Introduction
In modern democratic states, political decisions are thought o f as public matters 
which many individuals and groups can access. This has led to policy making 
processes involving complex interactions between policy advocators rather than 
monopoly political decisions. According to Luhmann (1982, xv, pp.253-5), we live in 
a 'centreless society' therefore it is impossible to view the government as a 
mono-centric or unitary unit since there are more groups involved in governmental 
activities at local, regional, national and even supra-national levels (Rhodes, 1997, 
p.3). As a result, the policy making process links many centres instead o f  political 
decision-making being completed merely within government. Hence, policy 
coordination plays a significant role during the process o f generating policy outcomes.
This chapter aims to discuss policy coordination in relation to land use planning 
through a neo-institutionalist lens. Section 2.2 will demonstrate the importance o f 
policy coordination in the planning process and specify the nature o f policy 
coordination in land use planning. Section 2.3 suggests that in a response to the need 
for Coordination, integrated planning has gradually come to be the focus o f  planning 
discourses. It will consider some o f the European discussions o f spatial planning and 
conclude that they underline the significance o f  understanding institutional dynamics. 
Some approaches to the analysis o f land use planning will be introduced in Section
2.4, and the significance o f the institutionalist method adopted in this research will be 
discussed in Section 2.5. The significance o f  culture and social context which affects 
the operation o f  planning coordination within institutions, will also be explored in 
Section 2.6. A broad conceptual framework for analysing policy coordination in 
relation to land use planning will emerge from the discussion.
2.2 The Issue of Policy Coordination, with Reference to Land Use 
Planning
To understand the issue o f policy coordination, it is first necessary to identify what 
policy coordination is and why there is a need for it. Lam (2005, p.634) explained 
why coordination is needed as follows:
'Coordination is needed w henever the accomplishment o f a task requires the 
collective effort o f a group o f actors. I f  not properly organized, rational 
individual actions could lead to aggregate outcomes that are not preferred by any 
o f the actors.'
Applied to the administrative hierarchy, it implies that once there is a need for 
co-work between agencies within bureaucracy, coordination becomes important 
(Cheng, T-J, 2005, p. 143) and problems can arise given the institutional design o f 
bureaucracy in which members are within. An institution might be inclined to take 
actions which might not to be in the collective interest (Dixit and Skeath, 1999). 
Unfortunately, the behaviour o f individual actors is often decided by their 
‘territoriality' (Cheng, T-J, 2005, p. 144) and departmentalism replaces cooperation.
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There is therefore the need for coordination between departments.
Policy coordination in relation to land use planning leads to discussions about 
reciprocity among actors within the land use planning system. Planning decisions are 
usually made by many agents and agencies, hence, some argue that ‘without 
coordination these agents and agencies might all have different and potentially 
conflicting objectives resulting in chaos and inefficiency' (Thompson et al., 1991, p.3). 
Accordingly Hillier (2000, p.33) states that plan making is located within a series o f 
alliances and networks o f governance activities in which networks may be understood 
as complex sets o f social relations.
Healey (1997a; 1997b), indicates that such relationships, or their 'inter-relational 
capacity', are affected by actors negotiating and negotiating rules and procedures in 
the planning process, and their different discourses and power relations. This implies 
planning per se is an activity highly dependent on coordinated actions. As 
differentiation o f  independence and differentiation o f interests increase, there is 
inevitably the need for a more integrated plan making process.
Though the importance o f policy coordination is widely accepted, it is not easy to 
specify precisely. However, with regard to land use planning, there are several 
theories which have been put forward to understand the issue o f coordination from 
different angles, notably theories about intergovernmental relations, governance and 
networks.
2.2.1 Intergovernmental relations (IGR)
In brief, the term 'intergovernmental relations' (IGR), means the interactions between
15
government units o f  all types and levels (Rhodes, 1981, p.76). Gage and Mandell 
(1990) state that intergovernmental relationships are like networks where managers 
play a role as intermediaries to coordinate and connect. The concept is based on 
multi-coordination and individual agencies which are equal and shares power. 
Coordination rather than authority is the linkage in such network and is used widely to 
explore the relationship between central and local governments (Rhodes, 1997, p.7). 
IGR refer to all governmental activities, official actions and attitudes, regular 
interactions and policy issues within government structure. Wright (1974, p.4) argues 
that IGR stresses the ‘m ultiple, behavioural, continuous a n d  dynam ic exchanges  
occurrin g  betw een  various officials in the p o litic a l s y s t e m According to his 
definition, the network o f IGR is. in fact, much broader than central-local relations 
and can be extended to cover policy coordination and multi-level governmental 
relations.
However, in spite o f the broad application o f the concept o f IGR, it has a weakness 
for policy studies. While the concept highlights the interdependence between levels 
and types o f governments, it seems to ignore the basis for this interdependence. In 
other words, it refers to but does not explain the relationship. Benson (1982, p. 148), 
based in an intergovernmental view, points out that groups and complex organisations 
are linked to each other due to interdependent resources. Also, administrative 
structures and interest groups will attempt to cooperate to ensure their own policy 
needs and preferences are met and to exclude those o f others.
Nevertheless, the concept o f IGR is relevant for exploring the interactions between 
government officials in charge o f governmental service delivery, although, the source 
o f service delivery is divergent today because o f the development o f privatisation
resulting from neo-liberalism. Thus the government is currently not the only one to 
provide public services, since, in many aspects, its role has been replaced by the 
involvement o f  private and voluntary sectors (Rhodes, 1992).
However, for the study o f  policy coordination, the concept o f IGR can be regarded as 
a 'starting-point' since public services (Rhodes, 1997, p.7-8), such as planning still 
relies on intergovernmental networks for their delivery. Notwithstanding it is 
necessary to go beyond intergovernmental networks to explore how and why the 
policy-making process operates.
2.2.2 Governance
Governance has arisen as an important concept in order to respond to the phenomena 
o f  fragmented policy-making process and multi-layer participant networks. There are 
various definitions o f  governance found in many fields. The UNDP (United Nations 
Development Programme) policy document. 'Governance for Sustainable Human 
Development', presents a multi-dimensional definition o f governance:
'UNDP defines governance as the exercise o f  political, economic and 
administrative authority in the management o f  a country’s affairs at all levels. 
Governance comprises the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions 
through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their 
differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. ’ (UNDP, 1997, 
http://m irror, undp. orz/m aznet/po licy/sum m ary, htm, accessed 17th Oct 2005)
According to the UNDP's explanation, governance comprises three legs: economic, 
political and administrative. While economic activities improve the quality o f life,
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political governance is the process o f  decision-making to formulate policy, and 
administrative governance is the system o f policy implementation. Good governance 
is completed only if it can encompass all three and define the processes and structures 
that guide political and socio-economic relationships (Ibid, http://mirror.undp.org/ 
magnet/policy/chapter 1 .htm). For good governance, consensus orientation, that 
mediates differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interests 
o f  the group, and effectiveness and efficiency that meet needs while making the best 
use o f resources are essential, and these will only exist in implementation if there is 
policy coordination. In other words, policy coordination is at least one of, if not the 
most, significant element to good governance.
In addition, governance theory points out the disadvantages o f a hierarchical structure. 
Traditional governmental hierarchy relies on authority and layer control which 
inevitably results in difficulties for policy implementation and integration (Chang, 
S-M.. 1998) and would gradually lead to unbalanced power relationships,
disconnection and incapable administrative processes. At the same time, fragmented 
structure or authority and departmentalism make intergovernmental coordination less 
achievable (Agranoff, 1988, p.540). Once conflicts within government arise, 
intergovernmental disconnection and policy fragmentation emerge. Accordingly, how 
to manage intergovernmental relations becomes a concern for good governance.
The concept o f  governance has had a significant impact on traditional planning in 
Taiwan. Chou, T. (2004, p.205) defines the difference between government and 
governance as the former is operated only in official institutions whilst the latter is 
embedded in the ‘social context and local milieu \  The trend o f ‘from government to 
governance' has influenced the nature o f planning and led to the development o f the
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discourses o f  social capital and cultural context (Liau, 2005). A broad definition o f 
institutions is already adopted in those studies to explore what and how the planning 
process operates. Accordingly, the neo-institutionalist is therefore employed to 
investigate the informal institution elements o f institutions within the planning 
system.
Institutionalism is becoming increasingly important in the planning discourses since 
more academics point to the significance o f relationships in governance. For instance, 
Vigar et al. (2000. p.34) states the significance o f  various relationships which those 
involved in governance bring to policy processes, both within and beyond the form al 
agencies where they work'. In other words, there is a need for a more inclusive 
planning process to coordinate both formal and formal agencies, and private and 
public sectors in order to achieve good governance.
2.2.3 Networks
As well as from intergovernmental relations and governance, there is another element 
that should not be ignored in the issue o f coordination. While many have emphasised 
the relationship between actors in the formal planning processes, Hillier (2000, p.33) 
points out that the networks and channels outside o f the formal planning processes are 
also worthy o f  mention. She states:
‘Actors (both officers o f  governance, such as planners, and private-s ector groups 
and individuals) may take direct action and lobby elected members or chain 
themselves to trees or bulldozers, fo r  example. The energies and pow er o f  these 
networks may influence planning decision-making in ways which may never 
formally enter the public domain, may never be publicly expressed, visible, or
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recorded. They are unlikely to be normalised into a rational, communicative, 
consensus-seeking debate. ’
Hillier thus argues that informal networks matter since they are inter-mediators in 
governmental operations. They not only define the roles o f  actors and the issues but 
also privilege certain interests, including preferred policy outcomes (Marsh and Smith, 
1995). All discussions related to policy coordination, such as the links between 
structure, network and actors and formal or informal interactions between central 
departments, inevitably focus on policy networks. Therefore to identify ‘how power is 
exercised in modern politics and who benefits from  its exercise ’, it is necessary to 
consider the policy network (Rhodes, 1997, p. 10).
Policy network research has been also very popular in the public policy study in 
Taiwan for many years. The most significant reason is that policy network research 
offers an ideal way to interpret the complexity o f  policy-making in such a pluralistic 
society (Tsao. J-H.. 2003. p.205-221). According to Lin. Y-H.'s (2002) study on 
policy networks in Taiwan, there are three characteristics o f the relationship between 
groups and government in a policy network. First, there must be interdependence 
since each participant needs others to attain their goal (Benson, 1982). Second, the 
policy network contains many participants and no individual can determine others' 
strategies and actions. However, it is not necessary that each member in the network 
has equal power and resources (Scharpf, 1978). Third, institutions matter to policy 
networks since networks are comprised o f relationships and interactions between 
members and rules and regulations ensure their operation and support (Benson, 1982; 
Rhodes, 1988).
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On the other hand, networks are not necessarily based on a formal structure. Lu (2003, 
p. 164) explains that in a policy network, the policy-making process can be operated 
without a hierarchical authority, and policy coordination is made by bargaining among 
powers. Policy networks provide a better framework for resolving some particularly 
difficult issues (see Lu, 2003). In addition, a policy network can be distinguished by 
the number o f its members, its function and the distribution o f  power (van Waarden, 
1992). Notwithstanding, whatever the kind o f  policy network, policy will not be 
effective without the legitimate process. If coordination is not produced during the 
policy formulating stage, it will necessarily be transferred to the more political stage 
for policy legitimacy (Wu, D., 2003).
As policy coordination is a central issue in the thesis, theories about 
intergovernmental relations and governance and related discourses are relevant to the 
topic. The role o f actors and the functions o f organisations are also important 
considerations in policy coordination. Without an understanding o f personal networks, 
it is difficult to uncover the reciprocity among actors within institutions. As this 
research focuses on policy coordination from the neo-institutionalist perspective, an 
exploration o f networks present a channel through which to investigate policy 
coordination in depth.
2.3 The Need for Coordination in Planning: Spatial Planning as an 
Answer to Policy Coordination
2.3.1 The rise of spatial planning
In the 1980s, Europe experienced a retreat from strategic planning caused by the
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dominant neo-conservative approaches to planning and post-modern scepticism, both 
o f  which tend to see planning progress as something unpredictable which cannot be 
planned (Healey, 1997b). As a result, urban and regional planning then stressed 
land-use regulations and projects (Motte, 1994), and this was reflected in the revival 
o f  rundown sections o f  cities and regions (Friedman, 2004, p. 64).
However, in the context o f growing socio-political complexity, such as the increasing 
strength o f the movement for sustainable development, a growing concern for rapid 
and apparently random development, the problems o f fragmented planning, the 
dramatic increase in interest in relation to environmental issues (Ibid., p. 64), and the 
renewed emphasis on the need for long-term thinking (Newman & Thornley, 1996), 
planning discourses expanded. This expansion resulted in the call for a more strategic 
approach, and spatial planning, as a framework for cities and regions. Strategic spatial 
planning was eventually introduced to the European planning agenda in the 1990s 
(Albrechts et al.. 2001: Salet and Faludi, 2000).
Albrechts et al. (2003. p. 113) pointed to the significance o f strategic planning in the 
European experience as follows:
‘Strategic framew orks and visions for territorial development, with an emphasis 
on place qualities and the spatial impacts and integration o f  investments, 
complement and provide a context fo r  specific development projects. ’
According to the description above, spatial planning is thought o f as an 
implementation o f strategic planning in a specific territory. Thompson, R. (2000, pp. 
127-128) expands on this thought:
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‘[spatial planning] calls fo r the strategic management o f  spaces or territories in 
ways which organize land uses with a wider regard fo r  the balance between 
developmental and environmental objectives. It implies a more cross-sectoral 
and longer-term approach than ‘town planning
Allmendinger (2003) indicates that the shift towards a more cross-sectoral and 
long-term planning approach has passed through two stages. On the one hand, there 
has been a call for new and more effective mechanisms o f economic governance 
which suggests that priority should be given to ‘institutions. process and scale o f  
development planning that focuses upon the “region ”, and on the other hand, an 
emphasis on planning integration or a spatial strategy has been associated with the 
call o f governance therefore 'coordinating and integrating the processes, institutions, 
plans and strategies o f  public and (to a lesser degree) private bodies, is seen as 
contributing to the effectiveness o f  economic g o v e r n a n c e He then stresses again the 
significant role o f the region in the planning discourse to integrate local planning 
needs and coordinate cross-sectoral policies though he agrees the recognition o f  a 
region is still divergent.
2.3.2 Spatial planning for policy coordination
In spite o f  the vagueness o f the definition o f spatial planning. Nadin has identified 
five interconnected themes in the spatial planning approach (2007, p.53):
to focus on spatial development outcomes and make more effective use o f  the 
planning system to help achieve the goals o f other sectors;
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to influence and integrate the delivery o f  spatial policy - the spatial impact o f  
other sectoral policy - the spatial impacts o f  other sectoral policies; 
to inject a spatial or territorial dimension into sectoral strategies and policy; 
to create new policy communities that reflect the realities o f  spatial 
development and its drivers;
to use planning as a learning process - promoting understanding and 
argument in a collaborative political process.
The above themes illustrate the wide extent o f spatial planning, and imply that it is 
viewed as a mechanism for a more coordinated and integrated strategy as a whole. 
Nadin (2007) also identified policy integration as a common theme in all the above, 
though this theme is not a new concept since there has been comprehensive rational 
planning.
Referring to British experience o f spatial planning, Nadin (2007) drew attention to 
two approaches for planning integration: the creation o f formal policy statements as a 
spatial planning framework and the application o f  existing principles in relation to 
spatial planning (Ibid). The main difference between the two approaches is whether 
there is a need for a formal framework for spatial planning: while the former argues 
the strength o f  a spatial framework, the latter suggests the coordination o f existing 
rules and roles may work as properly as a framework.
The first approach, the concept o f creating a formal framework for spatial planning, 
has been welcomed by several professional academies, for instance; a report, 'The UK 
Spatial Planning Framework', released by the Royal Town Planning Institute argues 
that a guidance approach ‘allows fo r  inter-sectoral and macro-economic coordination,
essential fo r  tackling complex problems ’ (Wong et al., 2000, p. 109); none the less, the 
latter approach, the application o f existing principles approach, suggests the 
coordination o f  existing rules and roles may work properly as a framework, as in an 
action-network (Carley and Christie, 1998). Such an approach is a more flexible 
option based on a milieu o f mutual learning and collaborative work although it 
depends on how fa r  collaborative and synergistic actions are "owned” by many 
stake-holders' (Wong et al., 2000, p.l 10).
Although there are diverging recognitions o f spatial planning, many recognise the 
significant roles o f governmental activities, since spatial planning is somewhat a form 
o f governmental intervention interwoven with political and economic developments 
(Jorgenson, 1998, p. 11). Its evolution is seen as an outcome o f the development o f 
nation state and welfare state policies, since planning is often seen as a tool to 
promote state modernisation (Vigar et al.. 2000, p.8). If spatial planning was to play a 
role in national development, it is the land use planning system through which state 
policies would be delivered. Nadin (2007. p.56) emphasised the significance o f land 
use planning and stated 'the statutory nature o f  land use planning to deliver 
infrastructure and public service through planning process is a positive inducement to 
policy coordination’. This recognition implies a linkage between land use planning 
and spatial planning. As Harris et al. (2002, p.555) has indicated, town and country 
planning is still a significant and central element o f  spatial planning which is the usual 
method used by the public sector popularly to offer 'a  wider, principally 
governmental, activity to shape the future landscape in a space.
Since spatial planning was introduced to facilitate territorial governance and policy 
coordination, it is expected to create more coordinative planning and establish
linkages between actors, to balance demands for development with the need to protect 
the environment, and to achieve social and economic objectives. The European 
Commission (1997) referred to spatial planning as:
‘Spatial planning embraces measures to co-ordinate the spatial impacts o f  other 
sector policies, to achieve a more even distribution o f  economic development 
between regions than would otherw ise be created by market forces, and to 
regulate the conversion o f  land and property uses ’ (European Commission, 1997, 
p. 24).
Meanwhile in its ‘New Vision for Planning' (www.rtpi.org.uk), the Royal Town 
Planning Institute (RTPI) advocates the need o f spatial framework for the planning in 
the UK and briefly describes strategic spatial planning as:
'At its simplest, strategic planning is a systematic, integrated approach to 
policy-making taking fu ll account o f  context, resources and the long term, while 
regional planning occurs betw een local and national levels ’ (Dimitriou and 
Thompson, 2007, p .29).
Similarly, the Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA) states:
‘...strategic planning is increasingly becoming more comprehensive and 
inclusive, and it is no longer possible or desirable to separate out land use 
planning from other associated strategic activities and systems o f  
implementation’ (TCPA, 2003).
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Thus, the concept o f spatial planning recognises that major developments affect the 
quality o f  place and there cannot be an appropriate strategic plan without an 
understanding and vision ‘across a whole range o f  social, environmental, and 
economic issues that go far beyond the considerations o f  conventional land use 
planning, and taking a comprehensive and integrated approach over long time 
horizons/ In other words, one o f  the aims o f  spatial planning is to ensure effective 
and coordinated thinking and action across the full range o f sectoral and departmental 
concerns.
Notwithstanding, some still questions whether strategic planning is about coordination 
(Bryson and Roering, 1996). Moreover, some argue that coordination is not the main 
purpose o f  strategic planning:
...the intent is not to fully integrate strategies across levels and functions, but to 
deal w ith important issues as they arise, or can be expected to arise, albeit w’hile 
taking into account the need to co-ordinate in a reasonable way with entities and 
events elsew h ere' (Friedman, 2004, p. 58).
However, the fact is, with regard to the need for policy coordination, that national and 
regional planning policy in many European countries now attempts to embrace spatial 
planning as a 'strategic coordinating mechanism' rather than a strict statutory land use 
activity (Tewdwr-Jones et al., 2000, p.666). Thus spatial planning is seen as a 
mechanism for strategic coordination in relation to land use planning.
Accordingly, compared to land use planning, which is based on the regulation and 
control o f  land, spatial planning features include wide ranging crosscutting
coordination to ensure the appropriate land use in a sustainable approach. At the same 
time, when conducting spatial planning, relevant factors, for instance economic 
development, environmental protection, even employment, education and so on, are 
taken into account in producing a decision that is more conducive to sustainable 
development.
2.3.3 The implementation of integrated planning
There is, o f  course, the question as to what extent spatial planning can do anything for 
integrated planning. Although it is believed there are advantages o f  spatial planning 
for coordination, Healey (2001. p. 267) reminds us that spatial planning, in the UK 
case, may lead to less sectoral and more centralised planning than the planning model 
in the past. In other words, spatial planning may sometimes be a more centralised 
approach. As Harris and Hooper (2004. p. 151) points out:
*.. .there is a potential danger that strategic co-ordination o f  spatially relevant 
form s o f  sectoral planning could result in merely a new form o f  comprehensive 
planning, unless it also embraces the reconceptualization o f  both space and 
planning at the heart o f  recent debates on spatial planning. ’
There is no consensus as to whether a national spatial framework should be developed 
by central government for the coordination o f regional and local policy (Wong et al., 
2000; Stead and Nadin, 1999). Stead and Nadin (1999, p.357) welcomed such a 
framework, nevertheless, they point to the need for there to be more requirements for 
coordination at state level. However, Nadin (2007, p.56) questioned the benefit o f 
comprehensive policy integration and stated the advantages o f sectoral work. He 
stated:
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‘Separating out government activity into sector is an inevitable and 
beneficial approach to government. It allows specification and  
concentrated pursuit o f  more detailed objectives and it encourages 
beneficial competition among sectors. This is why the sectoral 
organisation o f  policy making is relatively robust. ’
His statement implies that town and country planning per se is also one o f the sectors! 
However, at a practical level, according to Harris and Hooper (2004, p. 150), the 
desire for horizontal integration o f public policy, or joined-up government, has driven 
the concept o f  spatial planning. Referring to the Welsh experience, they argue that the 
development o f a spatial planning instrument, such as the Wales Spatial Plan, can 
help to facilitate policy coordination across a wide range o f sectors. Public policy can 
therefore benefit not only from being developed in a more *joined-up* manner, but 
also from injection o f a spatial dimension into the process o f integrated policy 
development. Progress in practice, however, remains patchy (Harris and Thomas, 
2008).
To summarise, spatial planning means that policy activity in a certain space and place 
should be more integrated and coordinated. It is more like an exercise in networking 
which concerns the quality o f place than a single technical tool dealing with land use 
planning (Healey. 1997b). The key to spatial planning appears to be getting the 
institution/organisation involved to work in appropriate ways.
The aim o f the thesis is to explore and to analyse the institutional design for integrated 
planning activities since the institutional approach offers the possibility o f looking at
the operation o f  policy coordination in relation to planning and ascertaining if  the 
current mechanism is capable o f problem solving. The rise o f spatial planning in 
respect to the need for planning coordination just proves the significance o f the 
institution in planning discourses.
2.4 Analysing the Land Use Planning Process
The planning process, as a kind o f policy-making process, is various, complex and 
cannot be simply identified as any single event or policy outcome. As the planning 
process is viewed as a series o f decision-making activities, to analyse the land use 
planning process, it is necessary to explore how policy making works. In other words, 
it is necessary to explain the roles and activities o f each element within it.
2.4.1 The reinvention of planning issues
The land use planning process is sometimes seen as a process o f regularisation since 
plans made are more or less social regulations. The meaning o f 'regu la tion ', from its 
origins in French usage, is ‘the systematic patterning o f  practices through which the 
state shapes processes o f  capitalist accumulation’ (Vigar et al., 2000, p.40). The term 
does not specifically mean the 'regulatory form' o f a policy system or legal power, 
rather, it more widely refers to changes in the patterns o f capitalist production process 
(Painter. 1995; Le Gales, 1998). Such changes have influenced the meaning o f 
regulation which today refers to the formation o f institutions in governance, while the 
term 'governance' includes governmental actions and collective coordination with 
governmental bodies and the private sector.
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Painter (1995, pp.278-279) interprets the mode o f  regulation as:
‘...the set o f  social, cultural and political supports which promote the 
compatibility between production and consumption in the regime o f  accumulation.
These supports operate through particular norms, networks and institutions 
which are the outcomes o f  social and political conflicts. ’
As a result, Vigar et al. (2000. p.21-22) concludes:
‘The distribution o f  form al responsibilities within planning systems has an 
important structuring effect on planning practices, specifying in legal terms who 
has the pow er to use the different tools, to change the tools and oversee others in 
their use ’.
Cullingworth (1993) points out that this kind o f distribution crosses levels o f  
governance, and may include both public and private sectors. However, it is worth 
noting that this pattern may vary over different countries.
In Europe, a new planning discourse is developing in which there is a rediscovery o f 
place and territory (Vigar et al., 2000). This is due to economic globalisation and 
neo-liberalism, both o f which have resulted in the reduced significance o f the welfare 
state as a model for service delivery. Generally, it is believed the rise o f spatial 
planning and the rediscovery o f place and territory are due to economic globalisation 
impacting on the welfare state as an institutional design for service delivery. In these 
circumstances, the role o f  the nation state is being challenged by global competition. 
Moreover, the focus o f service delivery has gradually shifted from central government
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to the locality.
Both changes have had a big impact on governmental structures, especially those that 
have traditionally been highly centralised as in the UK (Rhodes, 1988). The result has 
been less effective service delivery along with fragmented policy outcomes. Against 
this background, many stress the need for horizontal integration for territorial 
development, due to distrust in the vertical hierarchy and the increasing attention paid 
to establishing a policy framework for policy coordination. Regionalism and localism 
have begun to challenge centralised state power since the 1990s onwards (Bradbury 
and Mawson, 1997).
While the role o f  state in economic policy has decreased, there has been a rise in local 
involvement in regional economic developments, and individual networks have 
become more active in the policy-making process. Therefore, at the sub-national level, 
policy concerns have switched to regional and local governance and the capacity to 
coordinate policy diversity to develop strategies taking account o f economic 
development, sustainability and well-being so on (Vigar et al., 2000, p.8).
2.4.2 Approaches to analysing the planning process
In this research, the approach to analyse the planning process is intended to sharpen 
the analysis o f  planning by examining the relationship between actors which interact, 
cooperate or compete in the planning process. However, it is never easy to decide 
upon an analytical approach, since not only relevant sectors vary as a result o f the 
instruments and resources available, but also the planning process consists o f 
crosscutting interactive communications. Given the difficulty o f carrying out policy 
process research, many studies are purely descriptive and researchers simply map all
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the relationships and roles o f related organisations and individuals and then turn the 
insights gained into a picture for their readers to view (Hudson and Lowe, 2004).
Although there are many planning process theories, any analytical approach chosen 
should incorporate insights from successful policy research. Any analysis o f the 
planning process, as mentioned above, should attempt to ascertain how planning 
process works and what the relationships are within it. According to John's words 
(1998, p. 15), there are broadly five political science approaches or theories that can 
explain how policy is made and implemented:
1. Institutional approach;
2. Group and network approach;
3. Socio-economic approach;
4. Rational choice theory;
5. Ideal-based approach;
Each approach or theory offers its explanation o f  different sectors and interprets the 
reasons for policy change. However, this thesis does not intend to discuss in detail 
rehearse the recognised strength and weakness o f each approach for policy making 
analysis (see, e.g. John, 1998), rather, its aim is to explore the potential o f a broadly 
institutional approach for understanding planning in Taiwan, with particular reference 
to policy coordination.
Importantly, the institutional approach, among John's five approaches above, is strong 
in relation to the constraints that actors face, the norms and habits o f policy making in 
different policy systems and subsystems. As John (1998, p.63) points out: good
institutional analysis recognizes that institutions are constraints and that they vary 
across space and time. ’It is argued that the rules and norms are key features o f policy 
making, and the institutions, the arenas in which policy-making take place, affect 
policy outcomes. The definition o f institutions here includes all significant elements 
in the political system, for instance, organisations, laws, norms and rules. Institutional 
approach argues that institutions define how a political system works. It is difficult to 
deny this since, institutional subjects, such as the rules, organisations, norms and so 
on. take the central place in political science (John, 1998, p.38).
Leftwich (1984. p. 16) points out that there are two traditional focuses in this 
discipline: the study o f institutions o f government and the study o f political thought. 
However, political institutions are one o f the pillars o f the discipline o f politics (Ibid.). 
As Eckstein (1963, pp. 10-11) indicates:
If  there is any subject matter at all which political scientists can claim 
exclusively for their own, a subject matter that does not require acquisition o f  the 
analytical tools o f  sister-fields and that sustains their claim to autonomous 
existence, it is, o f  course, the form al-legal political structure. ’
Due to its significance in policy making, government institution will be discussed in 
Chapter Three and applications o f the neo-institutionalist approach will be revealed in 
the following chapters. For understanding o f institutional theory, the sections below 
will introduce institutionalism and illustrate its significance.
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2.5 The Significance of the Institutionalist Approach
2.5.1 Definition of institutions
Before discussing the significance o f the institutional approach, it is worth identifying 
what an institution is. However, there is wide variation in how institutions are defined 
since there are many institutional forms and varying views on why institutions are 
held to matter. In fact, the justification o f the definition o f  institutions used in a study 
is highly reliant on the research perspective taken by the researchers (Jessop, 2001, 
p. 1214). For example, if  the researcher adopts a broad definition o f institutions, they 
can be interpreted as the culture, traditions and social norms o f the context under 
investigation. If  the researcher adopts a narrow definition, an institution may be 
understood as government and the legal system. Therefore, the understanding o f 
institution is based on the viewpoint which a researcher takes and the interpretation 
can be various.
Hence it is not surprisingly that the view o f institutionalism is vague and so is its 
definition. From the political science viewpoint, institutionalism is thought o f as an 
approach that regards political parties as having some capacities to adapt to the 
external environment, but, on occasion, it also sees them as ‘prisoners* o f their own 
history as an institution*. Institutionalists analyse social phenomena through a party's 
history and believe the context determines the party's reaction today. Therefore, 
institutions can be rules that determine the decision-making process, as a result o f this 
acknowledgement, both formal and informal elements, such as organisations, agents, 
norms and policy-making procedures, can be identified as institutions.
According to John (1998), institutions, including political organisations, laws and
35
rules, are the arena within which policy-making takes place and constrain how 
decision-makers behave (John, 1998, p.38). Not only do institutions distribute powers 
and responsibility between sectors, but also arrange obligations and coordinate 
conflicts between organisations.
With regard to its function in political operations, the institution plays a significant 
role in political science as a result o f its function in defining how a political system 
operates, especially in the initial decision-making process. The importance o f 
institutions in classic political theory work also strengthened their significance. 
However, despite their importance, public policy researchers highlighted the 
importance o f  rational planning or the role o f groups rather than institutionalism. 
Institutions did not attract much attention from academics until the early 1980s when 
decision-making returned to the centre o f political science (Ibid. p.39).
As a result o f the institutional distribution o f power and responsibilities in the political 
system, it is expected that there should be structural equilibrium between institutions 
whereby political purposes can be achieved. Therefore. legislatures, executives, 
bureaucracies and judiciaries are in charge o f their own duties to reinforce both the 
effectiveness and legitimacy o f  government. In such a functionalisf view, institutions 
seem not to be independent from the policy-making process since they process 
demands from the political system and transfer them to policies (Easton, 1965). John 
(1998) described institutions as 'neutral transmission belts' transmitting political 
actions from the society to the executive and legislative authorities, which then 
deliver them to bureaucracies to return in the form o f policies (John, 1998, p.39). 
Figure 2.1 shows the action institutions generate and the policy outcomes to society.
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Figure 2.1 The Concept of the Institution in Functionalism
Source: Based on John (1998. chapter three)
Similarly, March and Olsen (1984, p.738) points out the significance of 
institutions in political democracy:
f
Political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but 
also on the design o f  political institutions. The bureaucratic agency, the 
legislative committee, and the appellate court are arenas for contending social 
forces, but they are also collections o f standard operating procedures and 
structures that define and defend interests. They are political actors in their own 
right. ’
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The description above indicated the role o f political actors in institutions. In spite o f 
the assumption by some functionalists that a proper division o f  power improves the 
policy-making process as some functionalists argue (Birch, 1964), few 
institutionalists pledge it today, since there is no evidence to prove that political 
systems operate in the interests o f citizens within a democracy, and many criticise the 
failure o f the political system to deliver effective and legitimate policies (Ibid., p.40).
As previously mentioned, what an institution is dependent on the theoretical approach 
o f the researcher. Some narrowly define institutions as organisations, e.g. states, 
corporations, that arch over societies and comprise economies and give coherence to 
both, while, for others, they are the sedimented structures o f  power and privilege 
manifest in such social relations as class and patriarchy' (Beauregard, 2005, p.206). 
However, for some, institutions are even thought o f as those ‘enduring beliefs and 
values*, e.g. culture or national identity, which influence individual behaviours. The 
variety o f  definitions shows the complexity o f  institutions: moreover, ‘even the 
categorization scheme leaves open numerous possibilities fo r  interpreting what might 
be an enduring value (say, individualism) or an organizational form  (say, civil society) 
in need o f  transformation' (Beauregard, 2005, p.206).
The definition o f the institutions in this study incorporates a somewhat meaning: not 
only organisations and agencies but also conventions, networks and culture can be 
seen as kinds o f institutions. While a wider view is taken, this does not mean 
everything is included as an institution in this research. According to Searle (2005), 
an institution is thought o f as ‘any collectively accepted system o f  rules (procedures, 
practices) that enable us to create institutional fac ts  ’. He interprets further:
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‘The creation o f  an institutional fac t is, thus, the collective assignment o f  a status 
function. The typical point o f  the creation o f  institutional facts by assigning status
functions is to create deontic pow ers  Once an institution becomes
established, it then provides a structure within which one can create institutional 
facts  (Searle. 2005, p .10).
Searle points out that social recognition determines the existence o f  an institution, that 
is to says, without social consensus, acknowledgment, and acceptance o f the deontic 
relationships, there would not be an institution. Accordingly, an occasional network or 
a contingent meeting cannot be regarded as an institution due to the lack o f common 
cognition. However, once there is a tacit agreement and general perception, even an 
irregular party or intangible web o f life could be thought o f  as an institution.
2.5.2 The significance of the institution in relation to policy studies
If the definition o f institution is so vague, what is its significance in relation to social 
studies? Importantly, the institution is thought o f  as a collection o f individual 
behaviour. Moreover, its feature o f multi-dimensional roles also makes the institution 
a considerable factor in social research, as Hall (1986, p. 19) explains:
'Institutional factors play' tw o fundamental roles in this model. On one hand, the 
organisation o f  policy- making affects the degree o f  pow er that than any one set 
o f  actors has over the policy outcomes... On the other hand, organisational 
position also influences an actor s definition o f  its own interests, by establishing 
in his institutional responsibilities and relationships to the actors. In this way 
organisational factors affect both the degree o f  pressure an actor can bring to 
bear on policy and the likely direction o f  that pressure. ’
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The quotation illustrates institutional influences outside the formal institutions o f 
government and thus takes a broader concern o f  the role o f institutions located within 
society and the economy (Hall, 1986, p.20). It is suggests, therefore, that the policy 
process has to be seen as an outcome consisting o f several organisational contexts, i.e. 
‘norms, values, relationships, power structures and standard operating procedures' 
(Hill. 2005. p.81).
Even though most agree the institution is an important factor in social science studies, 
on occasion the institutional approach is not acknowledged explicitly. As Rhodes 
(1997. p. 63) points out. it is not easy to describe an approach to political study when
... the people who practise it never discuss it. In other words, the focus on 
institutions was a matter o f  common sense, an obvious starting point fo r  studying 
a country and, therefore, these w as no need to justify it. ’
Indeed, it is difficult to analyse institutions because we live within them and the 
ambiguous nature o f institutionalism has led some to view institutionalism as ‘fragile  
achievements, filam ental and reversible accomplishments ’ and to doubted the worth 
o f  the institutional approach in scientific research (Philo and Parr, 2000, p.518). On 
the other hand, the vague definition allows the institutional approach to be used by 
different theorists with various methodologies depends on their trajectory or location 
beforehand and the context in which institutions are said to matter. As a result, neo­
institutionalists do not see institutions as fixed and irreversible. Moreover, since an 
institution is not a coherent or singular object, additional methods, for instance, 
actor-network and ethnomethodological methodologies, are helpful to explore its
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fluidity, heterogeneity, reversibility, and polyvalence ’ (Jessop, 2001, p. 1219).
With regard to planning, institutions are also highlighted in relation to planning issues 
which have arisen over the last decade. For instance, a new discourse emphasising on 
‘economies o f  space’ has gradually replaced the issue about ‘space o f economies’. 
Thus, the importance o f the institutional design is placed at the centre o f  regional and 
local development (Sassen, 2001). Further, the concept o f  the institution is no longer 
narrowly confined to a physical structure; reversely it can include a robust social 
context such as a network, culture, tradition, governance, and localisation. These 
informal elements are referred to by some academics as 'social capital’ (Groth, 2000).
Though some (Innes, 1995, p. 140) have argued that ‘planning is institutional design', 
Alexander (2005, p.210) suggests, ‘planning often demands institutional design ’. 
Institutional design is in fact an integral and essential part o f many planning and 
planning-related practices for the following reasons. First, the planning process itself 
is a kind o f institutional design and. secondly, institutional design is the answer to 
how a policy or plan should be operated. Alexander therefore contends there is a 
requirement to create ‘new inter-organizational linkages or transformation o f  existing 
networks, to concert the necessary decisions and actions among the involved 
organizations' (Ibid.).
2.5.3 The traditional institutional approach to social study
According to Rhodes (1997, p.64), the traditional institutional approach is descriptive, 
form al-legal and historical-comparative. The descriptive approach describes what is 
happening in a temporary situation and is used as a tool to explore the panorama o f 
institutions as a whole (Butler, 1958, p.48). Kavanagh (1991, p.482) identifies this
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method as a systematic description with an emphasis on explanation and 
understanding rather than formulisation. In short, there are two important meanings to 
descriptive-induction: first, the facts speak refers for themselves (which is criticised as 
‘secondary-even dangerous’). Second, through observation the truth o f the situation 
will come to light (Landau, 1979, p. 133).
Formal-legal inquiry has two emphases: the term, ‘legal*, refers to public law and the 
term, ‘formal’, refers to formal governmental organisations (Eckstein, 1979, p.2). This 
approach focuses on the study o f written constitutional documents but extends beyond 
them. The term ‘constitution* here is defined as ‘the system of fundamental political 
institutions' (Finer, 1932, p. 181). Formal-legal inquiry has been very influential at 
times and though it has less importance now, it remains a characteristic o f the study of 
political institutions (Drewry, 1995).
Historical- comparative is also a classic method in the study o f political institutions. It 
was used by Herman Finer, who did not employ a country-by-country approach but 
compared institution-with-institution across countries. He argues that such method is 
scientific since it explains objectively the why and wherefore o f  things through the 
survey o f main political institutions in not only their legal form, but also in their 
operation (Finer, 1932). For Finer:
‘The State is a human grouping in which rules a certain power-relationship 
between its individual and associated constituents. This power-relationship is 
embodied in political institutions ’(Ibid., p.l 81).
A significant contribution o f Finer is that he viewed political institutions as
instrumentalities and explored both the evolution o f  institutions and the operation 
occurring within (Rhodes, 1997, p.67).
The traditional institutional approach is descriptive and inductive and has attracted 
many critics related to its characteristics, particularly from American behaviouralists, 
the most influential o f whom was David Easton. Easton argued for a systematic 
conceptual framework which could identify political variables and relationships. He 
found the study o f  political institutions could not explain policy, since it did not 
include all variables. Moreover. Easton stated that hyperfactualism o f  the institutional 
approach ignored The general framework within which these facts could acquire 
meaning' (Easton, 1971, p.75-89). Another behavioural scientist (Macridis, 1963, 
p.47-8) contended that historical-comparative study was ‘excessively formalistic in its 
approach to political institutions'. It was ‘insensitive to the non-political determinants 
o f  political behaviour', and was ‘descriptive rather than problem-solving. or analytic 
in its method
It is illustrated that the methodology o f the study o f  political institutions attracted 
criticism. Behaviouralists claim that historical methods are not scientific because they 
stress individual cases and cannot generate systematic outcomes to structure the 
behaviour o f governments. The formal-legal approach is inadequate because o f ‘the 
gap between the form al statements o f  the law and the practice o f  government ’ 
(Blondel. 1976, pp.20-5, 68-72 and 127-8).
However, Rhodes' (1997, p.68-70) refutes such criticisms by arguing M acridis's 
criticisms cannot be applied to all institutional approaches, particular in respect to 
Herman Finer's achievement. Moreover, there is no perfect approach and
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behaviouralism has its limits, too. Therefore, the institutional approach, as a research 
method, is not a big problem in itself and can be used as a scientific method with a 
systematic methodology.
Nevertheless, some criticisms do identify real weaknesses in the institutional 
approach as sometimes practised. For instance:
Some early or classical approaches to po litics  have overstated the formal
nature o f  regular procedures and given insufficient weight to the less form al 
processes which themselves become institutionalised through repetition or 
duration over time ’(Gould, 1987, p.291).
In spite o f his criticism, Gould also recognises the positive contributions o f the 
institutional approach:
7/ does not ... follow  that we can. or should, dispense with a concept that 
pinpoints regular processes or mechanisms fo r  channelling certain activities, 
meeting certain recurrent challenges and contingencies and setting 
disagreements on and about the allocation o f  values- or indeed determining what 
the values are which will be allocated in a given territory in a specific era. ’ 
(Ibid.).
In summary, an institutional approach that focuses on the constraints o f institutions is 
still helpful but ‘implicit assumptions must give way to an explicit theory within which 
to locate the study o f  institutions ’(Rhodes, 1997, p.71).
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2.5.4 Neo-institutionalism and its critics
Compared to 'o ld ’ institutionalism, neo-institutionalism, a label which was given to 
the amalgamation o f  the traditional and behavioural school o f political science in 
about 1970, is thought o f as a theory focusing on developing a sociological view o f 
institutions and the relationship between institutions. Neo-institutionalists stress the 
effect o f  interaction among institutions and argue it affects institutional activities and 
decisions. They recognise institutions operate within, and are shaped by an operating 
environment, and. in the meantime, they are also struggling to survive in it. Thus, for 
example, institutions are forced to operate more economically in society because they 
cannot exist if  the transaction costs are greater than the benefits o f the operational 
activities (Calvert, 1995, p.60).
In response to criticisms traditional institutionalism, the neo-institutionalist 
perspective, as a revised institutional approach, stresses rules and norms in institutions, 
and embodies ‘cogn itive a n d  norm ative fra m es  which construct “m ental m aps ” an d  
determ ine p ra c tice s  a n d  b eh a v io u rs ' (Surel. 2000. p.498). These organised contexts 
all operate within the terms o f political discourse, which normally have a specific 
configuration where some elements are more dominant than others (Hall, 1993, p.289). 
Therefore, policy change only occurs as the ideological terms change.
Since the neo-institutional approach adopts a broad viewpoint on social research, the 
justifications for institutions can differ in differing circumstances. This therefore leads 
to a question: if  institution might be changed by shifts in circumstances, what is the 
extent to which these shifts can be explained independently o f other events? Hill 
concludes that ‘there may be differences between nations and differences between 
policy subsystems, in the extent to which such changes occur' (Hill, 2005, p.85). This
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is a limitation o f the institutional perspective.
Commenting on the institutional approach, March and Olsen (1984, p.747) stated:
‘ ...neo-institutionalism is probably better viewed as a search fo r  alternative ideas 
that simplify the subtleties o f  empirical wisdom in a theoretically useful 
way... The institutionalism we have considered is neither a theory nor a coherent 
critique o f  one. It is simply an argument that the organisation o f  political life 
makes a difference
According to the above quotation, there are two problems with the neo-institutional 
approach. First, the institutional theory collects together a wide range o f potential 
constraints and it is necessary to make distinctions between these constraints in order 
to explore what such constraints involved. Secondly, institutionalists stress norms and 
ideologies that imply today we are all institutionalists' (Frederickson and Smith, 
2003, p.69).
These problems, especially the second one, have been widely commented upon by 
sociologists. For example, John (1998, p.64) argues:
‘The main problem with the neo-institutionalist approach is its definition o f  what 
counts as institutional. By incorporating values and norms as part o f  institutions, 
they include too many aspects o f  political life under one category. The resulting 
amalgam o f  processes appears to explain change under the rubric o f  institutions, 
but in reality it disguises the variety o f  interactions and causal mechanisms that 
occur between the contrasting elements o f  the political system  ’.
Further, he contends that ‘...there is no institutional approach, institutions are ju s t one 
factor constraining public policy choices ’ (Ibid., p.65).
Based on John's assertions, neo-institutionalism may seem to offer little for policy 
process research since, as argued, the institution is just ‘one* factor within the 
environment where many other elements exist. Many criticism o f institutionalism is 
related to the weaknesses o f the institutional approach for the conceptualisation o f 
theory. It is therefore important in such research to clearly define the territory or 
boundary o f  an institution in order to make the conceptualisation o f theory more 
acceptable and mitigate criticism.
As previously asserted, institutions do matter. The institutional approach, especially 
neo-institutionalism, remains a useful analytical method to understand the policy 
making process, especially if used sensitively and with acknowledgement o f its 
limitations. The first significance o f the neo-institutionalist approach is that o f 
‘bringing the state back in* (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985), while ‘old* 
institutionalism was countered by reasserting the importance o f the state. During the 
1950s and 1970s. there was a lack o f the studies on state institutions although political 
science was very concerned with neo- liberal ism. The neglect o f state institutions in 
political science in these decades led to a lack o f understanding o f state functions. The 
rise o f neo-institutionalism therefore filled a vacuum in political discourses. Whilst 
classic Marxist theory tended to see the state as a supporter o f  the capitalist system, 
pluralist theory viewed the state as a neutral institution where interest groups would 
compete to control (Hill, 2005, p.78). Neo-institutionalists regard the state as a 
structured system influencing and perhaps constraining action whereas it may be an
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active entity with interests o f its own or it may contain actors with potentially 
conflicting interests (Ibid.). As a result, planners are seen as one o f the interest groups 
competing with or cooperating with other groups in a structured setting.
The second significance o f neo-institutionalism is its improvement on the 'old' 
institutionalism, which has been criticised for its narrow perspective on structure. 
Neo-institutionalism takes individual cognitive element and institutional relationships 
into account. Different from the previous institutionalism theory, neo-institutionalism 
claims that actors in institutions can behave in 'irrational ways' (DiMaggio and 
Powell. 1991) and it seeks to include irrational variables as it is contended they 
influence ideology. That is to say, institutionalists, especially neo-institutionalists, 
attempt to take into account the effects o f irrational variables since they believe 
ideological consensus represents an alternative for formal rules. Therefore, ideology 
becomes an alternative to formal rules. Neo-institutionalists use this approach to 
analyse market, economic, political and also public policy processes where 
institutional relations and individual behaviours are highlighted. Thus, 
neo-institutionalism looks at actual behaviour rather than only the formal rules, norms 
and structure o f institutions.
Finally, neo-institutionalists argue that social outcomes, such as planning policy and 
environmental change, are the result o f  both broad structural processes and the active 
involvement o f  agents (Rydin, 1993, p.74). Accordingly, the institutional approach is 
therefore welcomed for the analysis o f the interaction o f agents and individuals within 
institutions in order to ascertain the relationships between actors. As mentioned 
previously, neo-institutionalists argue that the state is neutral institution, therefore, the 
planning system is here thought o f as an arena where interest groups engage with each
4 8
other, sometimes competitively, sometimes not. The planning process, as a 
reallocation o f resources, is inevitably the central concern for relevant interest groups. 
Thus, the relationships between groups, power and organisations becomes the 
highlights o f neo-institutional theory.
Importantly, the neo-institutionalist perspective offers a critique o f other approaches 
to policy analysis and provides opportunities for looking at similar policy processes in 
different institutional contexts. As result o f these features, the neo-institutional 
approach is widely used to explore social policies in terms o f planning decision and 
the planning process. Moreover, such approach points out the non-physical elements 
o f  the institutional environment and this is also one o f  its major contributions to social 
policy.
Though there are indeed some limitations to this approach, it can nevertheless be used 
to look at the relationships between vertical levels or horizontal sectors within policy 
making. For instance, while Beauregard (2005) questions the definition o f institution 
as elusive; nevertheless, he cannot deny the neo-institutionalist argument, ‘to act 
within an institution is also to act on it ’ (Beauregard, 2005, p.206), and the very value 
o f  neo-institutionalism is its recognition o f the significance o f reciprocity between 
institutions and actors. Accordingly, this study adopts the neo-institutionalist 
perspective because it is a helpful approach to explore the role institutions play in the 
planning process.
It is also worth mentioning that the neo-institutionalist approach should be used only 
with an explicit theoretical context, and a systematic analysis framework. Based on 
scientific principles, though the neo-institutionalism is not perfect, it does offer an
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opportunity to understand what happens within the policy-making process. Given the 
aforementioned reasons, the significances and contributions o f the neo-institutional 
approach cannot be denied.
2.6 The Embeddedness of Institutions in the Social Context and 
Political Culture
2.6.1 The connection between the social context and institutions
Though most economically developed countries adopt a similar structure for state 
government, institutions embodying their own traditions, cultures and political 
contexts are still various since all formal structures and regulations inevitably alfect 
how current political decisions are made. Therefore, an individual institution reflects 
such background factors, for instance, complex political behaviours and the policy 
making process that it inherits.
As a result o f the fact that, the justification for the institutions relies on the social and 
cultural context o f the society, it can be seen that history has played a significant role. 
Comparing institutions in the UK and USA, John (1998) points out that the legacy o f 
a medieval governing system in the UK has implications for the practice o f secrecy 
and closed decision-making. Older traditions and practices still remain to shape a less 
open democratic public policy-making process although the UK has had the 
procedures o f a modem democracy in place for some time. On the other hand, the 
traditional American democracy embodying divided government and a more open 
policy-making process still operates everywhere in the USA (Ibid., p.41). In short, 
Dyson (1980) concludes that each country has its state traditions which are a mixture
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o f a culture's ideas and institutions.
This implies that institutions are influenced by their political environment and then 
adapt it. Thus, some contend that institutions have a self-adjustment mechanism to 
respond to changing circumstances whereas, others argue that institutions are 
potentially dysfunctional since they make wrong adjustments and are in a worse 
condition during social and political change (Linder and Peters, 1990).
Compared to traditional institutionalists, neo-institutionalists admit the influence o f 
individual behaviour on formal institutions and realise that physical institutions and 
individuals interact with each other. The justification for institutions in 
neo-institutionalism hence offers a ‘double-natured’ core, the role o f individual 
behaviour and the influence o f  social structure, which creates a dilemma, since on the 
one hand, the structure is important and it affects individual behaviour; while on the 
other hand, it cannot be denied that individual behaviour influences the structure 
(Lane and Ersson, 2000, p.24). Though neo-institutionalists agree that individual 
behaviour does indeed influence the institution within which it exists, they argue this 
fact does not affect the importance o f embeddedness in the social context.
Some institutionalists also believe the formal procedure forms the policy process and 
under such condition, institutions set regulations and define the norms o f the political 
system (Johnson, 1975). Such institutionalists generally believe an institution leads to 
a ‘standard operating procedure' as a guideline for decision-making in each 
organisation. This explains why the institutional framework is thought to affect the 
policy-making process.
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2.6.2 Different institutionalism schools of thought with reference to society and 
culture
Hall and Taylor (1998) identified three institutionalism 'schools o f thought': the 
historical approach, the rational choice approach, and the sociological approach.
'Historical institutionalism’ is a traditional approach stressing the significance o f 
organisations and identifying institutions as ‘systems o f  form al and informal rules, 
norms and practices in polities or political economies ’. Historical institutionalism 
provides ‘a broad long-range perspective, focuses on path-dependency' and provides 
*a heightened awareness o f unintended consequences'.
Some may argue historical institutionalism is empirically based in history and 
political science, and oriented primarily to the institutional analysis. Accordingly, it is 
not relevant for normative institutional design (March and Olson, 1984, p.747). On 
the other hand, others believe historical institutionalists have produced the most 
powerful network to emerge from the new institutionalist school (Hudson and Lowe, 
2004, p. 149). Further, the historical institutional approach focuses on social and 
political context (Pierson, 2001).
Rational choice institutionalism’ is connected with institutional economics. It 
assumes that an actor's behaviour is rational and intends to keep fixed values and 
preferences. This approach emphasises ‘the role o f strategic information and 
behaviour in institutional emergence and change' and it argues institutions originate 
from elaborate design and actors' agreement (Hall and Taylor, 1998).
‘Sociological institutionalism ’ is rooted in organisation theory. As a result, it inherits
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a perspective on institutional forms and procedures in organisations. Compared to the 
‘rational choice school’, the sociological approach suggests that institutional forms 
and practices are embedded in a iog ic  o f social appropriateness’ rather than ‘a logic 
o f instrumentality’, and they are based on institutionalisation in organisations instead 
o f strategic searches for maximum efficiency. This approach argues 
institutionalisation is a historic accumulation o f  cultural forms and social practices, 
hence it takes a broader view o f institutions which can include 'symbolic systems, 
moral values and societal norms' (Hall and Taylor, 1998).
For some critics, rational choice institutionalism is seen as a more scientific approach. 
For instance. Hall and Taylor (1996) comment that rational choice 
neo-institutionalists provide comparatively robust thought based on a thin conception 
o f rationality. In contrast, sociological and historical neo-institutionalists are less 
precise, especially when they explain the causal connections between institutions and 
individual behaviour. However Alexander (2005, p.209) argues that a blend o f  
‘rational choice’ and ‘sociological institutionalism' offers a useful basis for 
institutional analysis and design, since the former provides useful models and rigorous 
analytical methods and tools, and the latter can complement these with a theoretical 
foundation for analysing and inferring individual and collective preferences and 
values.
Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses but there is a common principle 
which should always be applied according to Jessop (2001, p. 1221):
‘.„it follows that institutional turns must always be specified in relation to
specific institutional properties, specific issues, and specific alternative ways o f
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explaining the phenomenon in question ’.
Although concepts relating to institutions can be imprecise, general and vague, with a 
cross and interwoven application, the institutional approach may offer an ideal 
approach to understand the workings o f society. As Amin and Thrift (1995, 
pp 101-102) contended that despite its limitation, the institutional approach help 'hold 
the key to understanding the workings o f the global economy'.
2.6.3 The significance of social and cultural elements to the institutional 
approach
Two o f the three institutional approaches, the historical and sociological approaches 
can make a significant contribution to the topic o f  this section, the embeddedness o f 
institutions in the social context and political culture. Sometimes, institutions may be 
viewed as organisations or social bodies which are significant for society and have a 
quasi-corporate role of. for instance, ‘legislative, executive, judicial branches o f 
government; trans-national firms, banks, or the peak organisations o f capital and 
labour; established religious faiths; and organisations more generally' (Jessop, 2001,
p. 1220).
But there is another distinction between institutions and organisations. While 
organisations are more 'program m ed\ p rescrip tive  p o litica l an d  adm inistrative fo r m s ’, 
institutions are ‘custom ary; an d  som etim es inform al ru les o f  p ra c tice  betw een  groups  
a n d  in d iv id u a ls’ (Storper, 1997, p.268). This distinction also reveals a noticeable 
feature o f neo-institutionalism, i.e. it stresses informal elements rather than only 
formal structure.
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For many neo-institutionalists who support a broader definition o f institutions, there is 
indeed a strong link between institutions and culture. As mentioned in previous 
sections, the proposed definition o f institutions depends largely on the respects in 
which they are held to matter. Thus it is inevitable that concepts o f institutions are 
often vague, diffuse, and mutually inconsistent and may even naturalise and reify 
institutions in the same way that neo-classical or rational choice theorists tend to reify 
human motivations (Alexander, 2005).
As regards the intangible factors o f institutions, i.e. culture and social context, many 
neo-institutionalists suggest these elements matter. Storper (1997, p.269) points to ‘a 
circular relationship between conventions and institutions'. He expresses this circular 
relationship as follows:
'Institutions have a strong effect, by generating regularity and precedent, in the 
formation o f  conventions that people employ to cope with the persistent and 
pervasive uncertainty o f  their interactions with other people in the economy. But 
by the same token, form al organized institutions can only function successfully i f  
the rules, procedures, incentives, and sanctions they establish are integrated into 
the conventions that guide people's behaviour. ... Successful form al institutions, 
then, have a hard organizational side, and a “soft ” conventional foundation ’.
Even in the social science field, institutions tend to be regarded as social practices that 
are regularly and continuously repeated and connected to defined roles and social 
relations, '...that are sanctioned and maintained by social norms, and that have a 
major significance in the social structure’ (Jessop, 2001, p. 1220). Examples o f 
institutions in this sense include the family, religion, property, markets, the state,
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education, sport, and medicine. Structuralists and regulation theorists sometimes use 
the concept o f  ‘structural forms’ to describe such institutions; other theorists have 
called them ‘apparatuses’ or ‘disposition ’ (Alexander, 2005).
On the other hand, sociological institutionalism sees culture itself as a form o f 
institution, since institutions give social life its meaning in the interactive and 
mutually constituitive relationship between institutions and actions (Hall and Taylor,
1998). Neo-institutionalists agree that institutions affect the environment and are also 
affected by the milieu to which they belong. Following this understanding, it is argued 
that all social elements and the cultural context interacting with institutions have roles 
in re-shaping institutions.
In addition, Amin and Thrift (1995) introduced the concept o f institutional thickness 
based on the conflation o f institution and organisation, since institutions are arenas in 
which various organisations compete with each other, cooperate to work, share 
information and develop mutual awareness. Accordingly, both formal and informal 
rules play roles within institutions, though there are still debates on the extent o f the 
importance o f informal and formal elements (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Discussions in 
previous sections indicate that the vagueness o f definitions for institutions makes it 
difficult to draw a line between formal and informal institutions because there is no 
clearly defined boundary between them. Therefore the concern o f neo-institutionalist 
is to look for an acceptable justification for institutions. This is also reflected in 
DiMaggio's new institutionalism which can be used to search for ‘common ground 
around particular ideas and approaches to obdurate problem s’ (DiMaggio, 1998, 
p.699). ,
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In addition, an institutional change never occurs in a vacuum; that is to say, the 
remains o f historical constraints will more or less influence the consequent institution 
(Shepsle. 1986). Ricker (1995, p. 121) similarly contended that: no institution is
created de novo... in any new institution one should expect to see hangovers from  the 
past. ’ Therefore, since any existing institution has inherited a past legacy, the 
embeddedness o f  an institution in the social context and culture may be viewed as a 
key factor to the current institutional design.
To summarise, despite the lack o f a clear definition o f an institution, all institutional 
approaches imply that institutions matter or 'they would not have major social 
structural significance' (Jessop, 2001. p. 1221). As a result, for a study seeking to 
adopt the neo-institutionalist perspective, the question which needs to be asked is: to 
what extent do institutions impact on ?
2.7 Conclusion
The first sections o f  this chapter showed that though there are limited academic works 
specifically mentioning policy coordination related to land use planning, there are 
many focusing on governance and intergovernmental relations which are relevant to 
the issue o f  coordination since they point to fragmented policy outcome and a need 
for integrated planning. The spatial planning concept as an answer to this requirement 
has received attention in the last decade.
As well >as the increasing interest in spatial planning or coordinated policy making, 
there is a rediscovery o f institutional design. Unlike the traditional institutionalism,
neo-institutionalism stresses not only structure but also informal norms such as 
culture and convention. This rectifies traditional institutionalism's neglect o f 
individual behaviour and offers a panorama view o f policy-making within institutions. 
However, there are criticisms o f neo-institutionalism, including the argument that the 
definition o f institution is too wide and still ambiguous.
However, this may not be a disadvantage in some social study cases since it leaves 
room for researchers to identify the constraints and scope o f neo-institutionalism, thus 
making the institutional approach more flexible and cross-sector study easier. As well 
as its flexible application, the institutional approach not only offers the opportunity to 
provide a inclusive viewpoint o f institutions and a better understanding o f operations 
within institutions (Jessop, 2001, p. 1218), some academics have demonstrated such 
approach to be a scientific research method (Storper, 1997, pp.268-270).
Due to the inclusive perspective o f the institutional approach and its advantage o f 
facilitating understanding informal norms and contexts, this thesis adopts a 
neo-institutionalist perspective to explore the policy coordination process, which is 
never a simple activity. The emdeddedness o f institutions is a primary concern of this 
thesis, which will endeavour to answer several research questions about the roles o f 
institutions in policy coordination with reference to planning. Chapter Three focuses 
on policy coordination in relation to planning in Taiwan and presents the research 
questions formulated for this thesis to address.
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Chapter Three Policy Coordination in Relation to 
Planning: The Taiwanese Case
This chapter will discuss policy coordination in Taiwan, especially that related to 
planning. It will also introduce the Taiwanese administrative framework and planning 
system to provide an understanding o f Taiwanese planning as a whole.
In order. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 review governmental institutions and political culture 
which have affected policy operation and shaped the context o f Taiwanese planning, 
while Sections 3.3 and 3.4 map the Taiwanese planning system as a whole, i.e. from 
national comprehensive plan at state level to local urban planning. Policy coordination 
as the focus o f  planning has been changing in response to globalisation and the 
democratic process, as will be illustrated in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. A short conclusion in 
Section 3.7 will finalise the research questions for the thesis. There is very little 
English language literature on these topics, and this chapter is, itself a contribution to 
planning knowledge.
3.1 Introduction
For many decades, Taiwan had been commonly regarded as an undemocratic country 
without an elected central government, and parliament, and public participation 
during policy making. Members o f the Legislative Yuan, the parliament, were not 
re-elected for forty-four years after 1949, and only local mayors and representatives 
o f local councils were allowed to be elected then. Democracy was not a main concern
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in the centre o f  politics until the 1980s when social movements were booming and the 
voice for a more democratic government spread nationwide (Chiang, M-H., 2000). As 
Chao and Myers (1998, p. 13) described:
The K M T’s limited democracy under martial law was rarely praised, but 
Taiwan’s economic development and social transformation became widely 
recognised and acknowledged... the KMT- dominated inhibited political center 
became even more inhibited by complex market processes and the rise o f  civil 
society, which encouraged an embryonic democratic process (Chao and Myers,
1998, p. 13).
Due to the vigorous democratic movement, the social and political culture, which had 
been stable for many decades, became subject to a number o f changes, such as the 
election o f members to the parliament, a presidential election, and changes in 
organisational cultures within political party cultures. By the end o f the twentieth 
century, as a result o f the movement towards democratisation, two significant events 
had occurred in Taiwanese politics: the Taiwan Provincial Government had been 
‘streamlined' to become a political symbol only, and the first change in ruling party 
had occurred after the DPP's victory in the Presidential election in 2000. These two 
historic events have affected not only the governmental structure but also have 
changed the nature o f  political operation (Chao, Y., 2002).
The institutional changes have led to some new challenges to politics, society and 
administration. Chiang, M-H. (2000) points to four primary problems facing 
government as a result o f the changing political context: the ‘black-gold’ or 
;gold-power’ culture; the centralised political power; regional disparities, and the
local administrative territory's inability to deal with local development needs. In this 
view, the ‘Black-gold' problem particularly, is the toughest problem to address. The 
term originally meant the local political factions and interest cliques which engaged 
with politicians and government officials to use their governmental powers for 
illegitimate private gain (Chen, M-T., 2001). Some argues this problem has resulted 
from the process o f democratisation: while political power relies on victory in the 
election campaign, the links between black (factions), gold (business) and power 
(bureaucracy) are thought to be closer than they should be and under-table 
relationship have become infamous features in the political culture o f Taiwan (Ng, 
1999). Today, the term ‘black-gold' or (‘gold-power') means not only the illegal 
linkage between political factions and interest cliques but also the situation where 
individuals and groups achieve their personal/political interests through their political 
relations (see Huang, D., 2003).
It is worth noticing that the planning system is the ideal market place for such 
business. The very close relationship between politicians and business has gradually 
destroyed public trust in governmental administration, though not every relationship 
is illegal. Further discussion o f Taiwan's political context will be found in Section 3.2.
3.2 Taiwan: Governmental Institutions and Political Culture
3.2.1 Governmental institutions in relation to planning
The governmental institutions in Taiwan was transffered from the system in Mainland
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China which was initially designed according to Sun Yat-Sen’s 1 theory, Three 
Principles o f  People. The current planning administration in Taiwan consists o f the 
central government and local government.
(1) The Central Level:
At the central level, the Executive Yuan under the President's supervision consists o f 
two primary planning authorities, the Council for Economic Planning and 
Development (CEPD) and the Ministry o f the Interior (MOI) (see Figure 3.1). 
According to the C E PD s official website, it serves in an advisory capacity to the 
Executive Yuan. The CEPD is responsible for:
Drafting overall plans for national economic development;
Evaluating development projects, proposals, and programmes submitted to the 
Executive Yuan;
Coordinating the economic policymaking activities o f Ministries and agencies; 
Monitoring the implementation o f development projects, measures, and 
programmes. (CEPD Website www.cepd.gov.tw, accessed 27th Apr 2006).
Under the CEPD (see Figure 3.2), the Department o f Urban and Housing 
Development has responsibility for preparing the National Comprehensive 
Development Plan (NCDP) and coordination o f urban and regional development, 
housing construction, environmental protection and related issues. It is also 
responsible for reviewing and studying policies in relation to land, housing, urban and 
regional development.
1 Sun Yat-Sen is called as Father o f  Republic o f  China.
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Figure 3.2 CEPD Organisation C hart 
Source: C EPD www.cepd.gov.tw  (Accessed 5lh Aug 2005)
The Department o f  Urban and Housing Development under the C EPD  is also 
responsible for reviewing the coordination and promotion o f  conservation, and 
important public investment and private participation so as to raise the quality o f  the 
living environment, establishing an efficient production environment and maintain
64
ecological and environmentally sustainable development.
Parallel to the CEPD, there is the Construction and Planning Administration (CPA) 
under the Ministry o f the Interior (MOI). The CPA consists o f ten operational units, 
including that is six departments and four administrative offices (see Figure 3.3).
The CPA manages a multitude o f affairs ranging from regional planning, urban 
planning, public housing, building regulations to public works. Those divisions 
related to land use planning are the:
Comprehensive Planning Division: it is in charge o f the drafting o f urban 
development policies, the revision and explanation o f urban planning laws, 
reviewing and approving urban planning cases as well as the planning, 
coordination and promotion o f metropolitan, new town and new community plans. 
Urban and Rural Planning Office: it is in charge o f national, regional, urban and 
local planning in Taiwan and related support activities, such as topographic 
surveying, information management, and studies o f urban planning reform.
Land Administration Division: it is responsible for services related to non-urban 
land zoning and land use control (CPA http://www.cpami.gov.tw/, accessed 22nd 
March 2006).
65
ON
Os
>
cera
N)Oo^4
(TQ3*n
u» 
u»
O■neraa:
o
3
M
V3
3a**■3■tre
O
O
M inistry o f  
the Interior
Construction 
and Plan ring 
A gency
Central Region  
Office
(Constructional)
- Council for National Land Planning Promotion
,|Regional Planning Committee
Urban Planning Committee
 Advisory Board, National Park Planning Committee
 Negotiation and direction committee o f acquiring public facility reservation land o f urban planning
 Construction Fund Management Committee
 the Organization of the Disciplinary Committee for Architects and the Disciplinary Action Review Committee for
Architects
— Building Technology Review Committee
 The Deliberation Committee o f Urban Design in Danhai New Town
   The Deliberation Committee o f  Urban Design in Kaohsiung New Town
 Promotion and Deliberation Committee o f Construction Broadband Channel Project
 Decreasing of occupational accidents task force .
— [C om prehensive Planning PivisiofT
 jUrban Planning D ivision]
 P u b l i c  Housing D iv ision
— National Parks D iv ision
  Building Adm inistration D ivision
— Public Works D iv ision
  Planning Adm inistration D ivision
~  Management A dm inistration D ivision
— Land Adm inistration D ivision
— Finance Adm inistration D ivision
— Building Engineering D ivision  
  Road Engineering D iv ision
— Environmental Engineering D ivision
— Construction D iv ision
— S ecretaria t  
" P erson n el O ffice
  Accounting O ffice
— C iv il Service E th ics O ffice  
( for  temporary m issions )
— New Town C onstruction D ivision  
  Urban Regeneration D ivision
- O f f i c e  of Senior Technician 
  Information Management O ffice
— Public R elations O ffice
Keriting National Park Headquarters 
. Yushan National Park Headquarters 
. Yangmingshan National Park Headquarters
■ Taroko National Park Headquarters
. Shei-Pa National Park Headquarters 
. Kinmen National Park Headquarters 
. Marin* National Park Headquarters
Land Reclamation O ffic e , Construction and Planning Agency 
Heavy Equipment C onstruction Corps, Construction and Planning 
• Agency
■ Urban and Rural Planning Office, Construction and Planning Agency 
•Northern Engineering O ffice  ( fo r  temporary m issions ) 
■Central Engineering O ffice  ( for temporary m issions ) 
-Southern Engineering O ffice  ( for  temporary m issions )
Sewage Systems O ffice  ( for temporary m issions )
In addition, the CPA’s superior ministry, the MOI, also supervises functional 
commissions which are relevant to land use planning, such as the Regional Planning 
Committee, National Park Committee, Urban Planning Committee, etc. Among them, 
the Urban Planning Committee and Regional Planning Committee are responsible for 
reviewing urban plans submitted by local governments and they play a significant role 
in the change o f  land use. Their functions will become clearer in the case studies 
presented in this thesis.
The head o f administration at the central level is the Premier o f the Executive Yuan 
who is appointed by the President and is scrutinised by the Legislative Yuan. Both the 
President and legislators are re-elected every four years.
(2) The Local Level
At the local level, between 1945 and 1999, there was a complex three-tier 
administrative structure before Taiwan Provincial Government was streamlined 
(1945-1999). Two metropolises, Taipei and Kaohsiung, are municipalities directly 
under the jurisdiction o f the central government, whilst the remaining territories 
belonged to Taiwan Provincial Government until 1999. Under Taiwan Provincial 
Government, there were 16 counties and 5 cities consisting of towns, villages and 
cities2 . The Taiwan Provincial Government was streamlinedJ as a result of
‘ There are three types o f  cities in Taiwanese administrative hierarchy, municipality e.g. Kaohsiung 
City, city equivalent to county, e.g. Tainan City, and city under a county, e.g. Banciao City under 
Taipei County.
J There is still a Taiwan Provincial Government O ffice appointed by the Premier o f  the Executive 
Yuan. The purpose o f  the Provincial Government O ffice is to maintain a connection with mainland 
China which the Republic o f  China government withdrew from in 1949. Maintaining a Provincial 
Government O ffice has becom e a sym bol to emphasise the perceived connection.
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Government Restructuring in 1999, and those planning authorities o f  the Provincial 
Government, i.e. the Construction Bureau, the Land Office, the Housing and Urban 
Development Bureau, and the Urban and Regional Planning Commission, were 
incorporated into the CPA. In other words, since 1999, the local level comprises two 
parallel systems: one is the municipality; and the other is the two-tier administrative 
structure, cities and counties and their following towns, villages and cities (Figure 
3.4).
The heads o f local governments are mayors o f  cities or magistrates o f counties who 
are re-elected every four years and are monitored by local councils which consist o f 
councillors re-elected every four years as well. There is an Urban Planning 
Commission in each city or county and its members are appointed by the mayor or the 
magistrate. However, the department at local level managing planning affairs can vary 
and is dependant on the structure o f local government. For the two municipalities, the 
Department o f Urban Development (Taipei City) or the Urban Development Bureau 
(Kaohsiung City) deals with planning activities, while there is an Urban Planning 
Commission appointed by the city mayor who is responsible for development control 
and planning permission.
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3.2.2 The tradition of strong bureaucracy and ‘rule of human’
Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Ching Dynasty in China in 1895. After a half 
century o f Japanese occupation, Taiwan reverted back to the control o f the republic o f 
China’s government. In 1949, Chiang, Kai-Shek, who had risen to power in the 
Kuomintang/Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in China, was defeated by the 
communists and withdrew with his KMT government to Taiwan. Taiwan’s 
governmental organisation initially followed the administrative framework o f the 
great China. Moreover, ancestors o f  most Taiwanese had immigrated to Taiwan from 
coastal China during the previous four hundred years. As a result o f the historical 
context, Taiwanese society retained a strong Chinese cultural and political tradition.
One o f the most important features o f the political tradition and operation is a strong 
bureaucracy which has dominated in China for thousands o f years (Cheng and Hsu,
1999). Huang, R. (1982), in his famous view o f macro-history, argues that such the 
dominant bureaucracy has been a major obstacle to political reforms in Chinese 
society over the centuries. Even today, despite the change o f ruling party from the 
KMT to the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) in 20004 , the dominance o f 
administration can sometimes cause an inaction o f policy according to Cheng, T-J.’s 
(2005) observation. The fragility o f the representative system might also be the cause 
o f strong bureaucracy according to Riggs (1997, p.l 18):
4 However, The KMT regained power in the 2008 Presidential Election.
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in countries whose representative instructions are fragile... the likelihood o f  
bureaucracy domination is greatest. This is clearest where mandarin traditions 
preceded the creation o f  such regimes
From a different angle, Waldo, D (1980, p.3) argued the development o f Western 
politics was democracy first (Greek style) and then bureaucracy (Roman system) 
followed. Cheng, T-J. (2005, p.87) states that, in contrast to the development o f the
Western politics, political development in Chinese-culture society (including Taiwan)
was a strong administration under the emperor for thousands o f years. In the case of 
Taiwan, democratisation has emerged relatively recently only.
Given the recent movement toward democratisation, does bureaucracy still dominate 
in Taiwan or is change taking place? In the era o f KMT rule between 1945 and 2000, 
bureaucracy was locked in an authoritarian regime i.e. the president o f KMT was 
always the President o f  Taiwan. When the DPP came to power in 2000, it accused the 
previous governmental administration o f ineffective management and blamed its own 
weak political control over the bureaucracy on the fact that most o f government 
officers remained loyal to the KMT3. As a consequence, there were severe conflicts 
between the DPP and the bureaucratic system6, and a tension called The new 
government vs. the old bureaucracy'7 emerged which reflected the difficulties facing 
the then DPP government. Although the institutional change in 2000 released
5 According to Y u’s (2002) investigation in 1999, 92% o f  director-generals in central government 
were members o f  the KMT w hile 85% o f  chairpersons and 70% o f  chiefs at the central level were 
members o f  the KMT. The higher the status, the higher the ratio o f  KMT members within the 
bureaucracy was.
6 U nited D aily  N ews 13th Aug, 2000 and 27th Sep, 2000.
7 U nited D aily  N ews 21st Oct, 2000.
administration from unitary political control and led to a multi-central governance, 
bureaucracy increased and there was an increasing division between the ruling party 
and the administration (Cheng, T-J., 2005, p.92-93). The conflict between The new 
government vs. the old bureaucracy’ therefore results in more problems in policy 
coordination.
Another feature o f the political operation is the so-called ‘rule o f human’ which has 
always played a significant role in the policy-making process or government activities 
(Liao and Hsu, 2002). Liao and Chien (2007) illustrated the 'rule o f law’ versus the 
‘rule o f human’ model in the form o f two diagrams (see Figure 3.5). They argue that 
the main difference between the two models is that in the second layers o f the ‘rule o f 
human’ model, the great person or some great men play a significant role.
The matter o f ‘rule o f human* leads to another issue o f interest, the importance o f 
personal social network. This relationship which is called ‘guanxi’8 in Chinese, is 
deeply rooted in Chinese-culture institutions and impacts on from international 
relationships to business enterprises (Ansfield, 2007). The effects o f such a solid 
network o f relationships has gradually attracted the attention o f Western academia 
(see Gold, Guthrie, and Wank, 2002) since the relationship network is an extremely 
important aspect o f Chinese-culture society, including that o f Taiwan (Rozman, 1991).
‘G uanxi’ is the pronunciation o f  the Chinese word,
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Figure 3.5 Rule of Law VS Rule of Human Model
Liao and Chien (2007, pp.7-8)
Many Chinese philosophers, for instance, Chi-Chao Liang (1873-1929) contended 
that the concept o f the ‘rule o f human' originated from ancient Chinese philosophy, 
Confucian humanism, which stresses the importance o f  maintaining social order and 
harmonising relationships9. In this context, law and legal process are the very last 
resorts for solving problem, since the individual is encouraged to yield to maintain 
social harmony (Liao and Hsu, 2002). As a result o f the concern to maintain harmony, 
resistance in Taiwanese society, especially in the public sectors, is unusual because 
public servants tend to follow orders, even when such orders conflict with regulations.
9 Liang was one o f  the great Chinese philosophers in the twentieth century and his thoughts on 
Confucianism can be obtained in the English version o f  his book, ‘H istory o f  Chinese P olitica l Thought: 
D uring the E arly Tsin P eriod ' published in London in 1930. However, the quotation cited in this thesis 
was borrowed from the Chinese version republished in Chinese by The Grand East Book in 1999.
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This has prevented public participation in public policy making because peoples are 
reluctant to express their opinions or concerns to avoid disharmony. Such concern for 
harmony influenced the relationship between individuals in institutions.
3.2.3 ‘Gold-power’ and the rise of local influence
As a result o f the social movements which emerged in the 1980s, citizens in Taiwan 
have gradually understood how to claim their right to a say in government and a more 
demanding civil society has therefore resulted (Hsiao, 1990). As to the development 
o f democratic movements, some observe Taiwanese society has shifted from ‘an 
intellectual guided society’ to ‘a preference or volition guided society ’ (Chu, C., 1991, 
p. 163).
The rise o f black-gold politics has been attributed by some to the movement towards 
democratisation from the 1980s when black and gold powers collaborated with local 
political groups to grasp planning power through public election (Chao, Y., 1996; Kao, 
2003). Black-gold power therefore spread quickly and affected policy-making in 
certain cases, though the KMT government attempted to eliminate this infamous 
connection (Chiang, T-S., 1996). As black-gold politics had become a structural 
problem which aroused public concern, the manifesto o f sweeping out black-gold 
culture stated by DPP Presidential candidate, Shui-Bian Chen, was particularly 
attractive. Chiang, T-S., (2005, p.94) even attributes Chen's victory in 2000 to the 
high public expectation o f a political scene devoid o f corruption.
The dramatic institutional change may be seen as a milestone in Taiwan's progress 
towards democratisation. Unfortunately, the power o f gold in political culture has not 
decreased with the development o f democracy. On the contrary it is widely thought
that the under the table relations between government and specific business bodies 
have transferred to a more sophisticated interlocking network. Accordingly, because 
this infamous connection did not disappear with the collapse o f  the old regime, when 
the DPP replaced the KMT in 2000, some argue it has become a problem embedded 
within institutions and call this institutional capitalism ‘white-gold’ (Tin, J., 2002).
Another reason for the linkage between gold power and the democratic process is the 
rise o f local political powers, which has partially resulted from a fiscal shortage in the 
central budget. Over past decades, Taiwanese planning was thought o f as plan-led 
planning since the national plans made by central government decided local 
developments. Notwithstanding that the rigid plan-led system based on zoning control 
had existed for decades, the shortage in the government budget and the amendment to 
the ‘Budget Distribution Act’ in the late 1990s10 forced central government to change 
the interventionist planning policy to a more market-led planning (Lu, 2001).
Market-led planning means a lower central budget and more local planning powers. 
The growth o f local political power resulting from deepening democracy in the 1990s 
has led to the development o f the entrepreneurial city (Lee, Lan, and Juang, 2005). 
Moreover, the new business-priority policy stated by the DPP government in 2001 
imposed neo-liberalism on Taiwanese planning. Therefore Taiwanese planning has 
been, in fact, changing as the political context has shifted from within (Chou, T., 2004, 
p.205). If the political culture and social context can be viewed as part o f institutions,
10 The budget o f  local governments in Taiwan had deeply relied on subsidies offered by central 
government. The amendment to the ‘Budget Distribution A ct’ in 1999 reallocated distribution o f  
central and local taxation, local governments now gain more financial resources from the taxation 
system.
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as discussed in Chapter Two, the dramatic change in political culture over the last 
decade would have affected Taiwanese planning.
3.3 The Planning Context in Taiwan
3.3.1 A hybrid planning system
The Taiwanese planning system can be thought o f as a complex combination o f 
different institutions cross-cutting various departments. Planning history in Taiwan 
can be traced back to the Japanese occupation (1895-1945). Between 1899-1911, an 
urban planning system was set up for major cities (Taipei, Taichung and Tainan) then 
a national land use planning system was completed for the establishment o f Taiwan as 
a military base for the Japanese invasion o f South Asia. In this blueprint, the Japanese 
colonial government defined Taipei as a political and economic centre, Taichung as an 
agricultural and light industry centre, and Kaohsiung as an industrial city. Three 
regional plans for Taipei, Taichung and Kaohsiung were therefore published as 
instruments to implement national planning. The legacy o f Japanese planning is still 
apparent in spatial development in Taiwan (Lai, T. 2001). For instance, the 1936 
Urban Plan Order land administrative system made by the Japanese colonial 
government was inherited after the Second World War when the Chinese KMT 
government replaced the Japanese regime in 1945 and there was no new planning 
system until the 1970s.
Moreover, the current Urban Planning Law was introduced as an urban land use 
planning regulation to mainland China in 1929 when Taiwan was still a Japanese 
colony. After the KMT government withdrew from China in 1949, the Urban Planning
Law was not revised until 1964 when the first amendment was made and concepts of 
regional planning were taken into account. The Regional Planning Act was published 
in 1974 and the first National Comprehensive Development Plan, and County and 
City Comprehensive Development Plan were therefore introduced in 1978. Since then 
the framework o f  a three layered plan hierarchy in Taiwan has been established.
The Taiwanese planning system is seen as an instrument for the government’s 
economic strategy and the purposes of planning have changed due to different 
concerns at different times (see Table 3.1). Spatial development in Taiwan has been 
highly affected by the political structure and social context. This is partly because o f 
Taiwan's developmental state strategy focusing on economic growth, and 
authoritarian rule determining the interaction between central-local relation, political 
groups and local stakeholders (Chou, T., 2004). Some researchers argue that the 
tensional relationship with China and domestic conflict between mainlanders and 
natives made the KMT government enforce autocracy and monopolise all policy 
resources, in particular economic development policy, after the Second World War 
(e.g. Lee, Lan, and Juang, 2005).
As a result o f its authoritarian rule, the KMT could control local power through land 
use planning which was used as a way to obtain enormous developmental gains. On 
the other hand, local governments had limited planning authority in relation to land 
use control, though they also collaborated with interest groups and big business as a 
coalition o f gain hunting (Chen, D., 1995). Intervention from central government 
weakened local planning authority and reduced the significance o f  land use planning, 
while Central economic policy was the dominant principle followed. With the 
development o f democratisation from the 1990s onwards, the competition between
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the KMT and the DPP reached a climax. Frequent election campaigns forced political 
parties to face the growing clamour for local democracy and loosened central control 
over local planning. On the other hand, it also impacted on the interest coalition at 
local level (Liang, Y., 2003).
3.3.2 The dominance of economic planning
Taiwan, due to the success o f its economic development policy, is generally viewed as 
a development-oriented country, since the central government has used the national 
development plan as a blueprint for the development o f the national economy. This 
feature o f a developmental state has affected economic development in Taiwan and 
has also had a strong influence on Taiwanese planning (Lee, Lan, and Juang, 2005).
Table 3.1 Purposes of the Taiwanese Planning System
Source: Lee, Lan, and Juang (2005) and Chou, T. (2004).
Before 1945 To support the colonial government’s aim o f building Taiwan as 
a base for the Japanese invasion o f  Southeast Asia.
1945-1970s To support the national economic strategy and to maintain 
political stablility.
1970s-mid
1990s
To make a layout o f population and land use.
Mid 1990s~ To coordinate planning authorities and to integrate relevant 
plans.
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An export-oriented industrialisation policy, based on state strategic intervention, was 
the development policy adopted by the Taiwanese Government in the 1950s to 1960s. 
According to Chou, T. (1999), the progress o f  export-oriented industrialisation 
resulted in a radical decline in the agricultural sector whereas industrial development 
rapidly increased. At the same time, the process accelerated industrialisation in 
Taiwan and stimulated urbanisation. Chou also points out that the rapid urbanisation 
that accompanied the pace o f industrialisation, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, 
led to regional disparities and spatial contradictions (Chou, T., 1999, pp.332-333). 
When metropolitan areas, such as Taipei and Kaohsiung, attracted most resources, 
capital and labour, during urbanisation, countryside areas lagged for behind and 
suffered from long standing depression.
Inheriting the mode o f  export-oriented industrialisation in the 1960s and 1970s, urban 
and regional development in Taiwan has inevitably engaged with the global economy 
and has headed towards global city building and regional competition (Hsia, 1993; 
Shih, 1998). However, regional disparity has widened drastically as the result of 
outstanding performance o f  economic growth, and a rigid planning system with its 
parallel urban and non-urban land use control system has been considered an obstacle 
to economic development (Hsing, 1999).
The spatial contradictions in regional development have been mainly caused by the 
devoid o f coordination between individual development plans which have been 
usually been designed with their own focuses (Chou, T., 2004). Industrialisation 
created rapid population movement to the major big cities, Taipei and Kaohsiung, and 
such change led to polarised development and uneven regional development. As a 
result o f this unwelcome side effect o f the national economic strategy, the impact o f
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economic development policy on land use planning has begun to attract the 
government’s attention.
Other changes have also occurred over the past decades. Although economic 
development in Taiwan has been dominated by central government since the first 
Four-year Economic Plan11 announced in 1953, some significant events occurred in 
the 1990s which have reduced its power, in particular the introduction of ‘Local 
Government A ct’, and the election o f mayor and magistrate12 (Huang, G-T, 2000). 
The ‘Local Government Act’ provides justification for local economic planning; 
however without central financial support, local governments cannot have their own 
economic development strategies (Chang, Y., 2005, p.47). As a result, any new 
economic project supported by the central government budget is always welcomed 
and thought o f  as an opportunity to promote the local economy.
As a typical developmental state, the primary planning agency in the Taiwanese 
planning system is the central government (Lee, Lan, and Juang, 2005) which has 
most financial resources and is the dominant decision-maker in the planning system. 
Notwithstanding, local government is increasingly gaining in influence in relation to 
central authority in some planning issues in which local assistance is necessary. In 
terms o f institutional design, local government holds power to make final local 
planning decision, although many cases can be found o f central government 
intervention.
11 An econom ic strategy for import substitution
12 Mayors o f  municipalities have been elected by citizens instead o f  being appointed by central 
government since 1994.
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Due to a tradition o f  centralised planning, local government has long regarded 
economic development as a responsibility o f central government (Chang, Y., 2005, 
p.38). However, with the progress o f the democratic movement, central government 
has been forced to release more authority to local government, especially related to 
economic planning.
3.3.3 Limited land use planning
With reference to land use planning, it is worth noting that the implementation o f  land 
use planning in Taiwan relies on bureaucratic administration instead o f a 
British-model o f  discretion and judgement, though both approaches reflect evolution 
o f individual legislation. In the legal tradition o f Taiwan, all prohibitions should be 
listed in legislated law. Accordingly, only planning control, has to depend on the 
regulatory machinery comprising written law or rules, otherwise, it is supposed to be 
allowed tacitly. While goals o f Taiwanese planning have been continually adjusted 
over the years and the role o f  land use planning has changed over time, the 
implementation o f Taiwanese planning remains substantially as its origin established 
under Japanese occupation (see Section 3.31 and table 3.1).
Based on his observation, Chou, T. (2004, p. 199) argues that planning in Taiwan has 
become a kind o f ‘institutional inertia’ which has a ‘lock-in effect’ embedded in 
long-term interaction among local development mechanisms, the planning profession 
and government organisations. As planning activities have been narrowed to land use 
plan making, planning has therefore become a sort o f  checklist for land distribution in 
which all other concerns, e.g. social inclusion and culture, have been excluded. 
Inevitably, planning has become a land use layout serving for economic development 
(Ibid. pp.201-202).
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In such circumstances, the state can only limit private right of development through 
planning regulations. Moreover, the planning authority has no right to intervene in 
individual detailed developments if there is nothing in them that breaks the planning 
laws or regulations. Chou, T. (2004) therefore contends the operation o f  Taiwanese 
planning has highly relied on formal institutions such as the law, statutory plans and 
the administrative authority. However, due to rapidly changing circumstances, the 
demerit o f a ‘lock-in ’ institution has appeared and what Chou has described as 
institutional inertia’. These phenomena have generated a series o f debates on 
strategic and spatial planning which will be presented in Section 3.6.
3.4 The Current Taiwanese Planning System
In Taiwan, most planning activities are undertaken at the local level, however, 
planning activity is carefully supervised by the final confirmation o f the planning 
authorities at the central state level. Although the removal o f  Provincial-level planning 
was implemented in the name o f streamlining the policy making process, the plan 
making authority is still inclined towards central government rather than local 
planning authorities. In order to provide understanding of planning centralisation, the 
following paragraphs will introduce the Taiwanese planning system as a whole.
3.4.1 Hierarchy of land use plans
Taiwan has a four-tier planning hierarchy (Figure 3.6). The highest level o f  the 
hierarchy is the National Comprehensive Development Plan (NCDP), which aims to 
promote a reasonable distribution o f population and economic activities; to improve
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the living environment; and to conserve and develop natural resources. Basically, the 
National Comprehensive Development Plan which is prepared by the Council for 
Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) is seen as a goal-oriented and 
instructive plan. It is placed at the same level as the national economic, social and 
defence plans which are prepared by the relevant Ministries at the central level. 
However, the NCDP which is drawn up by the Department o f Urban and Housing 
Development under the CEPD, is a non-statutory13 plan. As a result o f this limitation, 
the NCDP has in fact no tools to direct the statutory plans underneath it, i.e. urban 
plans and regional plans.
The second level o f the hierarchy comprises regional plans, national park plans and 
sector plans. The regional plan is designed to coordinate planning activities across 
boundaries o f local governments and to integrate development projects and sectoral 
plans at the regional level. It is also expected to manage land developments in rural 
areas.
In accordance with the Regional Planning Act and its Implementation Details, there 
are four regional plans in Taiwan: the Northern Regional Plan, the Southern Regional 
Plan, the Central Regional Plan, and the Eastern Regional Plan. These plans are 
prepared by the Construction and Planning Agency (CPA) and are for the promotion 
o f  the utilisation o f land and natural resources; a reasonable distribution o f population 
and production; acceleration o f an all-round economy; improvement o f the living 
environment and social welfare (see Figure 3.7).
13 In Taiwan, a statutory plan means a government plan made according to a Law or Act legislated by 
the Legislative Yuan. Without the legislative process, a plan is non-statutory and non-binding on 
planning authorities.
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National C o m p r e h e n s i v e  D e v e l o p m e n t  
Plan
Sectoral D e v e l o p m e n t  
P l a n
C o u n t y  (City) C o m p r e h e n s i v e  D e v e l o p m e n t  
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N o n - u r h a n  L a n d  U s e  
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U r b a n  PlanPhysical Plan
National P a r k  Pl a n
Figure 3.6 Simplified Diagram of the S tructure of the Planning System
Source: U R PO  W ebsite h ttp ://w w w .tcd.gov.tvv/ (accessed 6th Jan 2006)
T he third level o f  the hierarchy is the M etropolitan D evelopm ent Plan in two 
m unicipalities, and the County and City C om prehensive D evelopm ent Plans for other 
counties and cities. These plans are prepared by the local governm ent and are for 
prom oting econom ic developm ent, im proving the living environm ent, and allocating 
land for future developm ent o f  public facilities, transport and com m unication, 
education, m edical services, tourism , production and social w elfare.
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In other words, these Development Plans are likely to contain more spatial planning 
ideas and be viewed as blueprint for the future development o f the metropolitan, 
county, and city (CEPD http ://www.cepd. gov.tw/, accessed 17th June 2006). Like the 
National Comprehensive Development Plan, the comprehensive plan at the local level 
is a non-statutory plan and is prepared by the local planning authority without 
reconfirmation o f  legislative procedure.
At the bottom level o f the planning hierarchy is the statutory urban plan, which is 
made in accordance with the Regional Planning Act and the Urban Planning Law (see 
Figure 3.6). There are three types o f urban plans: city & town plans, village & street 
plans, and special district plans. Within each o f these urban plans, two tiers o f plans 
have to be prepared by the local government (or sometimes by the central government) 
according to the Urban Planning Law: the master plan and the detailed plan. The 
master plan shows planning layout for land use, while the detailed plan lists in detail 
regulations for development of land use (Ng, 1999). The planning procedure for 
drawing the local plan is shown as Figure 3.8.
3.4.2 Non-urban land: under the control of the Regional Planning Act
Although, as previous paragraphs have illustrated, the major plan making authority 
inclines to central government. However, due to the lack o f a statutory national spatial 
plan in Taiwan, local land use planning plays a key part in directing and regulating 
local developments. Therefore, it is useful to describe and explain this complex land 
use control system in order to provide the reader a comprehensive picture o f 
Taiwanese planning.
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Figure 3.8 The Planning Procedure of Local Planning (Master and Detailed Plan)
Source: CPA Website http://www.tcd.gov.tw/ (accessed 6th Jan 2006)
Taiwan is an area o f 36,000 square kilometres with a population o f around 22.88 
million based on the 2006 statistics (Government Information Office, 2007). Nearly 
two third o f  Taiwan is hilly region or mountain, as a result, only a limited amount of 
land is suitable for development. Such a small area and numerous residents had led to 
extremely high-density land use in Taiwan. The land use control system in charge of 
development is divided into two parts: non- urban land and urban land.
According to the Regional Planning Act, the total planning area o f the four regions is 
36,006 square kilometres (see Table 3.2).14 The first overall review years o f plan
14 The data were collected in 1984.
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promulgation were 1995, 1996, and 199715. All the land in the four regional plans can 
be divided into two types: non-urban planning land and urban planning land. Urban 
planning land is area in which an urban plan is applied, whilst non-urban planning 
land is all the rest. In Taiwan, the area o f the non-urban planning land is far larger 
than the area o f urban planning land and the ratio o f  area o f the non-urban planning 
land (around 3.14 million hectares) to urban planning land (around 0.46 million 
hectares) was 87:13 at the end o f 2007 (CPA Website http://www.tcd.gov.tw/ 
(accessed 14th June 2008).
All non- urban planning land is under the control o f a regional plan, however, a 
regional plan is not capable o f fully reflecting the reality: for instance, the projected 
population is often too high due to prediction being based on previous population 
growth shown in Table 3.2, only the Central Regional Plan has met its predicted 
population, while the other three regional plans have not achieved the prediction set 
by themselves.
Before governmental restructuring and streamlining o f the Provincial Government in 
1999, the Taiwan Provincial Government and central government shared planning 
authority for regional planning. But since 1999, all regional planning affairs are the 
responsibility o f the central government16.
15 In order to accommodate to changing circumstance, each regional plan is required to be reviewed 
overall every five years (Regional Plan Act, Article 13).
16 Before 1999, regional planning for north and south Taiwan was the responsibility o f  the central 
government and planning for the other two regions, central and east was the responsibility o f  the 
Taiwan Provincial Government. Since 1999, due to the streamlining o f  Taiwan Provincial Government, 
the central government has been responsible for all regional planning affairs.
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Region
Population 
in 2005 
(1000 
persons)
Area
(KM2)
The First Overall 
Review Year of 
Plan Promulgation
Target
Year
Projected 
Population 
(1 000 persons)
Northern Region 9,489 7,353 24 Nov. 1995 2005 10,944
Central Region 5,578 10,507 22 Aug. 1996 2011 5,194
Southern Region 6,363 10,002 28 Jun. 1996 2005 7,868
Eastern Region 603 8,144 24 Jun. 1997 2011 776
Table 3.2 Status of Regional Planning in Taiwan
Source: Translated from the CPA Website http://www.tcd.go v.tw/ (accessed 4th Jan 
2006)
According to Article 15 o f the Regional Planning Act:
‘After a regional plan is announced and implemented, fo r  the non-urban lands 
other than prescribed in Article 11, the concerned municipal or county (city) 
governments shall work out non-urban land-use zoning maps according to the 
land-use plan o f  non-urban lands, classify the lands for various purposes, and 
report to the upper-level competent authority fo r  review and recording prior to 
implementation o f  control. The same fo r  the procedure o f  alteration. The control 
rules shall be prescribed by the central competent authority. ’
The Implementation Details o f the Regional Planning Act (Article 13) points out that 
all non-urban lands are classified into ten types o f zones:
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7. Special agricultural district; 2. Common agricultural district; 3. Industrial 
district: allocated by the competent authority jointly with the related departments 
to promote the overall industrial development; 4. Rural district; 5. Forest district;
6. Slope conservation district; 7. Scenic district; 8. National park district; 9.
River district; and 10. Other utilization district or special-use district. ’
Similarly, Implementation Details o f the Regional Planning Act (Article 15) refers to 
18 land-use categories, including A building land-use, B building land-use, C building 
land-use, D building land-use, agricultural production land-use, forest land-use, traffic 
land-use, recreation land-use, ecological conservation land-use, and special aim 
enterprise land-use, etc. For instance, the A building land-use category refers to land 
that can be constructed on, out o f hillside, in a fertile or general agriculture zone.
In general, all non-urban land planning, except in a national park zone, should be 
supervised under the Rules o f Management o f Non-Urban Planning Land Use which 
are under the Regional Planning Act and its Implementation Details. The control 
process is similar to land use zoning control. However, local governments should 
prepare non-urban land use zone control maps and plans and then allocate a variety o f 
land-use categories to all the non-urban planning areas after the central government 
has announced the Regional Plans. Despite it is the local planning authority’s 
responsibility to designate non-urban land in regional plans, it often fails in its duty 
due to lack o f human and financial resources.
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The control o f  the development o f non-urban planning land in Taiwan is very loose. 
This appears to be due to several reasons. First, there is a large time lag between 
regional plans and the non-urban land use zone control map & plan. Second, because 
o f a lack o f human and financial resources for preparing and implementing plans at 
the local government level, most non-urban planning land is not designated to date. 
Third, there are no statutory plans setting out the future development blueprint the 
non-urban planning areas, except Regional Plans (Hsing, 1999).
3.4.3 Urban land: under the control of Urban Planning Law
Urban planning land is land that has been designated for this purpose in urban lands 
and its development is controlled under the Urban Planning Law and its 
Implementation Details. A total o f 443 districts in Taiwan had implemented urban 
plans up to the end o f 1999, 12 per cent o f the total area o f Taiwan (see Table 3.3). 
However, the ratio o f urban planning land to non-urban planning land was very high 
in the municipalities o f Taipei and Kaohsiung, reaching 100 per cent and 94 per cent, 
respectively. In Taiwan province, there were only three cities that came close to that 
level.
They were Tainan City (reaching lOOper cent), Taichung City (reaching 97 per cent), 
and Chiayi City (reaching 88 per cent). The other cities and counties were below 10 
per cent up to the end o f 1999. Figure 3.9 indicates the ratio of urban planning land to 
non-urban planning land by cities and counties.
Urban land use planning is based on a political-administrative system where 
developments are bound to zoning instruments. The most significant local planning
decision-maker, the Urban Planning Commission, is appointed by the magistrate or 
mayor o f each county or city, and refers to advice given by planning assistants in local 
government and then makes final planning decisions. In central government, the CPA 
deals with land use planning from the perspective o f the central state, while at the 
local government level, the local planning authority under local governments is in 
charge o f implementing planning policy.
Locality
The Number 
o f Urban 
Plans
Area o f Urban Plans (Unit: Hectare)
Total
City &Town 
Plans
Village & 
Street Plans
Special Area 
Plans
Taiwan Area 443 443,077 169,489 66,957 206,631
Taiwan
Province
424 401,517 130,739 66,957 203,821
Taipei City 1 27,180 27,180 - -
Kaohsiung
City
18 14,380 11,570 - 2,810
Table 3.3 Status of Urban Planning in Taiwan (up to the end of 1999)
Source: CPA Website http://www.tcd.gov.tw/ (accessed 3rd Jul 2006)
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Taipei County (50% -69% )Taipei City (over 70%)a 
Taoyuan County (30%-49%)
Hsinchu City
Hsinchu County (below  9%)
Miaoli County 
Taichung County 
Taichung City 
Changhwa County 
Nantou County 
Yunlin County
reeelung City
ndtCounty
C hiayfC ityV , t
Chiayi County 
Tainan County 
Tainan City 
Kaohsiung County 
Kaohsiung City 
Pingtung County (below  9%)
Hualien County 
Taitung County
Figure 3.9 The Percentage of U rban Planning Land by Cities and Counties
Source: T ranslated from the CPA W ebsite h ttp ://w w w .tcd.gov.tw / (accessed 4th Jul 
2006)
As regards the land use control system  in Taiwan, local p lanning affairs are relatively 
sim ple as a result o f  the political appointm ent o f  U rban P lanning C om m ission 
m em bers. But regional planning policy is m ore com plex since its p lanning process is 
not only related to intergovernm ental relationships but also affected by interw oven 
interests. C om pared to those in the British p lanning system , dissatisfied developers in 
Taiwan p refer a political approach instead o f  bureaucratic-judicial planning appeals to 
change the p lanning decision they have received. H ence, political intervention
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inevitably leads to disharmony between planning profession and planning 
decision-makers. Further discussion on political interventions will be found in the 
case studies o f the thesis (see Chapters Five, Six and Seven).
As mentioned in Section 3.3.3, this regulative system with zoning tools provides a 
comparatively inflexible mechanism for amendment. While it lists all ‘what not to do’ 
in planning regulations, it inevitably neglects the fast changing circumstances in the 
country due to globalisation and democratisation. In general, land use planning is 
considered by some to be too restrictive and the different standards for control o f 
urban and non-urban land use development produce confusion. Many argue the 
planning system is thus no longer suitable for the society (Hsing, 1999). Hua, C.Y. 
(1991) contended that it is time to revise the planning system due to changing 
circumstances and the need to provide more comprehensive planning in Taiwan.
The foregoing discussions in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.4.2 would suggest that the dominant 
actor in the Taiwanese planning system is still central government which owns most 
financial resources and dominates planning power in the institutional design. However, 
local government has been increasingly getting involved in the planning 
decision-making process. In theory, local government holds the power to make a final 
local planning decision; nevertheless it still highly relies on central govem menfs 
support to carry out planning activities (see Chapters Five, Six and Seven).
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3.5 Policy Coordination in Taiwanese Land Use Planning
Taiwan is well-known for its dynamic economic performance and is usually praised 
for its business efficiency. In the 2005-2006 Global Competitiveness Report o f the 
World Economic Forum (WEF), Taiwan was ranked the fifth in country ranking. 
However, the Public Institution Index for Taiwan suggests there is room to improve 
public service delivery (WEF, 2005) and this is not news to the Taiwanese 
government (Chu, Y. and Tan, C., 2002). With regard to the Public Institution Index 
for Taiwan in the WEF 2001-2002 report, the country was ranked twenty-fourth in the 
world for governmental efficiency, though overall the country's ranking was seventh. 
In spite o f its outstanding performance in national competitiveness, Taiwan's 
institutional disadvantages, such as the lack of coordination in governmental 
policy-making, may have an adverse effect in the long-term on its competitiveness 
(Lee, C. 2004). It is therefore not surprising that the central government has specified 
‘reinventing government' as its priority manifesto and pledged it will improve 
government efficiency (Yeh, 2005).
However, what is the reason for the weakness o f public institution? As Jiunn-Rong 
Yeh, Minister o f Research, Development and Evaluation Commission (2004-2006), 
pointed to five main problems resulting in government inefficiency at the state level: 
1. too many horizontal organisations; 2. a lack o f integration mechanisms; 3. the 
non-flexible institutional capacity; 4. too many commissions to clarify individual 
unit's responsibility; and 5. a number of redundant units. All those five points more or 
less point to the significance o f policy coordination which is also central to the 
government's manifesto o f reinventing government. In fact, the government has made 
its goal to reduce the number o f government organisations and simplify paper work in
order to improve government efficiency (Yeh, 2005).
3.5.1 Policy coordination in relation to planning at the central level
However, in Taiwan, the issue o f policy coordination was never highlighted until the 
mid 1990s. The turning point came with the increasing focus on sustainable 
development by not only grassroot environmental movements but also by the global 
campaign for sustainable development. As mentioned in previous sections (Section 
3.3.3), for decades, planning issues had been narrowly limited to affairs related to 
making land use plans. The lack o f regional planning authority was reflected in the 
lack o f spatial development concerns in planning and the indifference o f central 
government to strategic planning. Since there was no single authority in charge of 
land use planning, some have argued this resulted in the lack o f integration between 
land use management, land use planning and development agencies (Hua, 1991).
In spite o f the lack o f a spatial context in the planning discourse, there were 
discourses about policy coordination in environmental policy and public 
administration fields and those advocating sustainable development which had 
become the govem m enfs manifesto by the late 1990s. In fact, a National Sustainable 
Development Research Committee was set up under the Executive Yuan in 1997 in 
order to deal with sustainable development projects across various departments. 
However, this Committee is usually acting as a consultant to the Premier17o f the 
Executive Yuan with respect to issues related to sustainability rather than an 
administrative organisation. As a result o f the lack o f instruments for implementation 
o f sustainable development strategy, the Committee has found it difficult to integrate
17 The Premier, appointed by the President, is the head o f  the Executive Yuan.
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governmental projects under different sectors within a systematic framework as a 
whole (Cheng, C-Y, 2002).
However, a Suggestion White Paper for Sustainable Development in Taiwan was 
eventually drawn up by the Sustainable Development Research Committee in 2002 
(Hsiao, H. et al., 2002) which stated that one o f the main obstacles to sustainability 
was the lack o f policy coordination. The White Paper indicated that other obstacles to 
sustainability included unbalanced development and a lack o f institutional capacity, 
despite the existence o f the National Sustainable Development Council. It also 
stressed the need for integrated development goal coordinated policy implementation. 
Moreover it called for the establishment o f a specific planning authority dealing with 
environmental protection, economic development and social policies within a 
systematic framework (Sustainable Development Research Committee, 2002).
Regarding the Taiwanese planning system as a whole, the White Paper emphasised 
the need to coordinate governmental policies, such as National Economic Planning 
and Development Plan, National Comprehensive Development Plan and National 
Environmental Protection Plan, to achieve more integrated action. Moreover, it 
pointed to the need for monitoring system to manage the use o f land, resources and 
energy (Ibid., pp.46-56). Its suggestions pointed to the lack o f a systematic framework 
for planning integration within government and the need to review policy 
coordination in Taiwan. With regard to the content o f this White Paper and a 
governmental administration review, Lue (2003) identified three dimensions o f 
integration, namely horizontal, vertical and strategic, necessary for intergovernmental 
coordination across policy and administration. While horizontal coordination is 
related to inter-sector affairs and vertical coordination to cooperation between central
97
and local governments, strategic coordination means building up a comprehensive 
strategy i.e. performance management and an evaluation system.
However the issue o f policy coordination is not only limited to debates about 
sustainability but also found in the fields o f public work and administration. After 
reviewing the infrastructure o f the planning system, Huang and Lin (2005, p.249) 
concluded that national infrastructure plans and projects are fragmented, without 
coordination and public infrastructures at the local level are non-integrated, too. They 
contended that the non-statutory status o f the National Comprehensive Development 
Plan and local comprehensive development plans have contributed to this situation. In 
short, there are too many organisations, too much paper works, and a very complex 
policy and planning process to provide a strategic and sustainable government 
infrastructure (Ibid., p.253).
Nevertheless there are mechanisms designed for coordination within central 
government. For policy coordination at the state level, there are three channels in 
relation to the coordination o f internal cross-department affairs within the Executive 
Yuan: the Secretary-General, Ministers without portfolio, and functional commissions. 
However, in spite o f  these mechanisms, there is still a lack o f coordination in policy 
making and implementation at the central level although there was a change in 
government in 200018. It is thought the DPP government failed to run the state 
mechanism properly and it was also blamed for its clumsy administrative operation 
and poor skills in internal coordination. In fact, the DPP’s lack o f executive
18 In the 2000 Presidential Election, the D PP’s candidate, Chen, Shui-bian, was elected as the new  
President, the first non-KMT President in Taiwan since 1949. The DPP government was therefore 
called the ‘new  government’ in Taiwan.
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experience probably hindered policy coordination and led to more fragmented 
governmental actions.
Notwithstanding, the political culture in the Executive Yuan should also be taken into 
account. Departmentalism is viewed as one o f the most serious problems with respect 
to policy coordination and cross-sectoral affairs. Some attribute this to the lack of 
internal coordination within bureaucracy (Cheng, T-J., 2005, p.64). For example, the 
high-speed railway BOT project was the concern o f a number o f planning authorities: 
the Council for Economic Planning and Development, the Ministry o f Economic 
Affairs and the Ministry o f Interior; the Environmental Protection Administration, the 
Public Construction Commission and the Ministry o f Transportation and 
Communication; and also a schedule watcher, the Research, Development and 
Evaluation Commission. When a conflict occurred in relation to the proposed 
construction o f the high-speed railway and the development o f Tainan Science Park 
due to an assessment in 2000, which revealed the possibility that the vibration from 
high-speed train might result in damage to the hi-tech chip-production industry in 
2000, every department had its own concern with respect to the issue. There appeared 
to be no internal apparatus in the governmental structure addressing this problem until 
a specific meeting made by the Premier o f Executive Yuan coordinated the final 
decision {Liberty Times, 5th Mar 2001).
The change o f political culture resulting from the change in ruling party may also 
have contributed to fragile policy coordination. In the period o f the KMT regime, 
Ministers without Portfolio would be appointed to seats only if they had been senior 
Ministers. Thus, they would be familiar with the institutional culture and could be 
influential in coordinating cross-cutting policy (Chin, M., 2005, p. 16). In contrast, in
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the DPP administration, Ministers without Portfolio had no such familiarity and 
inevitably faced passive resistance from traditional departmentalism within the 
Executive Yuan (Cheng, T-J, 2005). As a result o f the disharmony between the new 
ruling party and the traditional bureaucracy, policy-making became even more 
fragmented and policy implementation was even more difficult.
3.5.2 Intergovernmental relationship
As a result o f  strong bureaucracy, the focus o f intergovernmental management theory 
in Taiwan has been the relationship between government agencies and its impact on 
the policy implementation (see Chao, Y. 1997, 2002, 2003; Li, C.,1999; Chen, H.S., 
2001).
Intergovernmental management, as a field, originated in the United States in the 
1970s and was introduced to Taiwan in the late 1980s. It focuses on policy 
implementation and attempts to achieve policy goals through coordination and 
conflicts resolution (Chiang, T-S. 2001). It stresses the importance o f linkage between 
government agencies and the process o f policy implementation (Chang, S-M., 1998, 
p.218). The need for coordination, communication and networking within government 
makes intergovernmental relations important in the field o f public policy analysis. 
Nonetheless, as in the UK, the term ‘intergovernmental relations' in Taiwan, refers to 
‘central-locaf relations that focus on the interactions between central and local 
political powers.
Chao, Y. a well-known policy researcher, reviewed the meaning o f inter-governmental 
relations and regional governance in Taiwan through disjointed-incremental theory, 
and indicated that the structural problem, no matter whether political or institutional,
mainly results from the centralised political power in the relationship between central 
and local governments. As well as the influence o f centralised power, worsening local 
politics and political culture19 also led to conflicts and tensions between governments 
(Chao, Y., 2003, p.55). Thus, the tradition o f centralised planning and the conflicts 
between political cultures are two reasons for the disharmony in vertical integration 
within the administrative system.
In a related field, public administration, Taiwan, has been profoundly influenced by 
the concept o f an integrated bureaucratic hierarchy and diversity in systems, and steps 
have been taken to address local government institutional reform since the late 1980s. 
Li, C. introduced a new managerial regime theory based on new institutionalist theory 
to analyse new and old institutions in transformation, which highlights new 
institutitonalisation and deinstitutionalisation (Li, C., 1999, p.57). He states that the 
managerial regime is a kind o f political arrangement and can be interpreted in two 
ways in relation to inter-government management. First, the principle o f sharing 
power must be satisfied by introducing a partnership mechanism. Secondly, given 
power, the managerial regime can make local government an enabling authority or 
steering authority (Ibid., pp.59-60). According to Li, C. managerial regime theory can 
assist in building up cooperation between governments, whatever the type the 
cooperation.
Both Chao, Y. and Li, C. have focused on the issues o f policy coordination and 
stressed its importance in their recent studies. Chao, Y.’s (2003) concern was the 
relationship between powers in vertical and horizontal dimensions, whilst Li, C. (1999)
19 More descriptions about this have been presented in Section 3.2.
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paid more attention to the institutional design o f power rearrangement- metropolitan 
governance. Yet, even though academics who discuss intergovernmental relations 
stress the significance o f policy coordination, they seem to focus on the distribution o f 
power between governmental organisations rather than the interaction between 
agencies during the policy-making process.
Policy coordination issues are considered in relation to intergovernmental relations in 
academic discourses, where the focus is mainly on at administrative effectiveness, 
government reform and regional governance. The relationship between central and 
local governments is also highlighted. However, apart from the concern with the 
vertical central-local relationship, it is worth noting that most discussions about the 
horizontal coordination emphasise on the relations between territorial governments, 
especially cross-border cooperation, while only a few research projects focus on 
policy coordination between different sectors as a whole. The lack o f crosscutting 
planning study leaves a gap in the literature, which this study seeks to address since 
its main focus is on the interaction between sectors and its main aim is to explore 
policy coordination through the institutional approach.
3.5.3 Policy coordination issues in relation to regional planning
Policy coordination at the regional level was a significant obligation o f the Taiwan 
Provincial Government, however, there has been a political vacuum between central 
and local governments since the governmental restructuring in 1999. After 1999, 
twenty-three local autonomies are supervised by a strong central government which 
has replaced the former Provincial Government’s responsibility for policy 
coordination between local authorities and sectors.
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In theory, central government should have taken over the full functions o f the 
Province government, however, because it did not, at the regional level, fragmented 
policies and rising conflicts between local authorities and sectors led to chaos 
resulting from the lack o f political power (Chao, Y., 2002). The highest administration, 
the Execution Yuan, has not yet realised how to manage those affairs transferred from 
the Provincial Government, including policy coordination at the regional level. Before 
Government Restructuring, Provincial Government, as a middle administrative level, 
was in charge o f policy coordination and intergovernmental cooperation. The removal 
o f the middle administration and the failure to assign its role to another or other 
agencies have produced more problems. Some cases have demonstrated fragmented 
policy implementation, the lack o f crosscutting planning and disharmony between 
local authorities after government reform in 1999. According to Tsou (2004), the 
influence o f central government on local integration has been decreasing with the rise 
o f individual local autonomy. Therefore, the lack o f administrative integration at the 
regional level is thought to be a by-product o f the 1999 reform. Although it is not the 
only reason for such fragmentation today, there is a gap between state and local 
administration.
However, some point out to other causes for this problem, in relating it to fragmented 
administrative boundaries. The scale o f local division is thought too small to address 
strategic planning and therefore local administrative territories are not capable o f 
doing so because it has been fifty years since the last review o f local government 
boundaries (Chao, Y., 1997). The current territories o f local authorities were drawn up 
in a specific historical and political context; however, after half a century, it is seen as 
an impractical and ineffective design (Chen, H-S., 2001). The small size and 
unrealistic territory is criticised as being unable to manage local development, and it
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is also contended that unbalanced political power between central and local 
government levels has forced planning powers to become more centralised, which in 
turn, has resulted in fragmented integration between central government and local 
authority policies, especially as there is no regional administration in Taiwan (Chao, 
Y., 1997). As a result o f the increasing conflicts in relation to planning between 
government levels, many maintain a new strategic planning mechanism is necessary 
to promote policy coordination and intergovernmental cooperation, hence the term 
'regional governance' has come into the discourse area (Chou, T., 2001).
3.5.4 The cross-territorial governance debate
In Taiwan, the debate on regional governance can be divided into at least two domains: 
the need for cross-territorial governance and the lack o f policy coordination 
mechanism. The former focuses on increasing conflicts between counties and cities 
competing for limited regional resources and infrastructure subsidies the from 
Execution Yuan, while the latter pays more attention to cross-sectoral policy linkage 
at local and regional levels.
Regional government is frequently suggested to fill the need for response to 
cross-territorial governance. It has been at the front o f discussion since Chan Lien, 
former president o f KMT and the KMT presidential candidate in the 2000 and 2004 
presidential campaign, announced that the regional government is a resolution to the 
problem of fragmented planning which is one o f the government's main goals to 
resolve. As the National Policy Foundation, a think tank o f  the KMT, pointed out, 
there are also problems with regional development.
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‘Firstly, regional disparity is widening; second, the small scale o f  local 
administrative territory is not conducive to compete with global competition; 
third, the current local administration is thought inefficient, and finally the scale 
o f local autonomy is too small to coordinate and integrate local resources. ’ 
(National Policy Foundation, 2004)
To resolve these problems, the National Policy Foundation suggested the following 
actions:
To enlarge local government;
To improve administrative efficiency;
To balance regional development, and
To improve local competitiveness {Central Daily News, 15th Jan 2004).
Referring to regional government, this KMT's think tank emphasised five principles:
1. Restructuring to better integrate existing local units; 2. The size o f the regional 
territory should be based on the metropolitan commute boundary; 3. The regional 
government must bring every county and city together to achieve regional common 
goals. 4. The aim o f regional government is to establish several international 
metropolises. 5. The ultimate mission is to establish regional economies.
Chi (2004a), a member o f the KMT think tank, suggested the term regional 
government should in fact mean regional governance, a kind o f local governance to 
strengthen local autonomy. The proposed combining several counties and cities to 
form a metropolitan government and this enlarged autonomous body could coordinate 
regional resources. In another paper (Chi, 2004b), he stated that central government
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should avoid intervening in the public affairs o f inter-local autonomous bodies and 
transfer power to local governance mechanism.
The opposition party’s (KMT’s) advocacy o f regional government was unsurprisingly 
not supported by the Execution Yuan’ because the DPP supported a two-tier 
governmental hierarchy rather than a three-tier system. Jian-Long Lin, former 
spokesman o f Execution Yuan (2003-2004) argued that regional government would 
complicate the administrative hierarchy and weaken local democracy 
(http://lifelongleam.cpa.gov.tw. accessed 27th Apr 2007). He contended that two-tier 
government is suitable for Taiwan and the National Spatial Planning Act, then 
undergoing a legislative review and approval process, would offer a complete 
mechanism for national and regional planning (see Section 3.6.3 below)20.
Many academics argue that adjustment to local administrative divisions an alternative 
to the establishment o f regional government. They maintain that devolution o f 
governance could integrate public and private sectors and create a partnership which 
would increase administrative effectiveness and reduce internal conflicts (Chao, Y, 
2002). As described in Chapter Two, the significant difference between ‘government’ 
and ‘governance’ is that the former simply emphasises public organisation while the 
other is more like a process and network, which includes both public and private 
sectors rather than public agencies. Hence, Yeh (2004) suggests that the British 
experience o f local strategic partnership could be an option for local governance. 
Considering partnership and regional cooperation, Chen, L-K. (2006) proposed 
regional collaborative management to deal with regional governance. He called for
20 It was the Executive Yuan’s response to the issue o f  creating regional government on 4th Jan 2004.
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institutional change to build a cross-territorial cooperation mechanism and suggested 
that administrative contracts and agreements should be temporarily applied until the 
mechanism was established.
When the draft o f the National Spatial Planning Act was passed to the Legislative 
Yuan in April 1997, various debates on the need for cross-territorial governance were 
generated. Though most agreed on the importance o f institutional change, there were 
various ideas put forward but little consensus on them. Suggestions ranging from 
regional government to a policy director commission illustrate the complexity of 
regional planning and differing understanding o f regional governance (see Chao, Y , 
2002, Chi, 2004a, and Chen, L-K., 2006 )
3.5.5 Policy coordination between sectors within regional planning
Compared to the vigorous debates on cross-territorial governance, the topic o f policy 
coordination between sectors seems to be less attractive to scholars and professionals. 
Most relevant academic works focus on the National Comprehensive Development 
Plan and the processing o f the National Spatial Planning Act. Chen, L-H. (1995), 
referring to the evolution o f land use planning, suggested the establishment o f a 
national land planning authority might reduce the fragmentation o f planning, while 
Chang, L. (1995) and Wang, H-K. (1994) both argued that the establishment o f a 
national planning authority might be helpful for horizontal policy coordination at the 
central state level.
After analysing relevant studies on policy coordination in relation to land use 
planning, Chen, M-T. (1997) concluded that the main challenge facing the existing 
land use planning system is the lack o f inter-organisational communication and
planning coordination due to a complex administration without a single planning 
authority to address crosscutting coordination. In his study, he found conflicts existing 
among local planning authorities even though they were under the same local 
government, e.g. the Economic Affairs Bureau and Public Works Bureau, since there 
was no linkage between sectors, from the central to local level. Therefore he 
emphasised the need to set up a Planning Directors Commission for both central and 
local planning.
Though there have been some studies o f national land use planning, there seem to be 
few academic works which have specifically focused on planning policy coordination 
at the regional level. As mentioned in the previous section, some researchers have 
mentioned the lack o f a coordination mechanism at the state and local level, i.e. Chen, 
M-T. (1997), but have not explained how policy coordination works at the middle 
level. It is worth noting that the growing debates on national spatial planning seem not 
to pay attention to the issues o f crosscutting coordination, especially at the regional 
level.
Even though academics who argue about intergovernmental relations stress the 
significance o f policy coordination, they seem to focus on the relationship between 
powers or organisations rather than policy coordination during the policy-making 
process (see Section 3.5.2). There are also few studies on coordination in relation to 
land use planning with other policies; hence the important contribution o f this study in 
attempting to fill in the gap in the extant literature.
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3.6 Taiwanese Planning in Transition: The Promise of Spatial 
Planning
3.6.1 Policy integration under the developmental state strategy
In Taiwan’s national strategies over past decades, economic development has been 
identified as a significant public interest hence has been viewed as a priority policy 
for government. Though economic development is a significant issue for every 
country, economic policy has an absolute priority for developmental states which 
regard economic growth as a primary benchmark for governmental performance.
Developmental state theory argues that the obligation o f the state is to promote 
industries through an overall strategy, including the supply o f industrial land (Lin, 
C-Y, 1996). Government therefore needs to establish a solid economic planning 
framework, which includes elite groups, bureaucracy, policy networks and the private 
sector. The reason for this is the unchallengeable status o f economic policy which is 
even more significant than political concerns sometimes. The developmental state 
strategy is thought o f as an efficient approach to promote economic growth in 
developing countries, and has been very popular among newly industrial economies in 
East Asia, e.g. Taiwan and Korea (Newman and Thomley, 2005).
Following a developmental state approach, it is not surprising that concern about 
economic development takes precedence over all other policies in Taiwan. In this 
context, land use planning in Taiwan is placed within the dominant economic 
planning framework and plays a role as an instrument for economic development 
(Kong, 2000). This might be the reason for the lack of spatial planning in Taiwan,
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since national development plans are strategic, have a monopoly status, and economic 
policy dominates in them, instead o f crosscutting and inclusive coordination.
In the 1970s, there was a series o f discourses in relation to the need for an integrated 
planning system coordinating various governmental activities, including economic 
policy and land use planning. As a response to it, in the late 1970s, the Taiwanese 
Government set out to analyse the poor correlation between public infrastructure 
planning and the requirements of economic development in order to remove all 
obstacles to economic performance (CEPD, 1979, p .l). Notwithstanding that the 
primary concern at this time was enhancement o f economic development of the 
country as a whole rather than making a complete spatial plan for national planning as 
a whole, this was the first time in which the relationship between physical planning 
and economic planning was taken into account in the central government's policy. The 
first National Comprehensive Development Plan (NCDP) was therefore subsequently 
in 1979, which provided guidance for all development plans underneath. As a top 
national development plan, the NCDP was expected to achieve the following aims:
to make an appropriate distribution o f population and economic development; 
to improve the living and working environment; 
to coordinate the use o f national resources.
The National Comprehensive Development Plan (NCDP) published in 1979 stressed 
the distribution o f population and improvement o f the environment rather than 
strategic planning. Moreover, the non-statutory status o f the NCDP made it difficult to 
supervise the regional planning and urban planning conducted by local planning 
authorities to achieve the goals listed in the NCDP. The planning administration in
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Taiwan relies on ‘legitimated plans’, therefore the NCDP, as a ‘non-statutory upper 
plan’ which has not been legislated, cannot direct those secondary plans made by 
legitimated law (see Section 3.4.1). In other words, local authorities have no 
obligations to implement those actions listed in the NCDP, while the NCDP is only 
thought o f as a reference blueprint for national development as a whole. This has 
resulted in a disconnection between central and local planning and led to more 
challenges to integrated spatial planning (Wang, H., 1994).
3.6.2 National land use planning in transition
As an answer to the above mentioned issues, the NCDP was revised in 1996 to meet 
the changing economic and land use planning context. In fact, there have been two 
draft versions o f the NCDP: one made by the CEPD, the other drawn up by CPA, 
under the Ministry o f Interior (MOI). The two draft revision o f the NCDP demonstrate 
the confusion surrounding planning accountability since both the CEPD and the CPA 
thought they were planning authorities for spatial planning. This also indicates the 
poor coordination between planning sectors, even for such a significant issue. In the 
end, the CPA version was abandoned so that the version cited in this thesis is that of 
the CEPD.
The edition o f the 1996 NCDP drawn up by the CEPD in 1996 covers not only all the 
islands o f Taiwan but also remote Kinmen and Matsu Islands which belong to FuJian
91Provincial Government . Moreover, in order to meet the future needs of national 
socio-economic development, it plans ahead for the allocation and management o f
21 Although the KMT regime retreated from China to Taiwan in 1949, Kimen and Matsu Islands, parts 
o f  Fujian province, have been retained as military bases against China. There is still a Fujian Provincial 
Government within the Taiwanese administrative framework, though it accounts for only two counties.
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land, water and other natural resources, and for the appropriate distribution o f 
population, industry and public facilities. The plan essentially provides an outline of 
long-term development objectives and policies and targeted the year 2000, when the 
population was projected to reach 24.19 million22. It is viewed as the first national 
plan in Taiwan to take aspects o f  spatial planning into account.
The overall aim o f the 1996 NCDP is consistent with environmental conservation 
since it invokes the principles o f sustainable development. It was set up to promote 
the rational utilisation o f land; to enhance the quality o f life, and to provide conditions 
conducive to optimal industrial development. In summary, it has three main 
objectives:
7 . Protection o f  the ecological environment:
This involves integrating conservation into the development process, utilising 
resources in a rational and efficient manner, and developing natural resources on a 
sustainable basis.
2. Improvement o f  the living environment:
This means creating a high quality o f  life in Taiwan, reducing disparities between 
different regions, and harmonising urban and rural development.
3. Development o f  the production environment
22 The statistics shown in section 3.4 indicate that the current population is much less than the 
predicted numbers.
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This entails pursuing further internationalisation, liberalisation, and technological 
upgrading, modifying the industrial structure, and establishing Taiwan as1 an 
Asia-Pacific regional operations centre. ’ (CEPD, 1996, p. 4)
As a plan in the highest layer o f the planning hierarchy, the 1996 National 
Comprehensive Development Plan was designed to coordinate different sectors and 
integrate departmental projects at the state level, whilst the County and City 
Comprehensive Development Plans were expected to perform a similar function at the 
local level. However, it is contended that the national and local Comprehensive 
Development Plans have not achieved what was intended and have some innate 
critical demerits. First, there is no comprehensive plan linking the NCDP and the 
County and City Comprehensive Development Plans and there is also no planning 
authority dealing with planning affairs at the regional level. Despite some wanting the 
existing four regional plans to take over regional planning affairs, this has not 
happened to-date. Second, both national and local Comprehensive Development Plans 
are non-statutory plans in Taiwan. That is to say, they have not been approved through 
the review and approval procedure in the Legislative Yuan. Therefore, in essence, 
such plans are like administrative orders which have no planning power to direct the 
authorities23 (Shih and Cheng, 2001).
Liao, Senior Specialist o f CEPD, described the situation as follows:
23 In Taiwan, a non-statutory plan does not have planning force to implement planning policies, in 
other words, it is more a kind o f  policy guidance rather than a binding plan.
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‘It (the NCDP) is rather a manifesto than a development plan, thus there is no 
compulsory implementation for the National Comprehensive Development Plan. 
Sectoral planning authorities draw up their own policies as circumstances 
change and do not necessarily take the National Comprehensive Development 
Plan into account due to its non-statutory sta tus’ (Interviewed in September 
2006)24
His comments suggest the NCDP was designed initially to coordinate developmental 
policies and provide a spatial planning framework in which planning activities would 
be integrated. However, due to it being more like a manifesto, the NCDP, even though 
it emerged at the highest level in the planning hierarchy, is a non-statutory plan in the 
Taiwanese planning system, while most other plans are empowered by formal 
legislation e.g. Urban Planning Law and the Regional Planning Act. Without a 
legislated bill to rely on, implementation o f the NCDP has faced difficulties in 
achieving its coordinative function o f integrating subsidiary planning.
3.6.3 The introduction of spatial planning
The 1990s was an era of dramatic challenges when two momentous phenomena, 
economic globalisation and political democratisation, impacted on Taiwanese 
planning. The former trend spreading around the world has led to the need for spatial 
planning which is expected to reduce internal conflicts, especially in the horizontal 
dimension, within institutions, whilst the latter has resulted in a fragmented state 
where frequent tensions between central and local governments have been uncovered 
and a vertical division has gradually appeared (CPA, 2004, chapter five).
24 This interview was conducted to produce research material for this thesis. The research methodology 
and strategy are described in Chapter Four.
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Although the existing NCDP provides a manifesto for spatial development, due to its 
limitation mentioned in previous paragraphs, calls for nationwide spatial planning 
continue to be heard, partly due to the topical issue o f sustainable development (see 
Section 3.5.1) and spatial planning being thought a necessary approach to implement 
it in Taiwan. Kow-lung Chang,23 a well-known environmentalist in Taiwan, and 
Cheng, J.D. maintain that for sustainable development o f land and resources, it is 
necessary to embark on government restructuring and reform o f the land management 
system (Chang, K. and Cheng, J., 2002). Referring to the existing government system, 
they argue that there are too many organisations overlapping without a coordinative 
framework to make policy action effective and efficient. Moreover, they stress the 
significance o f the regional level, since this is the level, they argue, at which to 
coordinate plans from different sectors (Ibid., p.9).
Their voices emphasise the need for a more strategic land use plan in order to 
coordinate those sectors outside the current land use planning system and to integrate 
future development. More and more academics argue that the lack o f a statutory 
spatial plan results in fragmented planning and an inefficient land use system (see 
Chen, M-T., 1997; Chou, T., 1999). In answer to the call for spatial planning, the 
National Spatial Planning Act was drafted in the mid 1990s under legislative process 
and is seen as a more effective response than the revised NCDP to the demand.
Spatial planning had never been a topic in Taiwanese planning for over half a century 
due to the domination of the developmental state strategy adopted by the KMT
23 Chang was Minister o f  the Environmental Protection Administration in Taiwan (2005-2007).
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government. Planning policy was simply as instrument to achieve the governmental 
goal o f continuing economic growth. Given the political context at that time, Hua, 
C.Y. (1994) contended that ‘...there will not be a solution fo r  the existing planning 
system i f  the CEPD ignores the political context and only attempts to address the 
problem in technical ways ’.
Similarly, Chou, T. (2004, p. 196) points out that Taiwanese planning after 1945 has 
overemphasised the quantitative index, e.g. economic growth and population and this 
has led to a spatial divide between cities in the country. Due to this, he argues, such 
thought no longer meets the needs o f Taiwanese planning today. He contends that the 
focus o f Taiwanese planning should move from the quantitative approach, making 
plans for population layout, to a qualitative approach, i.e. towards spatial strategic 
management. This view expresses Chou’s support for spatial planning. He also 
emphasises the significance o f coordination and institution:
‘Facing the challenges o f  space o f  flow  resulting from globalisation, the 
fundament o f  local development is coordinating local resources and shaping 
identity through building up local institutions and networks’ (Chou, T. 2004, 
p.209).
Chou (2004) also argues that planning requires more work incorporating relevant 
sectors such as culture and the environment. In fact, the neglect o f spatial planning 
resulting from the developmental state approach has led to lack o f integration with 
environmental planning and vicious competition among localities (Liau and Chou, T., 
2000). Accordingly, spatial planning is seen both as a mechanism to coordinate 
various sectors across administrative territories and planning sectors and helpful for
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sustainable development (Department o f Urban Development of Taipei City, 2002).
Due to Taiwan’s developmental state status, their lack o f independence from national 
economic strategy has made planning officers in Taiwan providers o f a planning 
service rather than planning policy-makers. Moreover, democratic development has 
resulted in a fragmented governance landscape, including planning policy-making. To 
reduce such fragmentation o f planning, academics have called for cross-cutting 
integration o f policy coordinated by a spatial planning framework (Chou, T., 2004). 
The pressure from them made the central government admit to the need for a spatial 
planning framework, hence, the introduction o f the National Spatial Planning Act in 
the late 1990s in response to their call for integrated spatial planning.
At a panel meeting o f  the Legislative Yuan to review ‘The draft o f National Spatial 
Planning Act and the abolishment o f Regional Planning Acts’, the Minister of Interior, 
Cheng-Shien Yu, admitted there was a problem of overlapping planning within the 
current system and ineffective regional planning due to the lack o f regional planning 
authority. He further stated the intention to strengthen and expand the merit o f the 
National Spatial Planning Act not only to land use planning but also to sectoral 
planning. A new mechanism for the national spatial planning would be set up for 
policy coordination within the spatial planning framework (Executive Panel Meeting, 
3rd April 2002). Yet, some still question the effectiveness o f the new spatial planning 
framework, for instance Legislator Ching You challenged the purpose o f the National 
Spatial Planning Act at the same meeting while he insisted on the need for the existing 
Regional Planning Acts based on four regional plans.
The review o f the literature suggests there is presently wide support for spatial
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planning in Taiwan and the term, spatial planning, is stressed in the draft o f the 
National Spatial Planning Act.
3.7 The Research Questions Finalised
Our interest in this study is the coordination o f policy sectors at the regional level at a 
time when political democratisation and economic globalisation are interacting and 
impacting upon Taiwan. As spatial planning is becoming increasingly popular and 
regional development has become the focus o f planning discourses, how does 
coordination operate and what roles do actors play in a planning institution in 
transition and to what extent can there be coordination within the existing system? 
The foregoing literature review would suggest that Taiwanese planning is still 
dominated by the central government, yet there are pressures which demand 
local/regional responses.
As described in previous sections, there is consensus on the need for an improvement 
in policy coordination. This has to be achieved within a context where industrial 
policy has profoundly affected national land use planning and large economic projects 
are inevitably key points for regional development in Taiwan. As aforementioned, 
distributing the layout o f industrial development is a significant section in the four 
regional plans according to the Regional Planning Act, this leads to a research interest: 
the role o f economic projects in relation to land use planning in Taiwan. As a plan-led 
planning system, ‘how can coordination operate within the p lanning system  fo r  
econom ic p ro jec t planning?  ’
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With regard to economic policy, the development o f industrial parks is a major nexus 
in which land use planning and economic planning meet. It has been the case that 
local governments, municipalities, cities or counties, acquire the land, prepare it and 
promote it to investors. In the early 1990s, the supply o f industrial land was less than 
that demanded by industrial developers, hence land acquisition was a major concern 
to both government and investors. However, the situation has since changed. 
Industrial land remains empty and unwanted due to the lack of demand. This has 
become a problem for local governments since the big industrial movement to China 
at the end o f the 1990s (Chou, T. 2004).
Moreover, once land use planning is seen as related to other policies, there are 
inevitably tensions between different purposes and interests over the development and 
specific use o f  land. Hence, in the policy making process, ‘what is the interaction  
betw een p o lic y  partic ipan ts am ong and within institutions, and  how can it affect 
p o licy  o u tco m e? ’ While most academic researchers highlight planning tools and 
planning conflict (both vertical and horizontal), this study will focus on the 
relationship between economic planning and land use planning sectors within the 
policy process, i.e. cross sectoral relations.
A new institutional perspective is believed to offer a holistic picture o f policy 
coordination within institutions. The anticipated strengths o f the institutional approach 
have been illustrated in Chapter Two. However, with regard to the Taiwanese context, 
there are further advantages o f the institutional approach: first, it is helpful for 
interpreting the interaction between individuals and structures; second, it also 
provides a panorama to see the dynamic dimension in vertical, horizontal and 
institutional change over the last ten years; third, and most importantly, it takes into
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account historical factors and social embeddedness which has affected Taiwanese 
society over decades (Cheng, T-J., 2005).
The last two questions are therefore generated. As mentioned in Section 3.2, if 
bureaucratic culture does matter in relation to politics and policy in Taiwan, ‘after the 
significant institutional changes in the late 1990s, has there been any change in 
bureaucratic operation in relation to coordination? ’ and ‘how have the roles changed 
in the planning sector, given institutional change? ’ In particular, the ‘rule o f human’ 
within the planning context will be a significant element in the field works as few 
academic works have considered it.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the social context and political culture in Taiwan. It has 
also highlighted issues with regard to policy coordination in relation to land use 
planning in Taiwan. It suggests there is a wide understanding o f  the need for more 
coordinative planning which, in turn, has resulted in calls for spatial planning. The 
review o f the literature helped to clarify the research interests, which led to the 
formulation o f further research questions. The next chapter explains the research 
design and methodology employed to answer the research questions.
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Chapter Four Research Design and Methodology
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides details o f the research methodologies employed in this study. 
Based on discussions in the previous two chapters and the literature review in Chapter 
Two, research questions are formulated in Section 4.2. The research design is 
described in Sections 4.3. The strength o f the case study strategy to explore policy 
coordination in Taiwanese planning is expanded in this section and thus the three case 
studies selected to answer the research questions, namely, Tainan Science Park (TSP), 
Kaohsiung Science Park (KSP), and Kaohsiung Multi-Functional Commerce and 
Trade Park (KMFCTP) are introduced in Section 4.4. The field work setting is 
described in detail in Section 4.5 and research methods to that data acquisition and 
data analysis are presented in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 explains how interviewees were 
chosen for the study, while Section 4.8 provides a brief review o f the contents o f the 
chapter.
4.2 Establishing the Research Questions
The literature review in Chapter Two explained the theoretical approach adopted in 
this research while Chapter Three focused on the policy making process in Taiwan, 
drew attention to problems within it, and explained why policy coordination is 
necessary in the Taiwanese planning context. The neo-institutional perspective was
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the theoretical approach adopted in this thesis due to its inclusion o f multi-elements 
and its focus on institutional structure. It was therefore considered an appropriate 
approach to understand changes in Taiwan in recent years.
4.2.1 Research questions
This study’s questions were posited based on the perception that the planning policy 
process is not only affected by Legislative Acts or administration but is evolving 
through complex interactions between individuals and groups within and across 
institutions. The assumption o f this research is that if an institution determines 
regional planning activities, there will be changes in relation to policy coordination, 
the plan making process, and interactions between actors due to significant 
institutional shifts.
From discussions relating to and interpretations o f neo-institutional perspective, it is 
clear that institutions matter in the policy-making process in that while organisations’ 
or individuals’ actions are influenced by circumstances, they also affect the 
environment within which they occur (see Section 2.6). Thus, policy coordination will 
change when there is an institutional change.
The literature review indicated that as institutional change occurred in Taiwan at the 
end o f the twentieth century as a result o f the movement towards democratisation in 
politics, there were also changes in the political circumstance and 
administrative/governance arrangements. Hence, the way policy coordination was 
implemented within planning and economic development would be expected to 
change as well. As a result, the following questions were generated by the discussions 
o f Chapters Two and Three:
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1. How does coordination operate between the land use planning and economic 
planning sectors?
2. How have roles changed in the planning sector, given institutional change?
3. What is the interaction between policy participants among and within institutions 
and how can it affect policy outcome?
4. After the significant institutional changes in the late 1990s, has there been any 
change in bureaucratic operation in relation to coordination then and now?
4.2.2 Planning context
To understand the planning institutions, it is necessary to explore the planning context. 
Previous chapters, especially Chapter Three, introduced the planning hierarchy and 
administrations in Taiwan, and pointed to the concern about fragmented policy 
making and implementation. Issues about policy coordination have been received 
increasing attention in planning discourses.
As a result o f the challenges facing the existing planning system, many academics 
have called for spatial planning to facilitate policy coordination in relation to land use 
planning. To achieve this, the existing governmental structure and political culture 
which have shaped the planning context cannot be ignored. Particularly important in 
this regard are the government reform, i.e. the streamlining o f the Taiwan Provincial 
Government in 1999 and the shift o f central power from KMT to the DPP in 2000. 
Both events were profound institutional changes and their impacts shaped the current 
political culture and planning process (see Chapter Three). Based on present 
understanding o f the challenges facing Taiwanese planning delineated in Chapter 
Three, the current planning contexts is perceived as follows:
1. Fragmented policy making and implementation have become increasingly serious 
in Taiwanese Planning.
2. Institutional changes embedded in social and political shifts, especially the 
democratic movement in the last decade, have created a growing a gap between 
central and local authorities.
3. It is argued that a policy coordination apparatus is lacking in the administrative 
structure and has not yet been researched.
4. It is not clear whether the lack o f coordination in the planning system is trending 
towards improvement or a worsening situation.
The first three phenomena have been referred to in Chapter Three, whereas there is a 
lack o f empirical evidence to forecast future trends. However, expected planning 
development is not a concern o f this study, since an understanding o f the current 
planning context should be sufficient to answer the research questions generated in 
the next section.
4.3 Research Design: The Case Study Approach
The case study method is selected as a research strategy to explore the study topic, i.e. 
policy coordination in Taiwanese planning, because the case study is not only a 
method suitable for exploratory and explanatory research but also an approach that 
takes a broad range o f factors into account.
Though some think the various research strategies should be arranged hierarchically 
and view the case study as a pilot study for the research as a whole (Shavelson and
Townes, 2002), Yin (2003, p.3) argues that this is a misconception. He contends that 
the case study is not only an exploratory strategy but can also be used for exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory purposes. The choice o f each strategy, according to Yin 
(2003, p.5) is based on three conditions:
(a) the type o f  research question posed;
(b) the extent o f  control an investigator has over actual behavioral events;
(c) the degree o f  focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events
For condition (a), he asserts that the case study strategy is especially useful to answer 
research questions seeking to ascertain ‘how’ and ‘why’, since such questions need to 
trace events over time instead o f frequencies or incidence. For conditions (b) and (c), 
Yin points out that the strength o f the case study method is that it allows examination 
of ‘contemporary events, but when the relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated’ 
(Yin, 2003, p.7), Therefore, it is preferred in doing empirical studies that investigate 
contemporary phenomena within real-life contexts, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomena and context are not clearly evident (Stake, 1995). Some may 
question whether the case study strategy is similar to the historical approach, and Yin 
agrees that much similarity may exist in the beginning phase o f a case study. However, 
compared to the historical approach, the case study includes two more sources o f 
evidence: direct observation o f the events and interviews with the persons involved in 
the events. As a result, the case study possess a has its unique strength ‘to deal with a 
full variety o f  evidence- documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations- beyond what 
might be available in a conventional historical study’ (Yin, 2003, p.8).
However, there are inevitably some criticisms o f the case study strategy. A very
com m on negative idea is that there is a lack o f rigour in the case study approach. 
Moreover, the case study is designed towards a particular result due to authors’ bias. It 
is difficult to deny such circumstances since some case study research has been o f  
poor quality, but this has also occurred using other strategies, such as experiments, 
questionnaires for survey, or historical research (Ibid., p. 10). Another concern about 
the case study is its capacity for scientific generation, since it only generalises from a 
single or a few cases. However, what is forgotten is that scientific facts are based on a 
m ultiple set o f experiments that have replicated the same phenomenon under different 
conditions and the same approach can be used with multi-case studies in an 
appropriate research design. Another significant weakness o f the case study is that 
investigators mistakenly see it as an easy method that anyone can use. This weakness 
can be avoided through a clarified conceptual framework and a scientific data 
collection approach (Ibid.).
A s Yin (2003, p. 10) points out, the goal o f case study research is to expand and 
generalise theories by analytic generalisation and this is different from research which 
enum erates frequencies by means of statistical generalisation (Yin, 2003, p. 10). The 
aim o f  this thesis is to explore policy coordination and to find out ‘how ’ the policy is 
coordinated and ‘w hy’ there are problems occurring. As shown in the previous 
paragraph, the case study method is an approach suitable for answering such ‘how and  
w h y ’ questions, thus is adopted in this study. At the same time, this study focuses on 
the contemporary development of Taiwanese planning through various sources, 
including documents and interviews, and the case study strategy is ideal for 
exam ining contemporary situation. As mentioned previously, the lack o f policy 
coordination in the Taiwanese planning system is widely acknowledged but few 
studies have explored it. The case study approach is ideal for exploring a hitherto
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unexplored field and discovering previously unknown interactions between economic 
and land use planning sectors.
Having chosen the case study strategy for this research for the reasons given, the 
following sections explain the research design.
4.4 Case Study Selection
As mentioned in chapter three, Taiwan has adopted a developmental state strategy and 
has focused on economic growth for decades. This developmental strategy has 
resulted in a dominating economic policy led by flagship economic projects, hence, 
significant economic projects can be used as a representative index for economic 
planning. As a result o f this context, this study will select three economic 
development projects as cases in order to examine policy coordination in relation to 
land use planning through an investigation o f the project-making process.
Accordingly, it will investigate the coordination between the economic planning 
sector and the land use planning sector, both horizontal and vertical relations. Based 
on the findings generated from the investigation and the analysis o f inter-agency 
relationship and policy coordination in Taiwanese planning, it is hoped the study will 
be able to explain the capacity o f the current policy coordination mechanism.
Though the case study method is ideal for this research, it is worth noting that a 
wrong choice o f case studies can lead to mistaken findings and results (Stake, 2000). 
As a study whose aim is to understand the planning institution in Taiwan, the first
requirement is to select representative cases, because only representative or typical 
cases are helpful for understanding the planning institution as a whole and with tight 
discipline, further study can be generated. Careful case selection can also avoid the 
criticism o f case studies that it is difficult to generalise findings from one or some 
cases to another (Yin, 2003, p.38). Further, this study focuses on the policy making 
process therefore projects or project plans that have been made and are still ongoing 
and require further plan making processes are ideal choices as case studies whereas 
those projects which have not yet been approved will not be considered in this study. 
Finally, to explore institutional change over the last decade, the project chosen as 
cases should have been undertaken between the middle 1990s and 2005, during which 
time there were dramatic changes in the political circumstances and administrative/ 
governance arrangements. Though this is not a comparative study, the study o f 
project-making processes over time is expected to offer a clear picture o f the effect o f 
institutional change in Taiwanese planning.
In short, the case studies chosen were selected for the reasons given below:
1. The case selected had to have been a significant economic development project 
completed not only by local government, in order to explore the vertical 
coordination.
2. The case selected had to have been listed as a priority plan in national 
development plans to ensure it was a representative case.
3. The policy-making process o f the case selected had been finished or had nearly 
reached completion and the case had been implemented or was ready to be 
developed.
4. The policy-making process o f the case selected had been undertaken during the
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period o f institutional change in the last decade.
Taking these four conditions into account, the three cases described below were 
chosen to accomplish the research purposes. Their location can be seen in Figure 4.1.
The Southern Taiwan Science Park (STSP) Project 
Development Context
The Southern Taiwan Science Park (STSP) project was established under the approval 
o f the Executive Yuan in February 1995. Due to the success o f Hsinchu Science Park, 
the first science park project in Taiwan, the STSP project was purposed as an 
industrial centre to promote economic development in southern Taiwan.
The Southern Taiwan Science Park (STSP) project comprises Tainan Science Park 
(TSP) and Kaohsiung Science Park (KSP). Tainan Science Park is situated between 
the Sinshih, Shanhua and Anding Townships o f Tainan County and comprises a total 
area of 2,565 acres. Kaohsiung Science Park is situated between the Lujhu, Gangshan 
and Yong-an Townships of Kaohsiung County and comprises a total area of 1,408 
acres. There is a newly established Kaohsiung Biotechnology Park on 21 acres o f land 
in the Nanzih District o f Kaohsiung City.
129
Figure 4.1 Location of the Three Cases
Source: CPA (1996)
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On 1st July 1993, the 2,388th executive meeting o f the Executive Yuan approved an 
Economic Revitalization Project and a science park project in southern Taiwan was 
proposed. The STSP Development Plan (of which the development o f Tainan Science 
Park was an element) drawn up by the National Science Council and subsequently 
received approval from the Executive Yuan in May 1995. This was the beginning o f 
southern Taiwan’s high-tech development. The STSP project is part o f a major effort 
to upgrade industry in southern Taiwan, with a view to balance the high-tech 
development areas throughout the island (Jou, 1998).
Case Study 1: Tainan Science Park 
Development context
There was a heated debate as to the site location for this project during the planning 
decision-making process. Its location was finally determined as an area across the 
three towns o f Shanhua, Shinshi and Andin in Tainan County. In July 1997, the Tainan 
Science-based Industrial Park Development office officially commenced operations, 
and according to a government report, aggressively promoted investment and various 
public construction projects within the Park.
Location and environment
The development area o f Tainan Science Park comprises 2565 acres. Investment in 
Tainan Science Park, the first site o f the STSP, has increased sharply and development 
around the science park has expanded rapidly. In order to accommodate more 
factories and attract new investor, a new development project, Lujhu Science Park in 
Kaohsiung County, a further element in the STSP project, was built and opened in 7th
131
July 2001.
Case Study 2: Kaohsiung Science Park (KSP)
Development context
In 2000 when the Taiwanese economy was booming, over 80% of the industrial land 
available in Tainan Science Park was leased out, and requests for more industrial land 
continued to pour in. In response to the demand from the hi-tech electronic industries 
for large-block factory land, the Executive Yuan agreed in May 2000 to designate the 
Intellectual Industrial Park which had been developed by the Taiwan Sugar 
Corporation in Lujhu as the site for the second developmental phase o f the STSP. The 
Intellectual Industrial Park became Lujhu Science Park and the project was officially 
approved on 6th April 2001. The Lujhu Science Park was subsequently renamed 
Kaohsiung Science Park (KSP) on 27th July 2004.
Location and environment
The second development site as part o f the STSP project, Kaohsiung Science Park, 
comprises a 1408 acre development area which extends across the three town o f 
Lujhu, Kungshan and Yunan in Kaohsiung County. The park is located approximately 
16 miles from Tainan Science Park and can be conveniently accessed. This location 
was favoured because of the already developed roads and available electrical and 
water utilities. The park is also within easy reach o f many public facilities, including 
some research institutes, human resources, industrial sites, an international airport, 
and seaport. Other advantages include ease in acquiring land in the park, and the 
park’s prime location and ease o f access.
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Both TSP and KSP are conveniently located near Kaohsiung International Airport and 
Kaohsiung International Harbour. With the extensive surface transportation network 
and quick links to the rest of the world, the STSP is expected to be the science and 
technology centre o f Taiwan in the future.
The relevance of the two science park projects to this research
The Southern Taiwan Science Park Project is the largest government development 
project in the last ten years. It is part of the central government's economic 
development strategy, 'Promoting Economic Initiatives’, and is supported by the 
public sector. Due to its significant role in regional development, the STSP project has 
been a concern not only o f central planning authority but also raised local government 
expectations for improved economic development. To implement such a big project, 
the science park would require coordination and cooperation across different sectors 
and levels.
Throughout the developmental period, from choice o f location to extension, there 
were endless debates and conflicts among different sectors and interest groups. Some 
have pointed out that in the competition between Tainan County and Kaohsiung 
County to be the first science park location as part o f the STSP project, the two 
counties adopted different approaches to win the bid. While the Tainan County 
Government attempted to persuade central government through the spatial 
development strategy, Kaohsiung County Government used local networks to 
convince the central planning authority to accept its bid.
Despite its defeat in the bid, Kaohsiung County Government was given the
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opportunity to become the location o f the second site as part o f the STSP project. It is 
argued by Yang and Su (2002), that without well integrated local networks which 
lobbied the central planning authority and fully supported Kaohsiung County 
Government in the second bid, it would not have become the location o f the second 
site as part o f the STSP project.
Accordingly, the experience o f Kaohsiung Science Park (KSP) presents an 
opportunity to investigate the coordination among central and local agencies, 
especially that between the economic and land use planning systems.
Case Study 3: Kaohsiung Multi-Functional Commerce and Trade Park 
(KMFCTP)
Development context
In June 1995, the Executive Yuan decided to make Taiwan an 'Asia-Pacific Regional 
Operations Centre' (APROC). The plan was to design six large-scale centres for 
air-transportation, media, manufacturing, sea-transportation, telecommunication, and 
finance.
The City o f Kaohsiung is the most important industrial city in southern Taiwan. It 
contains the Qian-Zhen Export Processing Zone and Nan-Zi Export Processing Zone. 
Moreover, Kaohsiung Harbour is not only an important transhipment centre in the 
Asia-Pacific Region, but was the eighth largest container port in the world in 2007 
(Port of Kaohsiung, 2008). Due to its merits, Kaohsiung was chosen as the location 
for manufacturing development and a transhipment centre of APROC. Accordingly,
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within Kaohsiung Harbour Zone, Kaohsiung Multi-Functional Commerce and Trade 
Park (KMFCTP) was created.
After receiving the No. 17486 Official Document from the Executive Yuan on June 
1996, the Division o f Public Works and Urban Development Bureau of the Kaohsiung 
City began to make the KMFCTP a reality.
Location and environment
The Kaohsiung Multi-Functional Commerce & Trade Park is located on the East side 
o f Kaohsiung Harbour. Parts o f the KMFCTP’s area overlaps Ling-Ya commercial 
zone, which is the major commercial activity zone o f Kaohsiung City, and its zone 
neighbours Ling-Hai Export Processing Zone and Kaohsiung Harbour's Container 
Centre. The KMFCTP is not only a most important industrial development zone, it 
is also part o f the future metropolitan development plans.
The Park encompasses 587 hectares o f land. Most of the land originally belonged to 
Qian-Zhen and Kaohsiung Export Processing Zones, Middle-Island commercial 
harbour zone, and the commercial zones o f Pong-Lai, Yan-Cheng, and Ling-Ya.
Due to Kaohsiung Harbour’s unique characteristics, the KMFCTP project is 
designated to create a multi-functional marine transportation centre. The centre will 
provide warehousing, transhipment, financial, commercial and other related services.
The relevance of KMFCTP to the research
The KMFCTP Project is part o f the ‘Asian Pacific Regional Operation Centre’ 
Programme, a long-term national development project set out in 1994, and
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undoubtedly one o f the significant economic projects in Taiwan. As a complex project, 
KMFCTP project contains various small plans across the sectors o f land use planning, 
economic development, urban redevelopment, and transportation. Due to the many 
sectors involved in its establishment, the KMFCTP project offers an excellent 
opportunity for this research to investigate policy coordination after the governmental 
shift in 2000, and to explore the relationship between the local planning authority 
which designed this governmental project and the central government which 
subsequently approved it.
4.5 Field Work Setting
The field work in this research consists o f a study of primary and secondary 
documentation, and interviews. Documentation reading helps contextual 
understanding, while the interview was the tool primarily used to generate fresh data 
about the cases and to analyse the institutional relations. The interview method was 
considered particularly useful for answering the research questions relating to the 
interactions among actors and the coordination between economic development 
policy and land use planning.
To explore the horizontal coordination between actors in relation to land use planning 
and economic planning, it was necessary to take both sectors into account. Moreover, 
to understand the vertical relations between the central and local authorities, research 
participants from both administrative layers were included in the interview list. 
Though the focus would be placed on coordination within governmental institutions, 
the private sector, e.g. interest groups, would not be excluded if there was proof of
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their influence in each project. Anticipated interviewee groups are shown in Figure 
4.2.
There were six primary categories set as potential interviewee groups in each case 
study in order to realise the relational map as a whole (see Figure 4.2). The intention 
was to interview at least one person from each o f the six categories, making 18 
interviewees in total (6x3=18). However, it was likely that some potential 
interviewees would be involved in one or more o f the case studies, e.g. officers in the 
CEPD and RPC, which would reduce the number of interviewees. In fact, 17 
interviewees were conducted in total (see Section 4.7 for further details).
Figure 4.2 Anticipated Interviewee Groups
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4.6 Data Acquisition and Analysis
4.6.1 Documents
Documentary data acquisition is particularly important in an empirical study. To 
ensure data collection from as many sources as possible, four types o f documentation 
relating to the research topic were perused:
1. Legislative regulations and relevant laws
2. National Economic Development Plans
3. Relevant land use plans
4. Working paper for the policy making process
Though only state documents o f constitutional or diplomatic origin are recognised as 
documents by historians (Scott, 1990, p. 10), in this study, the term 'documentation’ 
applied to any printed or written information related to the topic o f thesis. Thus 
non-official documents, such as meeting memo and notes, were perused in this 
research, since such documents are important for understanding policy operation. For 
example, the policy-making process for Tainan Science Park had finished by the late 
1990s, and many events were not shown in government documents. To overcome this 
obstacle, newspapers and magazines were read to obtain information useful for 
understanding what had happened at that time. Therefore, data extracted from 
newspapers and magazines were viewed as documentary material.
In addition, interviewing was also identified as a significant approach o f gaining data 
and much valuable information was generated from the transcriptions of interviews. 
Although government working papers provided some official records, e.g. plan details,
planning schedules, there were untold operations, in particular those relating to 
personal relationships which were uncovered through interviews. Even though the 
information elicited during interviews was not available in a previous written form, 
they generated as much useful information as would have been obtained from 
documentation.
Both documentation collection and interviews were carried out as part o f the field 
work. In order to obtain the most relevant and valuable information, the investigation 
method in this study used the snowball process approach for achieving an 
understanding o f the policy-making process in each project. The elite interview 
technique was adopted to reveal and explore the relationship among the selected 
individual informants.
4.6.2 Snowball process approach
All three cases selected were significant government projects related to various 
sectors, and the policy-making process for each case had taken a long time. This made 
it difficult to access all the actors involved in the policy-making process because there 
had been a number o f people involved in the process and there are too many 
documents to read related to the process to identify them within the time constraints 
o f this study. Accordingly, to extract the most helpful information from a complex 
situation, it was essential to pick ‘key persons' to interview and collect the ‘right 
documents’ to review in order to produce quality research.
The snowball process approach seemed to offer an ideal solution to this challenge. 
This approach starts from relevant persons in the relationship net and then moves on 
to others via information offered by interviewees and contacts. The technique adopted
in this study was a modified form o f snowball sampling whereby interviewees were 
asked to identify individuals whom they thought would be interested in or helpful to 
this study. This process is based on the assumption that a ‘bond’ or ‘link’ exists 
between the initial sample and others in the network (Berg, 1988). However, the 
greatest advantage o f the technique is that it provides a means of accessing a ‘hidden 
and hard-to-reach population’ which are 'few in number or where some degree o f trust 
is required to initiate contact’ (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). In interview research, the 
snowball technique can identify experts and people with strong and well articulated 
opinions. A good example o f the snowball approach in planning studies is 
Saunders’(1979) study o f urban politics where interviewees were asked who held 
power and this led to more respondents (Atkinson and Flint, 2001).
The snowball strategy has its difficulties, o f course. One o f the most noticeable 
problems, as Atkinson and Flint (2001) point out, is representativeness o f 
interviewees and sampling principle. Fortunately, this seemed not to be a serious 
difficulty in this research since the first interviewees offered a useful linkage to an 
insiders’ circle and this process is illustrated in Section 4.7. In general, with regard 
gaining access to an insiders’ circle, the snowball process approach is very useful for 
those studies focusing on social networks (Johnson and Weller, 2001, p.496).
With respect to the three cases, there were several relevant persons on the interviewee 
list as a result o f reviewing official documents, however, there were still some persons 
involved in the policy-making process who had not been named in official documents. 
Moreover, working papers which might have been very important for illuminating the 
policy decision-making process had never been published. All data in such resources 
were necessary for policy-making analysis and were what the investigator in this
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research sought. However, given that such data sources could not be accessed by the 
researcher, the snowball process provided valuable data which could be found and 
which would enable them to draw up the policy networks more clearly. The result o f 
the snowball approach is presented in Section 4.7.
4.6.3 Elite interview technique
Another technique for data production that was used in this study was the ‘elite 
interview'. Although the term ‘elite' seems to be ambiguous, it can be defined as 
'specifiable groups of persons' who possess power and privilege (Marcus, 1983). 
According to such a definition, the designation of whom or what is elite may be 
various and depends on the subject of the study. Individuals or groups may be elite, on 
the other hand, associations and sectors can be identified as elites, too. Whatever the 
designation is, it is dependent on broader understandings o f power and society 
(Odendahl and Shaw, 2001, p.301) as described in Chapter Two o f this thesis, and that 
is what this thesis address in the Chapter Two and Three.
In this study, the term meant those actors involved with economic development 
projects in the planning process. Having decided upon the meaning of ‘elite', it 
became necessary to find the 'right' respondents, those in the ‘insider’s circle' o f 
policy coordination in order to achieve an understanding o f how relationships were 
built up. The potential interviewee list comprised the participants in policy 
coordination in relation to economic planning and land use planning sectors at both 
central and local levels and in the private sector. There were at least two criteria for 
the choice of informants: first, they were thought of as policy-makers within 
organisations; and, second, they had participated in the economic project selected or 
they had most knowledge about the project in the sector.
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Yet some may question the accessibility to anticipated interview ees. In order to 
conduct elite interviews, the most significant concern is accessibility to respondents 
and this is the very reason why in this study the snowball process was adopted in 
conjunction with the elite interview method. As Odendahl and Shaw explain (2001, 
p.307), the original contact in an elite interview  is extrem ely helpful and ‘insiders', if  
there are any, are very helpful for establishing rapport and trust with other potential 
elite interview ees (Atkinson and Coffey, 2001). ‘Who know s w hom ' m atters in 
applying the elite interview in order to explore the network within which inform ants 
move and operate. Therefore, the best entry to an elite group for a researcher is 
through them selves o f  the ‘elite group ' (Odendahl and Shaw, 2001, p.301) and this is 
the strength o f  the snowball process. The design o f  the data acquisition process is 
shown in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3 The Design of the Data Acquisition Process
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Source: A uthor’s strategy (R.A means Respondent A)
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4.6.4 Semi-structured interview
Interviewing is a significant mode o f data collection in policy research and takes 
several forms- structured, unstructured and semi-structure interview. In this research, 
there was a clear focus on exploring the relationship between economic and land use 
planning sectors, and the investigator elicited information relating to the planning 
decision process via interviews (Bryman, 2001, p .315). The employment of 
semi-structured interview is because o f its strength in eliciting informants’ view, 
opinions and experiences and eliciting rich and in-depth information to obtain a full 
understanding o f the informants’ perspective on the topic under investigation (Arksey, 
2004, p.268). In order to understand policy coordination as a whole, informants’ 
experience was viewed as valuable data for analysing policy coordination, though the 
focus was not the individual respondent him/her self.
Most elite interviews were undertaken in person and were processed in informants’ 
offices. An in-person interview has advantages such as eliciting more accurate and 
thoughtful responses and greater effectiveness in illustrating complex issues, though, 
compared to telephone interviewing, it takes time and costs more (Shuy, 2001, pp. 
537-555). Interviews were conducted in informants' office to provide a quiet 
environment and avoid interruptions. Where permission was granted, interviews were 
taped recorded and notes made of interviewees’ comments.
4.6.5 Elicitation techniques for interviewing
Apart from the technical concerns, the most significant element in deciding the 
quality of an interview is still the questions formulated. An interview guide, referred 
to by Bryman (2001, p .319) was adopted in this research as it offered the interviewer 
a clear route to follow as the interview proceeded (see Figure 4.4). This interview
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guide was used in conjunction with Kvale’s (1996)26 nine questions suggested for 
interviews.
The individual interview is expected to start with some introductory questions and 
then to elicit the informant’s opinion through conversation. Subsequent questions are 
determined by previous questions and may also be varied according to the 
respondent’s background. Spradley’s (1979, pp.85-89) grand-tour and mini-tour 
question strategies are in an exploratory-explanatory sequence. Grand-tour questions 
can be informative and are asked to elicit background information, whereas mini-tour 
also gather information but focuses on a specific event connected with the research 
topic.
For instance, an introductory question might be: (a) ‘could you please tell me about 
how you became involved with this project’ (grand-tour)? Once the respondent has 
answered this, the follow-up question might be: what is your role in the organisation 
and in the project? And (b) ‘how have you co-worked with other sectors in this 
project?’ If the informant offers many details about the interaction with other sectors, 
the follow-up question might ask about specific events or activities and their details 
(mini-tour). Such questioning will provide a broader understanding o f the context and 
lead to a narrower focus on the topic studied. However, it is worth noting that the 
development o f an interview is heavily dependent on the individual characteristics of 
informants, and good preparatory background work by investigators can improve the 
quality of interviewing process.
'(> kvale, S. (1996) has suggested nine different kinds o f  question that most interviews should contain:, 
introducing, follow-up, probing, specifying, direct, indirect, structuring, interpreting questions and 
silence (give the interviewee the opportunity to answer)..
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Figure 4.4 An Interview Guide
Source: Adapted from Bryman (2001, p.319)
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4.7 Selection of Interviewees
Following the snowball approach, 17 interviewees selected were accessed for 
participation in the study (see Table 4.1). The final member o f interviewees differed 
somewhat from the originally intended total o f 18. No potential interviewee was 
found in the planning consultancy field using the snowball process possibly because 
of the weakness of the private planning sector resulting from the developmental state 
strategy adopted by the Taiwanese government (Sections 3.32 and 3.61) The names of 
interviewees together with their position and date o f interview are presented below. 
Interviewees gave their permission for their names to be used in this thesis.
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Table 
4.1 
The 
Final Inform
ant L
ist
-t.ON
Interviewee Title Interview 1Interview Place Interview D Reason of Choice Post Scriptum
R .A 1 Ms. Li-Kong Chen
Head of Department of 
Asset Science. Leader 
University
Telephone
3.51 Office, Glamorgan 
Building, CardilT 
University'
30* Jul 2006
A well-known academic on 
land use planning issues and 
ex-member of Urban Planning 
Committee, CPA
Starting point for 
in form ants in lan d use 
planning system
R .A 2 Mr. An-Chiang Wang Director of Comprehensive Planning Department. CPA Face to Face
Wang’s office. 
Comprehensive Planning 
Department, CPA
27* Sep 2006
Introduced by Ms Jui-Huan 
Chen
Alternative interviewee to 
Mr. C M Chen
R .A 3 Dr. Yen-Jong Chen
Head of Department of 
Urban Planning, Cheng 
Kung University
Face to Face Chen's office 19* Oct 2006
Introduced by Ms Shu-Hui 
Wu
Mem ber of Regional 
Planning Committee, CPA
R B I Dr. Chien-Yuan I., in
Prof of Graduate of 
Building and Planning, 
Taiwan University
Face to Face
Lin’s Office, National 
Taiwan University, 
Taipei, Taiwan
15* Aug 2006
A well-known academic on 
economic planning policy and 
industrial park
Starting point for 
informants in economic 
planning system
R .R 2 Mr. Hong-Ka Liao
Senior Specialist. Urban 
and Housing Development 
Department, CEPD
Face to Face Conference room, CEPD 28* Sep 2006
Introduced by Mr Chung- 
Chang Hsu
R .B 3 Ms. Ming-Chu Tsai Specialist Commissioner Ms. Tsai. Min-Chu Face to Face
Department of Planning 
and Evaluation. National 
Science Council
27* Sep 2006 Introduced by Ms. Hsiu-Min Chang
Former Chief of Science 
Park Unit, NSC till mid 
2006
R.C.1 Mr. Yuan-Jen Hsueh
Official servant of Urban 
Development Bureau, 
Kaohstung City
Face to Face
Conference Room, Urban 
Development Bureau, 
Kaohsiung City Hall
11* Aug 2006
Introduced by Ms, Li-Hong 
Chen
R .C 2 Mr. Wen-Chin Chang
Official servant of Urban 
Development Bureau, 
Kaohsiung City
Face to Face
Conference Room. Urban 
Development Bureau, 
Kaohsiung City Hall
II* Aug 2006
Introduced by Mr. Yuan-Jen 
Hsueh.
R .C 3 Mr. Chung-Chang Hsu
Deputy Chief Engineer. 
Urban Development Bureau 
(UDB), Kaohsiung City 
Government
Face to Face Deputy Chief Engineer Office. UDB \4m Sep 2006
Introduced by Dr, Tong-Po 
Ho
Table 4.1 The Final Informant List (Cont’d)
Source: Author’s data
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R.A1 Ms. Li-Hong Chen, Ex-Member o f the Urban Planning Committee, telephone 
interview on 31st Jul 06- led to R.C1 Yuan-Jen, Hsueh interviewed on 11th Aug 06, 
Urban Development Bureau (UDB), Kaohsiung City Government and Hsueh led 
further to R.C2 Wen-Chin, Chang , interviewed on 11th Aug 06, Senior Planner in the 
UDB. Also led to R.D1 Professor Tong-Po Ho, Department o f Asset Science, Leader 
University, and also the Ex-Vice-Secretary of Kaohsiung City Government, 
interviewed on 16th Sep 06- led to R.C3 Mr. Chung-Chang Hsu. R.C3 Mr Hsu 
introduced R.F1 Dr. Tsu-Lung Chou, Member o f the Urban Planning Committee, CPA, 
and R.B2 Mr. Hong-Kai Liao, Senior Specialist, Urban and Housing Development 
Department, CEPD, interviewed on 28th Sep 06- end o f process.
R.B1 Dr. John Chien-Yuan Lin, National Taiwan University, interviewed on 15 Aug 
06- led to R.F2 Dr. Chen-Kang Su, Assistant Professor, Department o f Land 
Management and Development, Chang-Jung Christian University, interviewed on 5th 
Sep 06.
R.F2 Dr. Chen-Kang Su led to R.D2Ms Jui-Huan Chen, Specialist Chief, South 
Taiwan Science Park Administration, interviewed on 11th Sep 06 and R.C4 Mr. 
Hsin-Hsou Wu, Director of Department of Urban and Rural Development, Tainan 
County Government, interviewed in 13th Sep 06- end o f process.
R.D2 led to R.A2 Mr. C.M. Chen, Deputy Director of Comprehensive Planning 
Department, Construction and Planning Agency (CPA), Ministry of the Interior (MOI), 
(replaced by Chen’s Director, Wang, An-Chiang due to unavailability), interviewed on 
27th Sep 06- end o f process, also led to R.D3 Ms. Hsiu-Min Chang, Section Chief o f
Kaohsiung Science Park Division, STSP Administration, interviewed on 15th Sep 06 
who led to R.C5 Ms Chien-Yun Hsu, Urban Planning Section Chief, Kaohsiung 
County Government, interviewed on 5th Oct 06.
R.D3 and R.C5 led to R.D4 Ms. Shu-Hui Wu, Industrial and Commercial Service 
Section Chief, Kaohsiung County Government, interviewed on 13th Oct 06 and R. C5 
also led to R.A3 Dr. Yen-Jong Chen, Member o f Regional Planning Committee (RPC), 
MOI, interviewed on 19th Oct 06- end of process.
R.D2 led to Ms. Ming-Chu Tsai, Member o f Integration Section, National Science 
Council, interviewed on 27th Sep 06.
The finding least expected was the very weak connection between the plan making 
process and private planning consultancies (Figure 4.5). As mentioned in Chapter 
Three (Sections 3.32 and 3.61), the planning process in Taiwan is supposedly used as 
an instrument for achieving economic development strategy and dominated by the 
public sector and the final potential informant lists as a result o f the snowball process 
confirmed this. Therefore, private sector seemed not to be referred to by informants 
during the snowball process.
The final informant list extracted by means o f the snowball process also illustrated the 
significance o f academic groups as well as public institutions in the planning process, 
since some academic respondents held positions in government, e.g. Dr. Tsu-Lung 
Chou, Member o f Urban Planning Committee and Dr. Yen-Jong Chen, Member of 
Regional Planning Committee. This suggested that academic groups might also have 
played an important role in policy coordination through their personal networks in
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academ ia. Further inform ation in relation to th is w as expected to be obtained from 
interviews.
Finally, the contribution o f the snowball process approach will becom e clear in the 
following chapters. With regard to respondents' backgrounds, it was noticeable that 
many inform ants chosen by the snowball approach were senior officers who had been 
involved in the policy-m aking process for long tim e. M any o f  them seemed to know 
each other and there appeared to be a strong netw ork behind the formal structure. I f  
the snowball process approach had not been used, these relationships would not have 
been uncovered not would the people in charge o f  the policy-m aking process been 
indentified. The findings presented in Chapter Eight provide further justifications for 
the selection o f  the research m ethods used in this study.
Figure 4.5 Final Inform ant List Extracted by the Snowball Process
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4.8 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the research methods and strategies employed in this 
research. In brief, the primary research methods used were the case study, elite 
semi-structured interview, and the analysis o f relevant documentation. These three 
methods provided strong triangulation, covered all necessary sources, and overcame 
the limitation o f a single method. The contribution o f the strong triangulation is seen 
in the rich research findings presented in the following chapters.
151
Chapter Five Case Study 1: Tainan Science Park (TSP)
5.1 Introduction
The development o f science parks in Taiwan has been an important issue over several 
decades. As a developmental state, Taiwan’s central government has viewed the 
promotion o f science parks as not only an industrial policy, but also a successful 
model o f economic development (Lee and Yang, 2000). For local governments, the 
development of a science park means a great amount o f investment and an 
opportunity to upgrade the local economy. Due to the strategic role o f the science park, 
it is not surprising that the establishment o f each science park has always attracted 
attention and competition.
The planning process o f Southern Taiwan Science Park (STSP) project had offered a 
large arena in which bureaucrats, politicians and interest groups, e.g. developers and 
landowners, interacted. As one o f Taiwan’s most significant economic development 
projects in the 1990s, the science park project involved crosscutting cooperation, 
including the land use planning sector. Studying the establishment o f science parks, 
and specifically the relationship between economic planning and land use planning 
sectors can contribute to an understanding of policy coordination related to land use 
planning in Taiwan.
This chapter focuses on policy coordination in the development o f Tainan Science 
Park (TSP), the first case in this study. The TSP project’s importance is due to the fact
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that it is not only a single industrial park project but also the largest economic 
development plan established by central government in the last decade. It offers a 
panorama o f governmental actions and also provides a model of how policy 
coordination is operated in Taiwan’s planning system. Yet, there is no research-based 
account o f it in the existing literature.
It therefore narrates the backdrop and context o f TSP in Section 5.2 and offers an 
understanding o f the policy making process in Section 5.3. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 
analyse economic planning and land use planning systems related to TSP through data 
collected by means o f  field work and documentation. Findings from the field study 
are presented in the final section o f this chapter.
5.2 Historical Context and Background Details
5.2.1 Historical Background
On 1st July 1993, the 2388th executive meeting o f the Executive Yuan confirmed an 
Economic Revitalisation Project in which the establishment o f the first science park in 
southern Taiwan was proposed. This would make it the second science park in the 
country, the first being Hsinchu Science Park (HSP). The development proposal then 
was still very vague, and the only certainty was that the new development would be 
set up in southern Taiwan in order to reduce increasing regional disparities. A few 
years after, the STSP project (which now includes both Tainan Science Park and 
Kaohsiung Science Park) had been submitted to the Executive Yuan by the National 
Science Council (NSC), and it received approval from the Executive Yuan in May 
1995. This was the beginning o f science park development in south Taiwan.
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It is believed that the reason the government promoted the STSP project was due to 
the over-development o f Hsinchu Science Park (HSP). The initial plan for HSP had 
not anticipated its huge success and the high demands for industrial land. As a 
consequence, there was no more land available within it for further development 
purposes (Kuo, 2001, chapter 3). Moreover, the developmental model o f HSP had had 
huge impacts not only on local planning but also national development planning since 
its success showed the science park project was a strategic tool to reduce the 
north-south divide in economic development, the significant goal of spatial policy in 
Taiwan.
With regard to the developmental path after the Second World War, economic strategy 
had become priority of state policy and received full support and a huge budget from 
the central government. Once the STSP project became a strategic policy, it inevitably 
became thought o f as a driving force o f the local economy. Since many counties in 
Taiwan were suffering from economic restructuring in the 1990s, the development o f 
the new science park seemed to be a solution to the problem. Hence, it was not 
surprising that there was competition among local planning authorities to have the 
STSP project located within their jurisdiction as much good was expected to come 
from it, it would boost the local economy and provide job opportunities (Interview 
with Dr. Su, Assistant Professor, Department o f Land Management and Development, 
Chung-Jone University, September, 2006 ).
As a result of local expectations, the STSP project was no longer a simple industrial 
policy but a spatial strategy to promote economic development in southern Taiwan. 
That is to say, the STSP project was seen as a major governmental effort to assist
industrial upgrade in the southern region, and to balance the distribution o f 
development areas for the high-tech industry throughout the island (Lin, C-Y., 1996).
Initially, there was much debate as to where the site for the STSP project should be 
located during the planning process (see Section 5.3.2). The STSP was finally sited in 
an area stretching across three townships, Shanhua, Shinshi and Andin in Tainan 
County. In July 1997, the Tainan Science Park Development office officially 
commenced operations, and according to the government's report, has attracted many 
companies and much investment (STSP http://www.stsipa.gov.tw/web. accessed 2nd 
January 2006).
5.2.2 Land use plan and location
The Southern Taiwan Science Park (STSP) project, including Tainan Science Park 
(TSP) and Kaohsiung Science Park27 (KSP), comprises two sites. The first site, the 
Shinshi site, is 1038 hectares in size and situated among three towns in Tainan County: 
Shanhua, Shinshi and Andin. The second site, the Lujhu site (discussed in Chapter Six) 
is a 569.99 hectares development area across three townships, Lujhu, Kungshan and 
Yunan in Kaohsiung County. Both sites are convenient to Kaohsiung International 
Airport and Kaohsiung International Harbour (see Figure 5.1).
A perfect location with a completed transport network was the very significant reason 
that the Shinshi site beat the Lujhu in the final round o f site selection. Basically, TSP 
is surrounded by National Highways No.l and 8, Provincial Highway T1 and County 
Road No. 178 while National Highway No.3 is nearby.
27 Kaohsiung Science Park will be discussed as the second case in the next chapter.
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As a result of the traffic system, TSP is within easy reach of Tainan Airport, and 
Tainan High Speed Railway (HSR) Station, and relatively near to Kaohsiung 
International Airport. Figure 5.2 shows the layout and land plan o f TSP. Noticeably, 
there is a high speed railway running from top to bottom of the eastern boundary o f  
TSP which led concerns about the damaging effect o f vibrations o f passing train on 
delicate high-tech instruments during the middle phase of development process.
5.3 Policy Making Process of TSP
The TSP originated in is the preliminary plan for the STSP drawn up by the NSC in 
1993 and subsequently approved at the 2,388th executive meeting o f the Executive 
Yuan. However, the idea to establish a second science park can be traced back to the 
‘Six-Year National Development Plan' issued by the CEPD in 1991. In this 
governmental document, the Taiwanese government first announced the project for a 
new science park in accordance with the purpose o f balancing regional development 
(see Table 5.1).
5.3.1 The need for the second science park
In the early 1990s, the development o f Hsinchu Science Park (HSP) faced a challenge 
since there was no land available for further expansion and the demand for land was 
still high. The National Science Council (NSC), the authority responsible for science 
park policy, faced difficulties in obtaining land for further expansion o f HSP in 
northern Taiwan. Therefore, the central government began to look for an alternative 
solution, including the suggestion to use a number o f empty land areas owned by the
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Taiwan Sugar C orporation28. M ost o f  this land was far from HSP and located in 
southern Taiwan, but it was viewed as a positive way to reduce regional inequality 
through the establishm ent o f  a second science park. The need for a new science park 
in southern Taiwan w as initially confirmed by the Executive Yuan in 1993 (Yang and 
Su, 2002).
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Figure 5.1 The Location and Transport System of Tainan Science Park (not to 
scale)
Source: STSP website, http://ww w .stsipa.gov.tw /w eb (accessed 15th Dec 2007)
:8 Taiwan Sugar Corporation was a government owned company which owned much farming land in 
Taiwan.
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The policy-making process for Southern Taiwan Science Park (STSP) project elicited 
much contestation during the site selection process. As previously mentioned, the
<
central government’s decision to establish a science park in southern Taiwan was due
i
to the recognised need to promote industrial development and balance regional 
development. However once the intention to establish the STSP was announced 
publicly, competition among counties to obtain the investment benefits suddenly 
intensified and the central government found itself facing the difficult decision o f 
! where to locate the STSP
Table 5.1 Chronological Development of Tainan Science Park
i Source: STSP website, http://www.stsipa.gov.tw/web (accessed 18th Dec, 2007)
Oct 1990
NSC suggested to the Executive Yuan that a second science park should be 
established
1st Jan 1991
National Six-Year Plan proposed the establishment of a new science park in order 
to reduce regional disparity.
25th Feb 1993.................
NSC published the report-‘Study o f Potential Bases for the Second Science Park’ 
which pointed to Shinshi (in Tainan) as the preferred location, while the two townships 
of Yanchao and Cishan in Kaohsiung County, were identified as sixth and seventh 
preference respectively.
1st Jul 1993
The 2338th Executive Yuan Council announced the ‘Promotion o f Economic 
Development’ project, indicating its determination to set up Southern Taiwan Science 
Park.
Jan 1994
A panel to plan the Southern Taiwan Science Park project assembled by the NSC.
1st Dec 1994
The NSC set out the assessment criteria for site selection o f the STSP.
14th Jan 1995
The Panel for Site Selection of the NSC suggested Shinshi, Tainan, as the site for 
the STSP.
25th Jan 1995............................................................................................................................
The NSC set up the STSP Work Panel.
28th Apr 1995.......................
The Executive Yuan approved the STSP project proposed by the NSC which 
organised the preliminary STSP Administration for construction purpose.
23rd Jun 1995
The NSC called a meeting with Tainan County Government and Taiwan Sugar 
Corporation for the purpose o f establishing the construction and development plan.
31st j ul 1995..............................................................................................................................
The NSC submitted an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to the 
Environmental Protection Administration, Executive Yuan.
13th Feb 1996
The Environmental Protection Administration o f the Executive Yuan accepted the 
EIA with some restrictions.
22 nd Apr 1996
Regional Planning Committee, CPA, approved the STSP development plan.
6th Jan 1997
The STSP Administration and Tainan County Government arranged the fisrt 
monthly meeting to discuss relevant development issues.
25th Apr 1997.................
Dao-Ye archaeological site was unearthed.
9th May 1997
CPA approved the STSP detailed development plan.
9th Dec 1999
CPA approved the Specific District Plan for the STSP
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5.3.2 Site location dispute
There were unsurprisingly many candidate competing in the site bid, however, only 
two candidates, Sinshih town, Tainan County and Lujhu town, Kaohsiung county, 
went forward to the last site selection round. In fact, after the initial evaluation, three 
competing sites went on to the final round: two were in Tainan County, Sinshih and 
Guiren, and the other was Lujhu, Kaohsiung. According to an interview in September 
2006 with Hsin-Hsou Wu, Director of Department o f Urban and Rural Development, 
Tainan County Government, Guiren was removed from the list first because there was 
another development project planned within it, the Special District o f High Speed 
Railway Station Project, in the area. The County Government wanted balanced 
development within the county therefore the local planning authority decided to offer 
full support to Sinshih as the site for the second science park.
In order to choose the most suitable site, a government panel for site selection made 
up o f representatives from academia, government and industries was appointed by the 
NSC to make a final decision. After several visits to both sites and evaluations of 
multi-sectoral factors, eventually, surprisingly, Sinshih was preferred to Lujhu, 8 votes 
to 1, though many thought the votes should have been much closer. During the 
interview with Director Wu, Department of Urban and Rural Development, Tainan 
County Government in September 2006, he contended that the decision had been very 
reasonable because of Sinshih’s decisive advantage, namely a large plain site with a 
rectangular shape and integrated transport system. On the other hand, Lujhu’s main 
problem was its location far from an urban area, and the unattractive fragmentation o f 
the site.
This study’s intention is not to judge if the decision was right or wrong, though there
must have been strong determination on the part o f those supporting Sinshih to ensure 
its ultimate victor, since its rival had exerted a tremendous effort to win the bid.
Despite there being endless questions about the result, Dr. Su (Interviewed in
September 2006) pointed out two crucial points why Shinshih won the bid:
‘A significant reason why the Panel finally chose Sinshih as the site fo r  the 
Southern Taiwan Science Park project was there would be more spare space for 
further development should the need arise. The experience o f H SP’s lack o f 
space had indicated that the new project should avoid this disadvantage in 
advance and should be able to provide more space. The Sinshih site is located 
in an area with much space fo r  expansion and, compared to Lujhu Town, 
Kaohsiung County, this was the decisive advantage o f  Sinshih Town, Tainan 
County.
Second, an excellent transport system was also a key concern o f  the Panel.
There are three highways and four highway, junctions around the Sinshih site 
(another one is nearby), whilst the transport system around Lujhu Town is not
as good as that o f its competitor. All the reasons cited above led to Sinshih 
being the site chosen for the Southern Taiwan Science Park project. ’
As mentioned in interviews with both Director Wu and Dr. Su, the concerns of the site 
selection panel were space for further expansion and the need for a nearby integrated 
transport system. They were the two primary reasons for choosing Shinshih site. 
However, a cloud of suspicion has hung over the decision and never vanished, that is 
to say, some argue that the Lujhu site had a transport system as good as its rival, 
though its area plan was not as big as that o f Shinshih (Interview with Dr. Su). Were
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the size o f the site and the nearby transportation system the real factors that influence 
site selection?
Both Sinshih and Lujhu have their advantages, however, it appears that both candidate 
sites were backed by some very ‘powerful persons’ who might have intended to affect 
the final decision during the policy making process according to interviewee 
comments. Let us review the political relationship Dr. Su spoke of when being 
interviewed:
‘...the former Magistrate o f Tainan County, the winner, was Tan-Shan Chen 
(DPP), while Teng-Hui Lee (KMT) was the President at that time. Though we 
cannot say how fa r  President Lee was involved with the decision making, it is 
possible Lee supported Tainan County in the bid since Lee maintained a very 
good relationship with specific DPP politicians, including Tan-Shan Chen'.
On the other hand, the current Speaker o f the Legislative Yuan, Jin-Pyng Wang 
(KMT), who was the Vice Speaker o f the Legislative Yuan at that time, cooperated 
with the Magistrate of Kaohsiung County, Cheng-Shien Yu (DPP) to promote the 
Lujhu site as a location for the STSP project. Speaker Wang’s constituency belongs to 
Kaohsiung County and Lujhu Town is Wang’s hometown. This implies, in the case o f 
site selection for the STSP project, that politicians put political concern based on local 
interests above political ideology.
In other words, the rules o f the political game at the local level differed from those 
operating at the central level. While spatial planning had increasingly influenced the 
planning discourse at the state level, local benefit was the prime political
consideration. Therefore, individual political coalitions had been formed for the same 
goal o f winning the bid in both counties. It is very difficult to tell to what extent such 
political coalitions had affected the decision-making process but it appears to have 
been an important factor in policy making in this case (Yang and Su, 2002).
Such informal political networks behind the official planning framework seem to 
suggest an arena where politics and planning interests meet up. Nevertheless, it would 
be unfair to conclude that the STSP site project selection decision was determined by 
political intervention only, since the decision was acceptable in general (Interview 
with Dr. Su in September 2000). In fact, despite there having been some theories 
about political intervention, many academics praised the outcome. According to an 
article written by Yang and Su (2002), if political power had been the sole influence, 
the final vote would not have been 8:1, a landslide victory to Sinshih; on the contrary, 
it would have shown a tied result. A better explanation for the result is that politicians 
might have attempted to defend their interests, but the Commissioners on the Site 
Selection Panel seemed still to be honest and professional, and made an appropriate 
decision:
‘...intervention from the NSC was negligible and even the panel had not 
adopted the NSC’s advice report. The site selection decision for the STSP 
project was based on the potential o f  Sinshih site... a scholar, one o f the 
commissioners, claimed that it was wrong to attribute it to political 
intervention’ (Yang and Su, 2002, p.58).
It is believed that the site selection process for the STSP project had been undertaken 
with professional concerns, though it was also true that the decision-makers had taken
complex factors including politics into account. As Dr. Su pointed out when being 
interviewed, there was a bureaucratic mechanism keeping the planning decision on 
track, despite both central and local governments concern about their political stake in 
the game. After a keen competition, the NSC eventually respected the choice made by 
the Site Selection Panel for the STSP project therefore it was determined that the 
STSP would be set up on the Sinshih site, Tainan County, and the site is called Tainan 
Science Park (TSP) today.
5.4 Economic Planning Framework for TSP
In the administrative hierarchy, all science parks are supervised by the National 
Science Council (NSC) which is the organisation initially responsible for the 
promotion o f the technology and science industry (see Figure 5.3).
5.4.1 NSC and STSP Administration
With regard to the relationship between the NSC and STSP Administration in policy 
making, as long as there is a need, the STSP Administration, as a secondary 
organisation o f the NSC, submits suggestions and ideas to the NSC, which can make a 
final decision or transfer it to the upper level, i.e. the Executive Yuan. Normally the 
NSC tends to accept suggestions from Science Park Administrations because each 
Administration knows the best development strategy for an individual science park 
and also has close contact with local planning authorities. In fact, management o f 
science parks is not the strength of the NSC whose most significant role is to help the 
promotion of research and design and to draft policies for technology and science 
industries (NSC website, http://web.nsc.gov.tw/. accessed 7th May 2007).
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Figure 5.3 The Organisational Chart of the National Science Council
Source: NSC website, http://web.nsc.gov.twA accessed 7th May 2007
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For the NSC, science park policy is only a part of the technology policy. In fact, the 
establishment of the first Science Park Administration, introduced by Kuo-ting Li29, 
was the first time it held to implement and manage technology industries in practice, 
though it had been experienced in policy making in relation to technology for decades.
Q Li was a famous economist in Taiwan and had been Minister o f  Economic Affairs. He is known as 
the Father o f  the Science Park in Taiwan.
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The development o f science parks is indeed different from the other duties of the NSC. 
TSP is the second science park after Hsinchu Science Park, and there have been ten 
further science parks developed in the last decade.
As more science parks have become established (see Figure 5.4), it has become 
beyond the N SC’s capacity to manage them all. As a result, a new division, the 
Science Park Unit, was set up within the NSC several years ago for policy 
coordination with all Administrations in order to integrate strategic and complex 
affairs which individual Science Park Administration cannot handle. The Science Park 
Unit is not listed in Figure 5.3 since it is more like a dynamic task panel instead o f an 
organisation (Interview with Specialist Commissioner Tsai, the former Chief of 
Science Park Unit, September 2006) although it is responsible for coordination affairs 
among science parks.
Unsurprisingly, the development o f TSP is inevitably related to crosscutting affairs. 
For instance, according to the formal planning procedure in Taiwan, an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) is required before a development is implemented. In the 
official structure o f the Taiwanese Government, the Environmental Protection 
Administration (EPA) is the Ministry in charge of EIA affairs. As a secondary 
organisation o f the NSC, the STSP Administration cannot deal with such issues 
without the NSC’s help. The important role o f the NSC in relation to economic 
planning is as a mediator to deliver comments from each science park administration 
to relevant central departments or the upper level. In other words, in the case o f TSP, 
the NSC plays a role on coordination and communication at the central government 
leveEas long as there is a need o f assistance from the higher level; otherwise the STSP 
Administration is the organisation which deals with most development policies.
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Figure 5.4 The Geographical Distribution of Science Parks
Source: NSC website, http://web.nsc.gov.tw/, (accessed 7th Sep 2007)
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In most cases, the STSP Administration can cope with most policy making and 
development implementation. Apart from some very special conditions, the STSP 
Administration manages communication and cooperation with local actors. As regards 
inter-Administration affairs, it is Hsinchu Science Park Administration which collects 
suggestions from individual Administrations to resolve problems in relation to 
conflicts between different science parks. When a problem cannot be resolved, it is 
the responsibility of the Science Park Unit under the NSC to coordinate with the
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actors concerned.
In the mean time, the power of developing science parks has brought the NSC some 
unexpected benefits, as indicated by, Specialist Chief Chen, STSP Administration, 
September 2006):
‘Due to the success o f  science parks, the public impression o f the NSC is that it 
has strong links with the development o f  science parks, though this is only an 
outcome o f technology policy. Such a successful image o f  science parks also 
makes the NSC more influential in policy making, i.e. the location o f new 
science parks ’.
Due to the success o f the science park strategy, the NSC has gradually gained a strong 
influence on policy making, in particular on economic planning. In spite o f its 
primary duty in relation to research and design policy, the NSC today has a significant 
role in economic development through site selection for new science parks, e.g. TSP. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the CEPD is thought o f as the authority responsible 
for economic planning at the central government level. An interesting question then 
arises: what is the relationship between the NSC and CEPD in relation to science park 
development?
5.4.2 The relationship between the NSC and CEPD
As mentioned in 5.4.1, the NSC is the supervisor o f science parks at the central level. 
On the other hand, Chapter Three describes the CEPD as the head o f economic 
planning in Taiwan so how has policy coordination operated between the NSC and 
CEPD in the case o f TSP?
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The interview with Specialist Commissioner Tsai, former Chief of the Science Park 
Unit, NSC, in September 2006 revealed that when a request for assistance from the 
NSC is made to the Executive Yuan, the Executive Yuan will arrange a coordination 
meeting and the CEPD will integrate comments from individual departments and 
offer its suggestions to the Executive Yuan (Interview with Specialist Commissioner 
Tsai) In fact, the reason that the NSC will reported to the CEPD is the assistant role of 
the CEPD to the Executive Yuan. Once the CEPD has received a request from the 
NSC, it will consult with relevant sectors and will offer its analysis to the Executive 
Yuan. There is usually a meeting chaired by the CEPD where departmental 
representatives can discuss and present their views. Therefore the CEPD's role is like 
that o f the planner o f public infrastructures, and the STSP project is viewed as one of 
them. In this case, the CEPD regards TSP as one o f several economic projects under 
the national economic planning (Interview with Senior Specialist Liao, CEPD, 
September 2006). In other words, as the economic planning unit of the Executive 
Yuan, the CEPD is irresponsible for inter-departmental coordination at the central 
level.
On the other hand, according to the interview to Specialist Commissioner Tsai, former 
Chief o f the Science Park Unit, NSC, no matter from where an initial idea originates, 
it is the NSC's responsibility to submit new projects for science parks to the Executive 
Yuan and this responsibility is bounded by ‘The Establishment of Science Park 
Rule'30. Thus, it would appear there is a conflict between the two organisations, while 
the CEPD is the highest planning authority in economic planning, only the NSC can
30 The Establishment o f  Science Park Rule is a written law which regulates the process o f  establishing 
a science park.
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launch a new science park project. However, ‘The Establishment of Science Park 
Rule’ does not diminish the dominant role o f the CEPD as the highest economic 
planning unit in the institutional design, even though the NSC holds the authority for 
policy implementation. In fact, all the CEPD needs is the endorsement of the NSC for 
proposals in relation to science parks, as Specialist Commissioner Tsai’s honest 
answer in the interview:
‘...it (the project) does not necessarily have to have originated from our 
planning, but the project must be endorsed by the NSC, no matter whether we 
agree or disagree with the endorsement ’
In other words, her comments suggest that planning activities in relation to science 
parks require the NSC’s endorsement for policy legitimacy. Therefore, although a 
science park project might have been decided by someone else, e.g. the President or 
the Premier, whatever the NSC’s opinion, it will still be the NSC which will launch a 
new science park project. This indicates that even though it is the NSC's 
responsibility to make a proposal for a science park, the decision to set up the new 
science park is not necessarily made by the NSC. That is to say, the decision to set up 
a science park may include many different material concerns, e.g. political or strategic 
development concerns, which are not the responsibility o f the NSC.
Though other material considerations might prevail in the NSC’s judgement, it seems 
not to apply to all circumstances, e.g. the site selection decision for TSP. Moreover, it 
is believed that the need for the second science park originated from a suggestion by 
the NSC. Going back to the initiation of the new science park proposal, while the 
government appeared to have first announced the establishment of the second science
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park in a plan released by the CEPD in 1991; the NSC had suggested to the Executive 
Yuan that a second science park should be created in October 1990 in response to a 
request from the Legislative Yuan. In short, the idea o f second science park had been 
proposed by the NSC prior to the political announcement made by the CEPD in 1991. 
This implies the initiator o f the second science park’s establishment was the NSC not 
the CEPD.
Whatever, the truth o f the situation, in the case o f TSP, the NSC was the key authority 
at the central level during the project planning process, though the CEPD might 
sometimes play a role in policy coordination among Ministries.
5.5 Land Use Planning for TSP
The development area of Tainan Science Park in the first stage was 683 hectares31 
which all belonged to the Taiwan Sugar Corporation, a government-owned company 
and also the largest land owner in Tainan County. In 1996, the STSP Administration 
was set up and its first achievement was to assist Tainan County Government to 
receive approval o f land use switch, from non-urban land use to urban land use, from 
the Regional Planning Committee (RPC) o f the Construction and Planning Agency 
(CPA) in 1999. After developmental area was confirmed, work on the TSP District 
Plan commenced in 2000.
5.5.1 The huge gains resulting from land use switch
31 The area o f  TSP is 1408 hectares in total today.
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In the Taiwanese planning system, the developmental area for TSP is different from 
that in the TSP District Plan. The former defines the area of the TSP site, and the TSP 
District Plan shows the surrounding area supporting the development of TSP, e.g. 
housing shopping and entertainment facilities. While the management of TSP is the 
responsibility o f the STSP Administration, the TSP District Plan was designated and 
planned by Tainan County Government. In Figure 5.5, the central area shadowed by 
the oblique lines is the developmental area of STP, and the surrounding area within 
the thick red line is the TSP District Plan area.
Land use planning inevitably involves huge gains and loss, and this applied to TSP 
District Plan making. As a support plan for TSP, TSP District Plan is a big land 
development project and contains a large area o f land for commercial and residential 
use. This area was originally farm land, however, when its use was changed to 
commercial and residential use, it became far more valuable. This presented an 
opportunity for local stakeholders to make substantial financial gains and led to 
further efforts by stakeholders to have it included in the TSP District Plan. Moreover, 
such potential enormous gain encouraged local interest groups, i.e. land owners and 
politicians, to seek for more land use switched32 (Interview with Director Wu, 
September 2006). This will be discussed further in Section 5.5.2.
J' In Taiwan, agricultural land is bound to farming use and it can be sold to farmers only. Therefore the 
price o f  farming land is usually low and the market is very limit.
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Figure 5.5 Map of the TSP’s Area and the TSP District Plan
Source: TSP District Plan website, http://tsbipn.tnhg.gov.tw/. (accessed 19th Sep 2007)
The local expectation o f  becom ing rich through land use switch put enorm ous 
pressure on the County G overnm ent when determ ining the land use planning area in 
the TSP D istrict Plan. Though there had been som e instances where land use switch 
had not fulfilled expectations o f  financial gain, local politicians were still enthusiastic 
about land use switch and therefore expanding the developmental area in the TSP 
District Plan. For instance, in the case o f  the Sinshih Town Plan, land use switch from
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farm land to commercial and residential use led to supply outstripping demand and 
subsequently little financial gain to stakeholders. Land use switch had gone ahead 
despite the local planning authority predicting oversupply in the land market due to 
pressure from stakeholders. In the case o f TSP, local interest groups had argued there 
was a need for more developmental land in order to offer ancillary facilities to 
companies within the park. However, as in the case o f the Sinshih Town Plan, the 
result was a collapse in the local property market after a few years due to over supply 
(Interview with Director Wu).
5.5.2 Coordination with local interests
The location o f TSP is very special because it crosses three Townships - Sinshih, 
Shanhua and Anding -  which ultimately generated difficulties for District Plan 
making. Initially, there had been no problem at all in the bidding phase for TSP, since 
winning the bid was in the common interests o f all. A political coalition brought locals, 
i.e. politicians, landowners and interest groups, together, to gain benefits from the big 
investment, but arguments soon emerged after the County Government began land use 
planning work.
Conflicts among the three towns, over issues as small as the name o f the area, were 
not resolved to the satisfaction of all interest groups, until Tainan County Government 
finally yielded to pressure from such groups and expanded the area o f the District 
Plan from 2400 hectares to 3299 hectares, which has the final area approved by the 
Regional Planning Committee (RPC) on 5th August 1999 (Tainan County Government, 
2002).
In fact, it was risky to increase the developmental area of the TSP District Plan since
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the RPC o f the CPA, responsible for supervising o f non-urban land use switch, had 
expressed concerns about the dangers o f over optimistic planning. In the initial plan 
made by the local planning authority, the area was bounded by several road networks, 
i.e. T19A, Highway No.l and Highway No.8, and a railway track which together 
made a complete rectangular shape (see Figure 5.5). However, the other two 
townships, Shanhua and Anding, resisted the expansion in the developmental area and 
claimed it would result in an imbalance in planning opportunities since Sinshih had 
been given the biggest area. As a result o f this complaint, two more meetings were 
held and an expansion up to 2800 hectares was accepted.
However, this was not the end o f the story:
‘When the District Plan had been submitted to the Regional Planning 
Committee o f  the CPA for review, Jui-Nan Hu, Chief o f Shanhua Township, 
contended that the boundary o f  the plan should be pushed further east closer to 
the railway. After this had been done, he further requested that the boundary 
line be moved eastwards again to the T1 provincial road. As a result, Shanhua 
would gain 400 hectares more in developmental areas in the District Plan.
Some more meetings were called as a result o f this request and Regional 
Planning Committee subsequently reflect the District Plan to the NSC and 
asked the NSC make a decision. Giving the reason o f  it making a completed 
transport network reaching to Tl, the expansion o f 400 hectares was eventually 
agreed. This resulted in a total developmental area o f  3299 hectares. ’ 
(Interview with Director Wu)
Hence, the area o f TSP District Plan was increased by 899 hectares, which was the
outcome o f mutual concession. In the case o f the TSP District Plan, local interest 
groups, such as landlords and political factions, seemed to be the winners while both 
central and local planning authorities conceded in the bargaining process relating to 
developmental area expansion. However, the success o f local groups might have been 
attributed to the milieu when TSP District Plan making was being undertaken (Kuo, 
2001).
First, as mentioned previously, the reason for setting up the second science park was 
because o f the high demand of land acquisition from high-technology firms and 
Hsinchu Science Park could not meet their needs any more. Taiwan's economy has 
relied heavily on the electronic industry therefore not only the NSC but also the 
Executive Yuan faced pressure and the central government was eager to establish the 
second science park as soon as possible. Existing circumstances spurred the central 
government to accelerate the development of TSP and it even yielded to interest 
groups in respect o f the issue o f the boundary o f the District Plan.
Second, the Chiefs of the three townships o f Sinshih, Shanhua and Anding, engaged a 
very good personal friendship, despite the conflict with respect to the developmental 
area division in the TSP District Plan. The Chief o f Shanhua Township, Jui-Nan Hu, 
was particularly unhappy about the initial District Plan since he thought Sinshih 
would end up with the largest developmental area. He also argued that the shape of 
the area in Shanhua was irregular and not practical for development purposes. 
Although Hu’s argument might be based on furthering local interests, his point in 
relation to area shape is nevertheless acceptable with regard to planning practice. In 
Taiwan, since irregularly shaped developmental sites are viewed as problematic by 
developers. When interviewed, Director Wu, Department o f Urban and Rural
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Development, Tainan County Government, commented as follows:
Tn honesty, an irregular site shape is not welcomed by developers. Fortunately, 
the regional Planning Committee accepted Jui-Nan H u’s argument and 
approved the expansion to the TSP District Plan in 1999
For Tainan County Government, negotiations with local interest groups were as tough 
as the competition with its antagonist, Kaohsiung County, in the round for site 
selection. The ultimate TSP District Plan nevertheless required endorsement from the 
central planning agency, i.e. the Regional Planning Committee (RPC), since there had 
been a big switch in land use. A further question therefore is: how did coordination 
between the local planning authority and RPC work in the plan making process for the 
TSP District Plan?
5.5.3 The local planning authority’s bargain with central government
Although the TSP District Plan was approved in 1999, the gap between the 
expectation o f development and the reality was very pronounced when the field work 
for this thesis was conducted in September 2006. The TSP Administration did not 
hesitate to convey their anxiety about the progress of the development o f ancillary 
facilities. When asked about the development of TSP District, Jui-Huan Chen, 
Specialist Chief, STSP Administration, admitted that most workers in the STSP had 
not yet moved in, but were relying on living facilities in other large cities, e.g. Tainan 
City, instead o f in the TSP District. Accordingly, did the TSP District Plan reflect a 
failure of land use planning? The Director o f the Department of Urban and Rural 
Development, Tainan County Government disagreed with this suggestion:
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‘...the establishment o f TSP was earlier than the TSP District, so that it was 
reasonable to expect that 40% o f workers in TSP would have to live in Tainan 
City rather than the District since there were no ancillary facilities as yet in the 
area where they were employed’ (Interview with Director Wu, September 
2006).
It is reasonable to suggest that in the development process, plan making needs to be 
carried out prior to embarking on the construction process since construction takes 
place in different phases over time, and without a plan it may become 
higgledy-piggledy and disorderly. Director Wu believed that development in the TSP 
District would eventually provide the required ancillary facilities for TSP workers and 
the construction process would be completed in its entirety.
However, the TSP Administration was not the only one who concerns about the 
capacity o f the County Government to deal with such a big District Plan. The 
Regional Planning Committee (RPC) expressed concerns about the plan with regard 
to its huge developmental area resulting from the pressure from local interest groups, 
though it eventually approved the developmental area submitted. The RPC also seems 
to have foreseen the delay in progress o f ‘zone expropriation’33 when they expresses 
their concerns about the over-optimistic TSP District Plan in the plan review process. 
In RPC members’ view, the plan was so huge to be effectively implemented by the 
local planning authority with limited human and financial resources. In an interview 
with Director Wu, the researcher endeavoured to find out the main reason for the
3’ Zone Expropriation is a method commonly used by local governments to acquire land from 
landowners for the building o f  public infrastructures. Landowners receive compensation for the 
acquisition o f  their land according to a formulation set by government.
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delay in the zone expropriation process, e.g. a lack o f human resources, shortage o f 
financial support, his answer was surprisingly direct:
‘To be honest, there have been very few  successful cases o f  Zone Expropriation 
in Taiwan. For example, the developmental area in Danhai New Town, Taipe, i 
is 800 hectares and has cost the Government 60 billion (Taiwanese dollars, 
around 1 billion sterling pounds) to develop. The development o f New Town is 
still low in standard, even though the CPA, the central government, has taken 
over this project. You can imagine how difficult it is fo r the public sector to 
develop such a big project with a huge area ’.
Zone expropriation has indeed become a thorny problem for land use planning in 
Taiwan. According to 4The Land Expropriation A c f , owners o f land expropriated can 
choose compensation by way o f cash or the return of a portion o f the land after 
development. Due to the continuing fall in land price led by over supply in rural area, 
landowners whose land has been expropriated in such area preferred cash rather than 
the return o f a portion o f land following development.
In order to resolve the problem of a shortage o f cash to compensate landowners for 
the acquisition o f their land, Magistrate Su o f Tainan County Government introduced 
private capital into the land expropriation process. The local planning authority came 
up with the idea o f dividing the huge developmental area o f the TSP into 15 
individual areas, each comprises 50-60 hectares. The reason for a size o f 50-60 
hectares was based on planning experience having shown that it was an ideal size 
covering all necessary facilities, i.e. park, school and making development easy. 
County Government hence planned to sell each piece o f land with small size to
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private company for commercial development.
However, this idea was actually not allowable under regulation existing at that time 
since private investment could not obtain such land prior to the detailed plan making. 
Second, to attract private investment, the local planning authority eventually allowed 
private investors to become involved in detailed plan making for, as Director Wu 
pointed out, ‘Without encouragement, it would be difficult to attract private investments
To attract private investment due to a shortage of cash for zone expropriation 
purposes, the Department of Urban and Rural Development, Tainan County has 
introduced a method o f ‘floating zoning’ with three restrictions applied to private 
investors:
a minimum percentage o f land is required for the building of infrastructure; 
a ceiling on floor area development;
the private investor involvement in detailed plan making must be in accord with 
the TSP District mast plan (Tainan County Government, 2008).
In other words, the local planning authority would retains the power of making the 
master plan and releases the power of designating detailed plans to private investors 
with certain restrictions. Director Wu argued that based on these restrictions, the local 
planning authority can still introduce innovative planning to meet the needs o f the 
market.
However, the idea o f ‘floating zoning’ was not allowable under existing regulations at 
that time as previously stated. Director Wu stated that even members o f the Urban
Planning Committee (UPC) o f the CPA argued that the planning system in Taiwan had 
become ossified and therefore change was needed. For instance, many decades ago, 
when land was classified as for residential use, it was not possible to change the use to 
other usage despite local economy needs. He said:
‘ There were plenty o f  difficulties encountered when seeking to make a change, 
but the fact was, so many planning innovations were bound to this inflexible 
system ’ (Interview with Director Wu).
The disadvantages o f this ossified planning system had been highlighted in the 
planning discourse for decades, however, there were few changes until the late 1990s. 
According to Mr. Chen-Yuan Kuo34 in the interview with Director Wu in September 
2006:
‘The biggest problem with the planning system is the system s stress on how to 
avoid the planning abuses rather than exploiting the merits planning can 
achieve. Without a more flexible system, the local planning authority has no 
room to promote local development. ’
In order to promote the concept of ‘floating zoning', in spite of the inflexible planning 
system, Tainan County Government continued to seek for allowance o f it within the 
planning system and to convince members o f the Urban Planning Committee (UPC) 
of the CPA. O f its importance, Tainan County Government stressed the restriction 
which stated that detailed plan making made by private investors must be in accord
34 Mr. Kuo is a senior planner in a private consultancy. He was also in the meeting when the interview  
with Director Wu conducted in September 2006.
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with the TSP District Master Plan under the control o f the local planning authority to 
allay UPC members’ concerns about the impact o f the concept. The planning practice 
of the TSP District Detailed Plan would also have to be in accord with the TSP 
District Master Plan, though some planning power would be shared with the private 
sector. ‘Three restrictions, (mentioned in previous paragraphs), w ould  be stric tly  
adhered to  an d  there w ould  then not be too much w orry that planning w ould run out 
o f  co n tro l’ (Interview with Director Wu).
In order to get the approval of the UPC for the adoption of ‘floating zoning’ in 
detailed plan making, the local planning authority determined to exploit personal 
networks and decided to visit some decision-makers individually, such as the 
Director-General o f the CPA and the Vice Minister of Interior, both o f whom had 
good relations with Magistrate Su. Given a positive response eventually, a turning 
point was reached and some members o f the UPC of the CPA expressed their 
intension to support this innovative idea (Interview with Director Wu). After extensive 
negotiations, this improvement to expropriation was approved by the central planning 
authority.
The success o f ‘floating zoning’ has had a big impact on Taiwanese planning system 
and more local authorities have requested more flexible planning. Meanwhile, the 
master plan and detailed plan are no longer bound together and the public sector only 
takes responsibility for the master plan making.
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5.6 Horizontal Policy Coordination in TSP
Section 5.5 explained the relationship among planning actors at both the central and 
local level, this section will discuss the horizontal coordination within central and 
local levels.
5.6.1 Horizontal coordination at the central level- the TSP Administration’s 
relationship with relevant central agencies
With regard to coordination with the Ministry of Interior (MOI), responsible for 
supervising land use planning at the central level, no big problem was found in the 
research. In this case, the role o f the MOI was like a planning inspector that offered 
counsel rather than approval. The MOI might ask for an amendment to the project 
submitted to it, but what it was concerned with was the content o f the plan; not only 
the judgement of objection or agreement. On the other hand, the TSP Administration 
experienced more difficulties in relation to the Environmental Protection 
Administration (EPA). Most land in TSP had been farming land and in low density 
use which had been an advantage in its bid for site selection in 1995 (see Section 
5.3.2). However, farming land comes under the category o f agricultural use and there 
was inevitably an impact resulted from its development on the surrounding ecological 
system. According to planning procedure, the EPA has the authority to monitor the 
TSP’s development and it can even inspect the water and electricity supply in TSP. 
During development of TSP, the EPA was concerned about environmental issues and 
asked for several meetings. The STSP Administration, perceived the actions o f the 
EPA as more or less challenges, though it also admitted the EPA’s underlying intention 
was to assist rather than to hinder (Interview with Specialist Chief Chen, STSP 
Administration in September 2006).
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From interviews with planning actors, the study discovered several inter-departmental 
interactions in relation to TSP at the central level. The first concern was the 
archaeology site found under the construction o f the TSP (Tsang, C., 1996).33 Due to 
the negligent site investigation for TSP, an unexpected archaeology site was found in 
TSP in 1995 and the discovery put a stop to further construction until a survey o f the 
site had been carried out. In order to preserve the historical treasure, a huge amount of 
money was needed to excavate and preserve it. However, as its discovery had not 
been anticipated, the expectation and preservation amount had not been included in 
the development budget. As a result of this incident, the construction process was 
brought to a halt at the request o f the Legislative Yuan until a resolution to the 
problem was found. The problem was not solved until the Premier of Executive Yuan 
intervened and offer a special budget for the heritage excavation (Interview with 
Specialist Chief Chen).
Another serious problem was the accusation by local farmers that flooding resulting 
from the TSP’s construction, had damaged their crops. Commenting on this, Specialist 
Chief Chen, the STSP Administration, said:
‘Our opinion was that in fact there was a regular flooding in this area every 
year. Importantly, there was lack o f evidence that the flooding had resulted 
from the construction. However, investors in TSP would not want flooding to 
affect their factories. To resolve the flooding problem, it required drainage 
work which is the responsibility o f the Water Resource Agency under the
35 The unexpected site contained many ancient objects dating back to 2800 B.C.E.
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Ministry o f  Economic Affairs (MOEA). We also sought the NSC s help report to 
report the matter to the Executive Yuan. ’
Eventually the Executive Yuan dealt with the problem and the STSP Administration 
obtained a special budget from the central government to initiate drainage work, so 
the flooding problem would no longer appear in TSP.
The aforementioned incidents suggest that the Executive Yuan is the final decision 
maker in difficult issues but it is also worth noting the role of the NSC. In the 
governmental hierarchy, the STSP Administration is directly subordinate to the NSC. 
During the course o f the field work, it was found that although the NSC assisted STSP 
Administration by reporting the flooding incident to the Executive Yuan in order to 
find an ultimate solution to the problem, it was in fact the STSP Administration which 
mostly communicated with other central agencies. Once there was a need for 
coordination with other departments, the NSC provided very limited assistance and it 
was the STSP Administration that talked to relevant authorities through formal or 
informal meetings in order to reach a consensus. The STSP Administration also 
reported to the CEPD if there were difficulties being encountered in reaching a 
resolution in inter-departmental communication.
5.6.2 Coordination between the STSP Administration and Tainan County 
Government
When interviewed with Specialist Chief Chen, STSP Administration, she contended 
that the STSP Administration had had a conflict free relationship with Tainan County 
Government since successful development o f TSP was a common desire of both sides. 
It is no surprising that Tainan County Government had won the STSP project because
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it had promised to offer a huge amount o f undeveloped land for TSP development 
since it had been looking for a means to drive the local economy. Hence, the STSP 
Administration experienced cooperation from Tainan County Government. Not only 
the local planning authorities, but relevant land use planning units at the central level, 
such as the Environmental Protection Administration and Construction and Planning 
Agency (CPA) had provided their advisory support during the land use planning 
process, according to Specialist Chief Chen, STSP Administration..
The development o f TSP had obtained necessary assistance from various sectors in 
general, yet inevitably some problems occurred during the making o f  TSP District 
Plan due to different concepts. While Tainan County Government focused on planning 
land use in the District Plan making, the STSP Administration concentrated on the 
development o f the science park. As described in previous paragraphs, the local 
planning authority was affected by continuing pressures from local interest and 
political groups. As a result of this pressure, there were some delays and changes to 
development. For instance, the District Plan had been submitted (to CPA) in 1997, but 
the Regional Planning Committee (RPC), CPA had not discussed this plan until 2000, 
as there were differing opinions among towns. To satisfy local needs, the areas of 
District Plan had been increased from 1000 hectares to 1900 hectares and then to 3299 
hectares (see Section 5.5.2). The local Planning authority had taken a long time to 
coordinate the diverse local requests. Although a decision was eventually reached by 
the RPC, when the new Magistrate o f Tainan County took office, he had different 
ideas about the plan. All those above factors considerably delayed confirmation o f the 
District Plan. Specialist Chief Chen said:
‘...we were not there to judge the District Plan but thought its size was
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unrealistically large to successfully develop. Nevertheless, we understood local 
landowners ’desire to obtain benefits from the land switch. ’
The delayed development of TSP District Plan made the STSP Administration anxious 
and some incident also made the STSP Administration unhappy to local planning 
authority. In a case relating to the expansion o f the TSP, the local planning authority 
rejected a request for assistance from the STSP Administration. In the matter o f land 
expropriation, the STSP Administration wanted to transfer the expropriation 
procedure to the County Government due to difficulties resulting from a conflict 
which had occurred between the STSP Administration and landowners on a previous 
occasion when the STSP had set out to establish TSP. The STSP Administration 
proposed offering 22 billion Taiwanese dollars (approximately 367 million sterling 
pounds) to the County Government for dealing with land expropriation matters 
(Interview with Specialist Chief Chen).
Despite the STSP Administration's negotiations with the local planning authority, its 
proposal was still rejected since Tainan County Government argued that of the local 
planning authority were to accept the proposal, it would be exposed to a substantial 
financial risk in land stock. At that time, the property market was prone to fluctuations 
in land price and it was therefore questionable whether the planning authority would 
actually benefit from the proposal in the long-term since the expropriation process 
could take years and the amount offered could depreciate (Interview with Director Wu, 
Tainan County Government).
Communication with local landowners had never been easy and after delayed 
finalisation o f the expropriation matter. When the local planning authority bought land
from private land owners, it ran the risk of holding a large amount o f land that might 
be unprofitable to develop given fluctuations in land price and economic conditions. 
As a result, the STSP Administration continued to deal with expropriation matters but 
at the same time to persuade the local planning authority to take over this role for 
them. Although the STSP Administration insisted it had a good relationship with 
Tainan county Government, such relationship at times experienced problems.
The expropriation issue reveals the different concerns o f the STSP Administration and 
local planning authority. The former is concerned with the path of development in 
TSP, while the latter is more concerned about the financial risk involved and the 
expectations of local interest groups. In general, the interviews suggest the STSP and 
local planning authority had a good relationship, the expropriation issue cited is one 
o f the few occasions when they failed to match consensus on an issue.
In spite o f some disharmony mentioned above, in general, as regards the TSP District 
Plan, the STSP Administration's concerns focused mainly on transport designs and the 
capacity o f land for future expansion (Interview with Specialist Chief Chen, STSP 
Administration). Otherwise, the STSP Administration generally respected the decision 
o f the local planning authority. To promote the development of TSP, the 
Administration had, subject to strict restrictions, also paid planning consultancy fees 
to the local planning authority for the planning work it had requested in relation to 
TSP’s development. According to Specialist Chief Chen, the STSP Administration 
had once paid the local planning authority consultancy fees for drawing up the TSP 
District Plan. The planning fee amount was approximately 60 million Taiwanese 
Dollars, (approximately 1 million sterling pounds). The amount was agreed between 
the STSP Administration and Tainan County Government.
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Although the TSP District Plan needed the endorsement o f the STSP Administration 
since it had to meet the development needs o f  the TSP, the local planning officer also 
agreed that the STSP Administration rarely intervened in the plan making process. In 
general, the STSP Administration maintained a good relationship with Tainan County 
Government, and the local planning authority praised the STSP Administration for its 
positive attitude towards the making o f the TSP District Plan (Interview with Director 
Wu, Department of Urban and Rural Development o f Tainan County Government, 
September 2006).
Apart from the good relationship, was there any formal institutional apparatus for 
policy coordination between Tainan County Government and the Administration? 
Unfortunately, there seemed to be no such device in the current planning framework, 
however, there had been a more formal mechanism for policy coordination which had 
existed with the establishment o f the STSP Administration.
In the early stage, there had been a one-stop window service36 provided by the County 
Government. The one-stop window service had worked very well since most works 
were related to planning affairs only. As the development of TSP progressed, 
coordination came to involve more crosscutting policies which the one-stop window 
was no longer capable o f dealing with. The TSP Administration therefore needed to 
maintain contact with individual units within the County Government (Interview with 
Specialist Chief Chen, STSP Administration), which implies there was the lack of
36 A one-stop window service means an integrated platform whereby the STSP Administration 
presents all their needs to a single unit which then manages consultation and coordination within 
Tainan County Government.
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formal platform for policy coordination between the STSP Administration and Tainan 
County Government after the new Magistrate (Magistrate Su) cancelled the one-stop 
window service provided by the County Government to the STSP Administration.
In spite o f the cancellation of the one-stop window service by Magistrate Su, the local 
planning authority continued to do its best to satisfy the STSP Administration's land 
use planning needs. It invited the STSP Administration to attend meetings related to 
the TSP District’s development. The STSP Administration also invited the local 
planning authority to meetings to discuss the TSP’s development. Both the local 
planning authority and the STSP Administration contended that their policy 
coordination relationship had been to-date very good as indicated in the interview 
with Director Wu, Department o f Urban and Rural Development o f Tainan County 
Government:
‘The STSP Administration is responsible fo r  the management o f the science 
park. It had had a very good relationship with us (Department o f Urban and 
Rural Development). From the establishment stage o f  TSP, we have maintained 
very close ties with each other, since we try to meet the needs o f both sides. ’
At the beginning of the establishment phase o f TSP, there had been regular panel 
meetings arranged by both the STSP Administration and Tainan County Government, 
where many issues had been tackled and resolved successfully. Some ten to twenty 
meetings had taken place in the first years until there were fewer problems to resolve. 
Such meeting had not been convened since the administration of Magistrate Su (the 
current Magistrate) according to Specialist Chief Chen, STSP Administration.
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Apart from the regular meeting, there is no standard operation process for 
coordination between economic planning and land use planning at the local level. In 
fact, most interactions take place on an informal and flexible basis (Interview with 
Specialist Chief Chen, STSP Administration). Managers in both sectors had their own 
personal contacts which helped to facilitate communication. Due to the common 
aspiration to promote TSP’s success, horizontal coordination at the local level 
appeared to be surprisingly good.
5.7 Key Themes in the Research
Policy coordination between actors and the importance of institutions were two main 
areas of attention in this study. Several findings discovered during field relating to 
these two areas are presented below.
5.7.1 Powerful persons in policy coordination
While this research’s primary intention was to analyse the interactive relationship in 
the plan-making process through a neo-institutionalist perspective, unexpectedly, the 
significance o f 'big persons’ became apparent in some policy coordination cases. For 
instance, the STSP Administration faced a difficulty regarding the water supply due to 
the rearrangement of agricultural irrigation by the Water Resources Agency (WRA) o f 
the Ministry o f Economic Affairs (MOEA). The amount of water supply STSP should 
require to meet forthcoming need over several years was estimated to be 200,000 tons 
per annum, though not so much would be used at first. It was reasonable for the STSP 
Administration to claim the future need in advance, a shortage of water could result in 
serious damage to high-tech instruments. However, the WRA hesitated to accept the
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water supply amount due to existing agricultural needs for water for irrigation 
purposes in the area.
Due to the foreseen serious consequences resulting from a shortage of water, the 
STSP Administration called for a review of water distribution in the region. In spite o f 
the crucial emergency, Tainan County Government could not offer assistance since 
water use planning comes under the auspices remit o f central government. It is worth 
noting that there was no immediate response after the STSP Administration had 
reported the difficulty to the Executive Yuan through the NSC. However, a solution 
appeared very soon as a result of certain events. In an interview with Ms. Chen, 
Specialist Chief, STSP Administration, she recalled the story:
‘The STSP Administration attempted to seek support from the agricultural 
sector and reported the matter to the Executive Yuan. Meanwhile, we also 
informed President Chen o f this problem when he visited TSP since we had 
fa iled  to find a solution to it from the water supply and land use planning 
agencies out the consensus among sectors in other ways...
...with regard to the term, ‘powerfulpersons’, you used. I suppose that means 
those outside the “normal” administration... Thanks to some very powerful 
men, fo r  instance, Morris Chang and Wen-Long Shi3 , who expressed their 
opinions on the issue, it was hardly something the Premier o f the Executive 
Yuan and the President could ignore. Soon after, they made a final decision 
since consensus (between the economic sector and agricultural sector) seemed
37 Chang and Shi both are heads o f  famous multinational corporations and have a good reputation and 
strong influence on business and politic in Taiwan.
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to be unachievable.
The turning point appeared to the complaints from Morris Chang and Wen-Long Shi, 
both are very successful businessmen with huge investments in TSP. Besides their 
achievement in industry, they are well respected by the government and have been 
Presidential Consultants (Huang, Y-S, 2006). Specialist Chief Chen’s comments 
intimate that ‘powerful persons’, even though not in the public sector, played a role in 
policy coordination due to their influence and access to ‘big politicians’. This was 
also demonstrated in the other case referred to in Section 5.3, during the selection o f a 
site for the STSP project, when ‘big persons’ also attempted to intervene in the 
selection process, though it is thought the final decision might still have been based 
on professional considerations. Nevertheless, both incidents suggest the role o f 
'powerful persons’ was a relevant factor to policy coordination, at least in the case o f 
TSP.
5.7.2 The pros and cons of informal networking
In previous sections, it was suggested that though there was a lack o f formal 
structures involving some actors, e.g. the STSP Administration and the local planning 
authority, these agencies still remained tied together. This research attributes their 
good relationship to the informal networks behind the formal planning framework. 
There have been plenty of examples in previous pages to prove the influence o f 
personal networks, from site selection to the approval o f the ‘floating zoning’ method, 
when informal networks compensated for the lack o f a formal coordination 
mechanism.
Just as there are positive examples of informal interactions, there are also negative
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examples in relation to policy making. The significant role o f informal networks 
points to a weakness in the formal coordination mechanism and policy makers’ 
frustration with informal interactions and/or interventions is demonstrated below. 
Basically, if a policy is made through the formal administrative process through 
internal coordination, there will be fewer obstacles to policy implementation. 
However, if  a policy is made without consultation, i.e. a Top-down’ decision made 
without consultation works, there will be inevitably conflicts in the forthcoming 
execution o f the policy. Specialist Chief Chen, STSP Administration, offered an 
interesting example:
‘There was a case recently... An Environmental Impact Assessment (E1A) for  
the Central Taiwan Science Park (CTSP) was approved, although some 
Regional Planning Committee (RPC) members complained their opinions had 
not been treated with respect and they had even been forced to agree to the 
approval... ’.
The underlying story is that there had been a high demand for land acquisition from 
those companies in the CTSP. Companies had rushed to gain land to develop due to 
the special characteristic of the electronic industry: the time from order accepted to 
products dispatched is usually very short. Investors could not wait for the 
time-consuming EIA process therefore the Vice-Premier o f the Executive Yuan 
presented her concern to the EIA, which was regarded by some members of the 
Regional Planning Committee (RPC) as political lobbying. It was argued that she 
should have only paid attention to the development o f CTSP for the need of 
companies, and not intervened on these behalf as such intervention was irregular (see 
also Section 6.7.3 for more discussion about the political intervention in CTSP).
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Such criticism was not only voiced in the case o f CTSP, but in relation to other new 
science park projects which were thought to have been approved without professional 
approval and through pressure the executive level of government (Interview with Dr. 
Chen, RPC Member). Under such conditions, departments exposed to pressure will 
accede to executive level orders so as not to face further pressure in relation to policy 
implementation (Interview with Specialist Chief Chen). Nevertheless, the reality is 
that once a decision has been made by the executive level, the bureaucrats will follow 
the direction given, i.e. from the Executive Yuan in the CTSP case, however, there 
will be many difficulties that the CTSP Administration will have to face in the future 
arising from the damaged relationship between it and the RPC.
Once political intervention has been seen to work, more interest groups will attempt to 
deliver their wishes to the CEPD through ‘powei-ful persons' since their projects will 
go much more smoothly 'when they have support from “big politicians” ' (Interview 
with Dr. Chen, RPC Member). Without strong support, a project faces more 
difficulties, and the purpose of establishing science parks may be buried underneath 
political concerns. Therefore political consideration preference rather than economic 
appraisal can come to dominate in the decision making process.
However, there appears to have been an important exception to this. In the case of site 
selection for the STSP project, Site Selection Panel members focused on professional 
considerations. Though many argue political intervention had affected, this study 
suggests that such intervention failed to affect the result.
5.7.3 Institutional change and the response of bureaucracy
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The development o f TSP has taken for ten years since the significant institutional 
change o f the first ruling party switch in the 2000 Presidential election. A proposition 
o f this thesis is that policy coordination circumstances change with institutional 
changes since the institution is embedded in the social context and culture. It is 
therefore presumed there will have been shifts in planning coordination to cope with 
the impact.
Due to the sensitivity o f making a comparison between the KMT government (before 
2000) and the DPP government (2000-2008), most interviewees expressed their views 
very diplomatically. Specialist Chief Chen, STSP Administration, was little more open 
in the interview undertaken in September 2006:
7 have served in the STSP for 9 years. In my opinion, policy making before 
2000 was comparatively stable whereas after 2000 many unrealistic promises 
have been made by politicians for election purposes. These promises please 
local people and local interest groups and politicians gain local political 
support. ’
However, such promises made by politicians have not been appraised for their 
necessity or possibility. Thus, the planning mechanism is ignored and normal planning 
procedures are not respected. Policy makers within the planning system become even 
more frustrated and may question their roles. Accordingly, it is suggested that the 
institutional change in 2000 affected policy making.
The ruling party switch had affected policy making, however, both Specialist Chief 
Chen, STSP Administration and Director Wu, Tainan County Government insisted
that policy direction had been retained whoever the leader o f their respective 
organisations. This suggests there is another network behind the political network, a 
so-called ‘bureaucratic culture’ (Interview with Dr. Su, Assistant Professor of 
Chung-Jone University, September, 2006).
In other words, the contents of a policy might have still remained due to inter-actor 
communication within the bureaucratic network and informal channel, such as 
networks and personal contacts. Maintaining good relationships with each other is 
therefore important to keep the network functioning, particularly since there may be a 
change in personnel over time. Although institutional change in 2000 affected policy 
making process, it had less o f an effect on informal networks and policy coordination.
5.7.4 Personality of local leader mattered but direction remained
Section 5.5 referred to the coordination process with local stakeholders, which is a 
main interest in this research. This section will discuss the decisive role o f the 
Magistrate o f Tainan County in more detail.
Although it was the duty o f the Department o f Urban and Rural Development to 
negotiate with local interest groups, the strategy that the County Government adopted 
was determined by the Magistrate’s personality. The former Magistrate Chen had been 
more open-minded and respectful of professionals’ suggestions therefore had not 
minded when local interest groups made various requests or even bargained with the 
upper level of the County Government. In theory, local interest groups should have 
shown their respect for the planning authority’s lower position in the administrative 
hierarchy and not approached the upper level directly, however, because Magistrate 
Chen was not autocratic, he did not intervene local interest groups gained their
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objective, i.e. the expansion o f TSP District Plan. (Interview with Director Wu, Tainan 
County Government).
In contrast, the present Magistrate, Magistrate Su, has his own clear view on how 
development should progress in Tainan County, and his intention is to incline local 
leaders and local interest groups towards his point o f view. In the case of TSP, he also 
attempts to influence local opinion prior to conducting negotiations with the central 
government (Interview with Director Wu). As a result, there is only one main opinion 
heard at the local level. Thus it is clear that the personality o f the Magistrate plays a 
decisive role in the coordination process at the local level.
The STSP Administration also noted a clear difference between the two Magistrates. 
When interviewed, Specialist Chief Chen commented:
‘Possibly due to the different time period, the former Magistrate Chen 
experienced a harmonious relationship with the STSP, whilst the current 
Magistrate, Su, faced considerable stress from local interests. ’
The interviewee politely refused to be drawn on explaining the difference in detail but 
implied the praise to the former Magistrate Chen. Recalling the discussion about the 
coordination between the County Government and the Administration, there had been 
a one-stop window platform run by the County Government to deal with coordination 
affairs relating to TSP and it had been the most significant channel o f communication 
during Magistrate Chen’s administration. Since the removal o f the one-stop window 
platform, formal coordination has only been undertaken through occasional meetings, 
though it has not encountered serious problems since the personal network still works
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effectively (see Section 5.6.2). Despite Director Wu (Tainan County government) 
contended that the one-stop window service had ceased due to its inability to manage 
complexity but its cessation occurred soon after Magistrate Su came to office.
Different Magistrates have had different thoughts on how the relationship between the 
STSP Administration and County Government should be conducted. However, it is 
noticeable that this difference seems not to have affected the consistency o f planning 
policy. Director Wu stated when interviewed,
‘...this (TSP) is the key to Tainan County’s future development. Magistrate Su 
believes TSP will lead the industrial upgrade in Tainan County, therefore, he is 
eager to participate in every stage o f its development ’.
Director Wu’s comments highlight the significance of TSP to Tainan County's 
economic development and show how the personality of the Magistrate can help (or 
hinder, the coordination process). However, due to the importance of TSP, the main 
policy direction will not change, no matter who the Magistrate is. For instance, the 
expansion o f the TSP District Plan established during the former Magistrate Chen’s 
administration has not been changed at all, though a new method, ‘floating zoning’, 
has been introduced by Magistrate Su. In short, the personality o f the leader may 
affect the approach, however, the direction o f land use planning has been inherited.
5.8 Conclusion
In the case o f TSP, the STSP Administration has been responsible for policy making,
development implementation and policy coordination while site selection was made 
by a Site Selection Panel organised by the NSC.
The research surprisingly found the absence o f other economic planning agencies in 
the coordination process e.g. the CEPD and even the NSC had played a limited role. 
With regard to the vertical relationship in economic planning, according to an 
interview with Specialist Chief Chen, the NSC accepts suggestions from the STSP 
Administration especially for those related to individual development at the local. 
Science park policy is not ordinarily the responsibility o f the NSC and, as an 
organisation for the promotion of technology and science development, it is very 
difficult for the NSC to manage the various contexts o f each science park. Further, it 
is not the responsibility o f the NSC to face various local groups in the political arena, 
therefore, its subdivision, the Administration of the Science Park, has taken on most 
of the duties for policy outcome in relation to development.
Despite the STSP Administration receiving limited support from its supervisor, the 
NSC, there is in fact an informal network for policy coordination at the central level. 
Through this network, the STSP Administration can manage most coordination with 
other Ministries. The CEPD is not consulted unless there is a conflict.
On the other hand, the Department of Urban and Rural Development, Tainan County 
Government deals with land use planning for the TSP District Plan. In this case under 
study, most coordination had occurred between the STSP Administration and the local 
planning authority and any conflict appears to have been resolved successfully. 
Although there was a lack o f a formal platform for coordination, communication had 
worked effectively due to the efficiency of informal networks. Many interviewees
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referred to the close tie between the STSP Administration and County Government. 
This therefore suggests both sides were satisfied with the interactions in general 
though the personalities o f the Magistrates might have influenced the interactive 
model.
Finally, the matter of the ‘big person' must be taken into account in the policy 
coordination discourses. As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, ruled o f man is a very special 
characteristic in Taiwanese society (Liao, D. and Hsu, C., 2002) and this case has 
provided much proof o f it since it has demonstrated the significance o f powerful 
persons. Such persons are not necessary politicians, however, they have usually 
affected or even changed the decisions through their personal relations with decision 
makers. Examples can be found in this chapter from the solution to the flooding 
problem to the adoption o f the floating zoning method. Given the effectiveness o f 
informal networks, the ‘big person' with a powerful personal network has become a 
material factor in policy coordination.
The case study o f Tainan Science Park (TSP) provides some provisional answers to 
the research questions posed in Chapter Four. However, the significance of 
personality and personal networks in the case study raises the real possibility that the 
findings reflect the influence of usually dominant or charismatic individuals. 
Consequently, there is value in a second case study of science park project, and this is 
presented in Chapter Six.
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Chapter Six Case Study 2: Kaohsiung Science Park (KSP)
6.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses policy coordination in the development o f Kaohsiung Science 
Park (KSP) which opened on 7th July 2001. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a 
science park cannot be narrowly seen as only a single industrial park project because 
its enormous effect on the local economy always attracts interest groups. Accordingly, 
the case o f KSP, as the case of Tainan Science Park (TSP), presents an opportunity to 
examine governmental actions and how planning coordination is operated in the 
development o f a science park project.
This chapter will explain the backdrop and context of KSP in Section 6.2 and describe 
the policy-making process in Section 6.3. While Sections 6.4 focuses on economic 
planning, Section 6.5 illustrates the land use planning system related to KSP through 
data collected during field work and documentary analysis. Some findings derived 
from the field study will be presented in the final section of this chapter.
6.2 Historical Context and Background Details
6.2.1 Historical Background
After the electronic industry experienced a boom period in the late 1990s, over 80% 
of the industrial land available for the Phase I Site o f Tainan Science Park (TSP) had
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been leased out by the end o f 2000, and requests for more industrial land were
TO
continuing to pour in. In order to fill the ongoing demand for industrial land , in May 
2000 the Executive Yuan agreed to the suggestion to set up an Intellectual Industrial 
Park on the Lujhu site which lost the bid for the location o f the STSP in 1995. The 
Intellectual Park was officially approved by the Executive Yuan to transform it to the 
Lujhu Science Park on 6th April 2001 and renamed Kaohsiung Science Park on 27th 
July 2004.
A significant feature of this case is its model o f development. The project was a joint 
development operated by the National Science Council (NSC) and Taiwan Sugar 
Corporation (TSC). The NSC, as the planning authority responsible for science park 
policy at the central government level, was responsible for the planning and 
development of the Lujhu site whilst the TSC offered a huge area o f empty land for 
the site’s development. The TSC would then after development receive developmental 
gains from land use switch. The land the TSC owned was designated as land for 
agricultural use. After development it would change to land for industrial and 
commercial use. Both parties, i.e. the TSC and NSC, would gain from this 
development project. The TSC would derive developmental gains and the NSC would 
have found a solution to the ongoing demand for land for development purposes. The 
following section describes the land use plan and location.
6.2.2 Land use plan and location
Kaohsiung Science Park is situated between the Lujhu, Gangshan and Yong-an 
Townships o f Kaohsiung County and comprises a total area of 1,408 acres (570
38 Most demands were from the Integrated Circuits!IC) and TFT-LCD industries for large-block 
factory land.
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hectares). There is another small Biotechnology Park o f 21 acres, established in the 
Nanzih District o f Kaohsiung City. The development o f KSP is divided into two 
phases. Phase 1 was implemented in 2002 and phase 2 o f development is currently 
ongoing and is estimated to be completed by 2010 (see Figure 6.1).
Though the Lujhu site failed in its bid to be chosen as the site for the STSP in the first 
competition in 1995, its excellent location and integrated traffic network led to it 
being offered the opportunity to become the site o f a second science park as part of 
the STSP project (STSP website, http://www.stsipa.gov.tw/web. accessed 18th Nov 
2006). KSP is situated between Provincial Road T1 and T17 and National Highway 
HI running between Tainan City and Kaohsiung City. Its equal distance to two large 
cities gives KSP the advantages of a good transport network and adequate skilled 
labour. Besides the three significant traffic routes, County Road K184 and K186 run 
across the site from west to east and connect the main highways to form a complete 
local traffic network. There are also two railway stations, Lujhu and Gangshan, part of 
Taiwan Railway System nearby the site (Figure 6.2).
In spite o f its excellent location, KSP has a decisive demerit, its site shape. Provincial 
Road T1 crosses the Lujhu site and divides it into two parts and the shape of the site is 
like a scalene triangle. A divided developmental area with a zigzag boundary may 
have been significant reasons why it was not selected as the location for the STSP 
project in 1995 (Interview with Dr. Su, Assistant Professor, Department of Land 
Management and Development, Chung-Jone University, September 2006).
205
Figure 6.1 The Layout of Kaohsiung Science Park  (not to scale)
Source: STSP website, http://www.stsipa.gov.tw/web (accessed 18th Dec, 2007)
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Figure 6.2 The Location and Transport System of Kaohsiung Science P ark  (not 
to scale)
Source: STSP website, http://www.stsipa.gov.tw /web (accessed date 16th Dec, 2007)
6.3 Policy Making Process of KSP
The K SP’s birth was a consequence o f  the com petition between the Shinshi site and 
Lujhu site to becom e the location for the STSP project in the mid 1990s. A lthough the 
Shinshi site won the bid (see Table 6.1) then, the Lujhu site subsequently became the
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location o f KSP. An inevitable question therefore arises: what led to this dramatic 
change, and what was the turning point in the story o f the Lujhu site?
6.3.1 Development of the Lujhu site
After its defeat in the site competition to become the site for the STSP project, 
supporters o f the Lujhu site strongly objected to the decision and blamed the NSC for 
political interference (Yang and Su, 2002, p.62). In addition to continually making 
complaints through political channel, local coalition groups^9 embarked on a more 
pragmatic strategy to revive the fortunes o f the Lujhu site. The first success was 
agreed cooperation with Taiwan Sugar Corporation (TSC), which owned extensive 
property in Kaohsiung County, to develop the Lujhu Site. In fact, Lujhu site was 
mostly owned by TSC, and the successful bid of the Shinshi site led to uncertainty 
regarding its future development (Interview with Section Chief Chang, KSP Division, 
September 2006). Kaohsiung County Government and TSC subsequently entered into 
a joint development project which was expected to benefit both sides. While TSC 
would offer land for development, Kaohsiung County Government would provide all 
necessary services (Yang and Su, 2002, p.62).
At that time, the central government policy also included encouraging traditional 
industrial parks to upgrade to intellectual industrial parks as part of industrial 
restructuring. The coalition o f local interest groups and politicians supported this 
policy and sent a proposal for an intellectual industrial park to the Executive Yuan 
(Interview with Section Chief Chang, KSP Division).
39 The coalition comprised local interest groups and politicians from various political parties, i.e. the 
Vice Speaker o f  the Legislative Yuan, Jin-Pyng Wang (KMT) and Magistrate o f  Kaohsiung County, 
Cheng-Shien Yu (DPP).
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Table 6.1 Chronological Development of Kaohsiung Science Park
Source: STSP website, http://www.stsipa.gov.tw/web (accessed 25th Dec, 2007)
Oct 1990
NSC suggested the Executive Yuan set up a second science park after the Hsinchu 
Science Park.
1st Jan 1991
National Six-Year Plan supported the establishment o f a new science park in order 
to reduce regional disparity.
25th Feb 1993...........................................................................................................................
NSC published the report-‘Study of Potential Bases for the Second Science Park" 
which pointed to Shinshi (in Tainan) as the preferred location, while the two townships 
of Yanchao and Cishan in Kaohsiung County, were identified as sixth and seventh 
preference respectively.
1st Jul 1993
The 2338th Executive Yuan Council announced the ‘Promotion o f Economic 
Development' project, indicating its determination to set up Southern Taiwan Science 
Park.
Jan 1994
A panel to plan the Southern Taiwan Science Park project assembled by the NSC. 
1st Dec 1994
The NSC set out the assessment criteria for site selection of the STSP.
14th Jan 1995.............................................
The Panel for Site Selection of the NSC suggested Shinshi, Tainan, as the site for 
the STSP.
9th Sep 1997
The NSC Minister, Chao-Shiuan Liu, announced the Lujhu site would be the 
priority option if there was need for a second site as part of the STSP.
8th Apr 2000
The NSC agreed the Lujhu site as a second site as part o f the STSP project.
24th Apr 2000..........
Kaohsiung County Government applied for preparation o f the KSP District Plan. 
19th May 2000..........................................................................................................................
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The Executive Yuan conditionally accepted the proposal of the Lujhu site as the 
expansion o f STSP.
6th Apr 2001.......................................................................................
The Executive Yuan officially approved the development o f Lujhu site as the 
second base o f STSP.
24th Jul 2004
Lujhu Science Park was renamed as Kaohsiung Science Park.
18th Feb 2005
Regional Planning Committee, CPA approved the KSP District Plan.
Thus, the local coalition formed to support the Lujhu site’s bid to become part o f the 
location for the STSP project did not collapse after failure of the bid in 1995. Rather, 
it looked for any opportunity make good use of the site, even to establish an 
intellectual industrial park on the site (Yang and Su, 2002). Eventually, it received a 
positive answer from the central government since on 6th Oct 2000, the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) for Lujhu Intelligent Industrial Park was approved by the 
Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) and the development of the Lujhu 
site for this purpose was confirmed.
6.3.2 How the Lujhu Site became Kaohsiung Science Park
If the Lujhu site had been designated an intellectual industrial park, how did it 
become Kaohsiung Science Park today? The enthusiasm of the solid local coalition is 
perhaps one reason, however it is thought by some, i.e. Yang and Su (2002), that 
certain events actually contributed to this ultimate outcome.
The first event contributory event was a problem associated with the development of 
the Shinshi site per se. Section 5.6.1 explained how two problems were encountered 
in the development process: one was the finding of a prehistoric archaeological site
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and the other was flooding during site construction. Both incidents raised questions 
about Shinshi site’s suitability as the location o f the STSP project and led to worries 
about future development. When these events occurred, the proposal for Lujhu 
Intellectual Industrial Park was in the planning process and undergoing review by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). At the same time, the central government 
released its intention to look for a second site as part o f the STSP. Although the 
application for Lujhu Intellectual Industrial Park was being reviewed by the MOEA, 
the local coalition in Kaohsiung County transferred their attention to the government 
release and entered the bidding process, putting forward the Lujhu site as the second 
site as part of the STSP.
Supporters from different backgrounds, i.e. politicians, landowners, joined together 
and called for the establishment of Lujhu Science Park. Such supporters included at 
that time Magistrate Yu of Kaohsiung County (DPP), Vice-Speaker Wang of the 
Legislative Yuan, and Legislators from constituencies in Kaohsiung County. They 
grouped together to visit the Executive Yuan to present the advantages o f their bid 
(Yang and Su, 2002).
On the other hand, there was also a need for a second base for STSP. Section Chief 
Chang o f KSP Division when interviewed in September 2006 narrated the story in 
brief:
‘Despite the loss o f the bid in 1995, Kaohsiung County Government never gave 
up on its intention to develop the Lujhu site. It kept in touch with Taiwan Sugar 
Corporation and the Industrial Development Bureau, MOEA, to establish an 
intellectual industrial park on this site.
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Around 1999, space on the Shinshi site had become increasingly scarce and 
therefore attempts were being made to look for a new site for expansion 
purposes as part o f the STSP. This was the first reason for Kaohsiung Science 
P ark’s establishment. Another reason was risk reduction, i.e. no known 
flooding problem, which made Kaohsiung Science Park an alternative viable 
option. ’
Although Section Chief Chang mentioned the effort o f the local coalition to promote 
Kaohsiung Science Park, she did not refer to any lobbying that may have gone on 
behind the scenes. Some argued (Yang and Su, 2002) that the coalition’s effort was 
rewarded with the establishment of Lujhu Science Park in 2000, and that the change 
in ruling party in the same year also contributed to its establishment. Kaohsiung 
County Government and DPP Legislators combined their resources to effectively 
present their case to the central government, and the new DPP government responded 
positively to their request as a pay back for their support in the 2000 Presidential 
election40.
However, the findings in this study question the connection between the establishment 
o f Lujhu Science Park and the shift in ruling party, since the Executive Yuan had 
approved the establishment of Lujhu Science Park on 19th May 2000, when the KMT 
was still the ruling party41 (see Table 6.1). In other words, it was the KMT 
government which made the planning decision to set up KSP, and the DPP
40 Kaohsiung County is as a significant power base for the DPP since the DPP has won most o f  the 
elections in Kaohsiung County over the last decade, including an overwhelming victory in the 2000 
and 2004 Presidential elections.
41 President Chen (DPP) took up office on 20th May 2000, the day after the decision had been made.
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government furthered the development process.
6.4 Economic Planning Framework for KSP
In the organisational structure, Kaohsiung Science Park, as a second site as part o f the 
STSP, has to take orders from the STSP Administration (see Figure 6.3). Since the 
STSP Administration is located in the Shinshi site, a distance o f around 16 miles from 
KSP, there is a KSP Division under the STSP Administration on the Lujhu site.
Section 5.4 discussed internal relationships within the NSC, the economic planning 
authority responsible for the STSP project, and this chapter will not repeat the 
description again since both Tainan Science Park (TSP) and KSP are under the STSP 
Administration's management.
6.4.1 Competition between local governments: the National Telecom Technology 
Centre
In 2002, a CEPD’s report revealed that there would be a project to set up a National 
Telecom Technology Centre. This centre would be a quango and established in a 
science park in order to raise awareness of telecom technology as another national 
strategic industry. Like any big government investment, the Telecom Technology 
Centre was seen as an enormous project that local governments could not neglect. For 
Kaohsiung County, the project was viewed as a positive catalyst for the forthcoming 
development of KSP and upgrade of the local economy. The benefit o f the 
establishment of the National Telecom Technology Centre was inevitably an attraction 
to the local government.
2 1 3
Figure 6.3 Organisational Chart of the STSP Administration and KSP Division
Source: STSP w ebsite, http://www.stsipa.gov.tw/web (accessed 26th Mar, 2008)
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Interestingly, the STSP Administration was not particularly concerned wherever the 
Telecom Technology Centre was set up in TSP or KSP, since both science parks are 
under its supervision. However, it was not the case for the two County Governments 
which were burdened with huge local expectations (Interview with Ms. Wu, Section 
Chief o f the Industrial and Commercial Service Section, Kaohsiung County 
Government). As a result of various considerations, i.e. the investment and the 
pressure from local expectations, bidding to become the site for the National Telecom 
Technology Centre became a game between local governments rather than a 
competition between science parks.
The finding of this study suggests it was in Kaohsiung County Government that 
played a significant role in this bid. When interviewed in September 2006, Section 
Chief Wu o f the Industrial and Commercial Service Section, Kaohsiung County 
Government stated that due to the lack of development coordination mechanism at the 
regional level, local planning authorities compete against each other for limited 
resource offered by central government, rather than cooperate for regional 
development, a very unhealthy competitive culture develops.
In such circumstance, political intervention based on political considerations is more 
significant than professional evaluation. In addition. Dr. Su (Assistant Professor, 
Chung-Jone University, September, 2006) stated that political intervention has 
become increasingly prevalent in the Taiwanese planning system, particularly in 
recent years. For instance, in the competition to win the bid to become the site for the 
National Telecom Technology Centre, Kaohsiung County had a strong competitor, 
Taoyuan County, which had many advantages in terms of location and a strong
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industrial base. Moreover, Taoyuan County was the Vice-President’s home county and 
it was said that an unofficial source had indicated Taoyuan County was likely to win 
the bid and gain the project due to these factors (Interviews with Dr. Su, Chung-Jone 
University and Section Chief Wu, Kaohsiung County Government).
However, somewhat surprisingly, Kaohsiung County gained the project. What, 
therefore, led to Kaohsiung County winning the bid o f the decision was deeply 
affected by political considerations? ‘Frankly; we used our political resources as w ell’ 
said Section Chief Wu when interviewed. The key to Kaohsiung’s victory was its 
supporters’ adoption of the same tool used by those supporting Taoyuan County’s bid, 
i.e. political pressure. Section Chief Wu said straight to the researcher:
‘If others used their political resources, why not us. Taoyuan County had a 
Vice-President but we had the Speaker Wang o f  the Legislative Yuan. It was in 
fact a competition o f  political resources. On the day o f  the announcement, high 
ranking officials, including Premier Yu, congregated to wait for the result, 
though there were voices complaining about political intervention. ’
After intense competitive bidding, the National Telecom Technology Centre was 
finally set up in KSP in 2003, though it has not brought as many benefits as were 
anticipated at the time of the bid. It is a typical economic project whose pending 
arrival is heralded with much loud thunder but which ultimately produces very little 
rain, in other words, in other words, much was promised but very little has been 
achieved.
Whatever the effectiveness to-date of the National Telecom Technology Centre, it
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illustrates the reasons why local government has been eager to become involved in 
economic development projects even though such involvement is not part of its duty. 
Moreover, in the case o f large investments, local coalition groups will expand every 
effort to ensure such projects are sited within their locality and political influence is a 
popular resource employed in the economic planning process.
6.4.2 The lack of spatial development strategy and the rise of local government
Chapter Three explained how economic planning had been dominated by the CEPD 
during the rule of the KMT, and it had decisive authority to put forward planning 
suggestions to the Executive Yuan. However, when the DPP came to power in 2000, 
this situation began to change.
The DPP had come to power through grass root support and its members therefore 
knew the importance of maintaining such support to gain re-election (Interview with 
Senior Specialist Liao, o f the CEPD). On the other hand, local groups understood 
their votes could be a powerful instrument to gain benefits from government policies, 
hence, were happy to exploit this for their own ends.
In such circumstance, the proposed establishment of a new science park as a huge 
development project leads to intense competition between local governments. 
However, as Dr. Chen, Member o f Regional Planning Committee (RPC), pointed out 
when interviewed in September 2006, local governments usually submit their bid to 
central government without taking into account of national spatial development. 
Given the enormous advantage of such development, undoubtedly, every county 
argues that it offers the best site option and insists it meets the necessary 
infrastructures requirements. However, the economic planning authorities, i.e. the
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NSC and CEPD, at the central level which argue that strategic concerns should be 
considered more than local interests when deciding where to locate a new science 
park. Rather than criticise local governments for promoting local interests, Dr. Chen 
attributed the problem of uncoordinated planning to the lack of spatial planning:
7  can understand local governments ’ eagerness to pursue huge development 
projects in view o f the pressure exerted by local expectation. However, the 
problem is exacerbated by central government lacking an overall planning 
strategy for such development, i.e. science parks. I f  there was a clear blue print 
fo r spatial planning, local governments could develop their own advantages 
instead o f  chasing similar investment i.e. science parks. When diverse 
strategies are adopted for local economic development, the tension between 
Counties as a result o f  seeking limited economic projects could be reduced. ’
In Dr. Chen’s opinion, a science park differs from an industrial park since its 
establishment is related to high-technology development which is the main strategic 
industry in Taiwan. Therefore, there are more requirements in terms of academic 
support and industrial networks, which central government should take into account 
during the policy making process. Thus, the decision to locate a science park may not 
be based solely on meeting local’s expectations, especially when several sites are 
competing in the bid process. To win a bid, coalitions o f local interest groups and 
politicians are very common. Political intervention in the policy making process is 
also increasingly frequent due to the lack o f integrated planning policy, e.g. spatial 
development strategy, and this lack is the real cause o f unplanned development 
(Interview with Dr. Chen, RPC Member). Despite there being a National 
Comprehensive Development Plan (NCDP), it only states developmental strategies in
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general and does not mention individual economic projects (CEPD, 1996). Further, 
the four Regional Plans should indicate the location of significant economic projects 
as guidance for regional development, however, according to Professor Lin from the 
National Taiwan University interviewed in September 2006, the fact is, Regional 
Plans do not direct such projects, whereas conversely, such projects indicate 
amendments o f Regional Plans.
In the planning process for KSP, Kaohsiung County Government played far more 
significant role in economic development planning compared to Tainan County 
Government in the case o f TSP. In the case of TSP, it is the STSP Administration 
which deals with coordination with other central agencies but in the case o f KSP, 
Kaohsiung County Government has taken over the role o f coordination from the KSP 
Division. The bidding process to become the location for the National Telecom 
Technology Centre described in the previous section demonstrated the significance of 
Kaohsiung County Government in this. When there was a need for negotiation with 
the relevant central agencies, the Urban Planning Section o f Kaohsiung County would 
request the assistance of the CEPD because o f its coordination role at the central level. 
Due to its limited number o f personnel, the CEPD responded grudgingly to such 
requests for assistance. When interviewed, Senior. Specialist Liao of the CEPD 
complained about the ‘extra work’ involved in complying with requests for such 
assistance:
‘Science Park Administrations have a lot o f skilled professional planners 
whereas there are far fewer personnel in the CEPD. Nevertheless, the CEPD is 
responsible fo r coordinating overall planning policy fo r  science parks. In my 
view, it is difficult to meet both our responsibilities and local government
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requests for assistance.
However, why was Kaohsiung County Government so heavily involved in economic 
planning which was thought to be the responsibility o f the Kaohsiung Division of the 
STSP Administration? Although there is an increasing trend in Taiwan for local 
government to become involved in economic development policy, Kaohsiung County 
Government’s participation in the economic planning process for KSP is unusual 
(Yang and Su, 2002).
There are several possible reasons for this phenomenon. First, the movement towards 
democratisation in Taiwan has led to an increase in the power o f local government. 
Such power has also been attributed to the frequency of local elections in which 
political parties need support from local interest groups (Interview with Senior 
Specialist Liao o f the CEPD). Second, as a second site o f the STSP project, the KSP 
Division is still a small unit with very limited resources (see Figure 6.3) and this 
limits it capacity for economic planning (Interview with Section Chief Chang o f the 
KSP Division). Finally, the local coalition which supported the Lujhu site’s bid in the 
middle 1990s successfully achieved its goals and this resulted in many developmental 
gains in Kaohsiung County (Yang and Su, 2002, p.53, 63).
6.5 Land Use Planning for KSP
6.5.1 The planning process for the KSP District Plan
Once KSP had been set up, there were inevitably going to be many developments 
promoted in and around the surrounding areas, and there might have been a messy
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layout without a development plan. A District Plan was viewed as a solution to 
fragmented development, and it was the task o f the Urban Planning Section o f the 
County Government to manage the planning process for the KSP District Plan in 
terms of plan making, application, and approval seeking.
As in the development o f TSP, the planning process for the KSP District Plan was a 
very tough challenge for the local planning authority. The complexity of planning 
content, the huge land use switch and the enormous developmental gains made the 
planning process problematic. Section 5.5.1 has illustrated the difficulties encountered 
in making the TSP District Plan and the contestations between local interest groups. 
However, the main problem associated with making the KSP District Plan differed 
from that the TSP District Plan. In the case of the KSP District Plan, although local 
interests competed with each other, the solid local coalition helped to reduce conflicts 
at the local level. The challenge facing KSP District Plan making came from the 
Regional Planning Committee (RPC) of the Construction and Planning Agency (CPA), 
central planning authority.
The KSP District Plan planning process commenced in 2001 when the Urban 
Planning Section o f Kaohsiung County Government authorized a private planning 
consultancy to undertake an assessment for the making of the District Plan. In the 
beginning, Kaohsiung County Government commissioned the Thi Planning 
Consultancy to take over responsibility for planning assessment report. As a private 
planning consultancy, Thi Planning Consultancy was responsible to the County 
Government for technical work, i.e. site investigation, surveying, data collection, and 
construction appraisal. However, work related to strategic planning still remained the 
responsibility of the local planning authority.
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According to Section Chief Hsu, the Urban Planning Section of Kaohsiung County 
Government, there were some smaller planning companies working with the Thi 
Planning Consultancy. For instance, Li-Cheng Planning Consultancy outlined the 
development plan for Kaohsiung Science Park and helped in presenting it to RPC 
meetings. Although private companies had a role in drawing up reports related to 
construction and building, they were not involved in land use planning in relation to 
strategic aspects, e.g. transport planning and environmental planning.
Since private planning consultancies appear to have been given responsibility for 
drawing up reports and site investigation, what was the role o f Urban Planning 
Section in drawing up the District Plan? Section Chief Hsu explained:
‘We supervised the planning companies throughout the plan making process 
and we reviewed the reports they produced. Only reports that followed the 
local planning authority’s directions were accepted and then submitted by us to 
the Regional Planning Committee o f the CPA. We also asked planning
consultancies to amend plans if  we had other considerations or concerns as a 
result o f  suggestions made by the Regional Planning Committee. The Urban 
Planning Section and the planning consultancies worked very well together.
The comments made by Section Chief Hsu suggest a partnership between the local 
planning authority and private consultancies and, at the same time, reveal an 
interesting phenomenon: private planning consultancies played a role as planning 
agencies dealing with paperwork in order to assist the local planning authority. In fact,
it is a model which has recently appeared in Taiwanese local planning due to the
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limited capacity o f local planning authorities (Interview with Senior Specialist Liao of 
the CEPD). In the KSP District Plan making process, due to its limited number of 
personnel, the Urban Planning Section was unable to manage all planning activities, 
therefore it had to put out to tender work related to site investigation, data collection 
and report making. The relationship between private planning consultancies and the 
planning authority was created since the beginning of District Plan making and, 
according to Section Chief Hsu, it seems to have worked very well.
Further, unlike the case of TSP District Plan, where local interest groups sought the 
expansion o f developmental areas, Kaohsiung County Government did not encounter 
much pressure from local stakeholders in this respect. Section Chief Hsu confirmed 
that the local community had fully supported the local planning authority in its goal to 
develop KSP because such development would be advantages to them. Thus, local 
interest groups stood solidly behind the local planning authority. She was uncertain as 
to whether this support would last after the detailed planning process commenced as 
there would inevitably be winners and losers. In general, the lack of local lobbying 
pressure made the preliminary KSP District Plan making process relatively easy.
6.5.2 Questioning of KSP District Plan by Regional Planning Committee (RPC) 
Members
Eventually, the Kaohsiung Science Park District Plan was drawn up to cover an area 
of 2200 hectares and to contain Kang-Shan Ben-Chou Industrial Park and Yongan 
Industrial Park.
As a Member of the Regional Planning Committee (RPC), when interviewed, Dr. 
Chen recalled there were no major problems with KSP's location except a need for
improvement to drainage works. All support infrastructures and plans for KSP were 
satisfactory. Dr. Chen explained that that was the result o f the bid in 1995 when the 
Lujhu site sought to become the location of STSP. The KSP District Plan therefore 
met most o f the requirements demanded by the RPC. There were only a few technical 
details that needed to be included, e.g. drainage work. He described the planning 
process for KSP as follows:
‘Our works was very simple. We reviewed the plan, assessed its contribution, 
and confirm its area. After approval by the RPC, it went to the Urban Planning 
Committee (UPC) for a detailed land use planning review ’ (Interview with 
Dr. Chen, RPC Member).
The above comments suggest the making o f the KSP District Plan making was a 
relatively smooth process whereas, in fact, some friction occurred during discussions 
among RPC members.
The initial population anticipated in the KSP District Plan was 70,000, criticised by 
RPC members as being an over-optimistic prediction (CPA, 2006). Thus, the RPC 
expressed some reservation, similar to the attitude found in the STSP District Plan 
making process (Section 5.5.3). Section Chief Hsu of Kaohsiung County Government 
did not criticise the reservation of the RPC when interviewed, and she said:
‘To be honest, this is a common problem in plan making in Taiwan. If you make 
a calculation o f estimated population in urban plans, you will always find the
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number is above the current population in Taiwan.42 So I can understand the 
Committee s criticism. However, as a local planning authority, we always take 
an optimistic view since we take responsibility fo r local development. ’
Section Chief Hsu’s comments raise a question with regard to local government’s 
optimistic planning prediction: were there local pressures, e.g. local stake holders, 
forcing the County Government to express an ‘optimistic’ expectation for District 
planning? Section Chief Hsu did not answer this question directly but she implied 
there would inevitably be pressure from local interest groups in the forthcoming 
detailed plan making. She also indicated that to-date the local coalition’s concern 
were all about speeding up the confirmation procedure at the RPC since approval of 
the KSP District Plan would contribute to local economic development. In other 
words, local interest groups, and stakeholders had yet to react to the detailed planning 
process. As Section Chief Hsu said: ‘local interest groups have not at the moment 
begun to lobby; but it is possib le  they w ill in the future. ’
6.5.3 The relationship between the CPA and local planning authorities
Besides Regional Planning Committee (RPC), there is another important actor in the 
CPA, the Comprehensive Planning Division. During the District Plan making, it 
offered technical assistance, such as planning guidance, providing information 
relating to RPC concerns, and acting as a bridge between the RPC and Kaohsiung 
County Government. This assistance helped the local planning authority to meet 
RPC’s requirements. Section Chief Hsu of Kaohsiung County Government indicated
42 The population o f  Taiwan as a whole is 22.88 millions (see Section 3.4). Total planned population in 
Taiwanese urban plans is 25 million, while the current population in urban plan zones is 18 million 
only (CPA, 2006). There is a gap o f  30% between predication and reality.
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that while the Comprehensive Planning Division was willing to offer suggestions to 
the local planning authority, it did not necessarily support planning project submitted 
by the local planning authority to the RPC. Since the CPA is higher than the local 
planning authorities in the institutional design, it applies a very strict standard when 
reviewing plans submitted by local planning authorities according to field work 
findings (Interview with Director Wang o f the Comprehensive Planning Division, 
CPA). The strict attitude o f CPA is not welcomed by officers in local planning 
authority. According to them, the CPA is at the upper level to assist local planning 
authorities, however, according to a central planning authority officer, Director Wang, 
the Comprehensive Planning Division, CPA is mainly responsible for assisting the 
RPC in plan review and final approval process. Also, while the CPA is willing to 
assist the local planning authority, it respects the decisions made by the RPC although 
it also endeavours to maintain good relations with local planning authority.
What therefore is the mechanism for coordination between the local planning 
authority and CPA? In the case o f KSP, after the KSP District Plan had been approved 
by the RPC, Kaohsiung County planning authority submit it to Urban Planning 
Committee (UPC)43 o f the CPA, which undertook the detailed plan review process 
and approved it if  appropriate. In the case o f KSP, Kaohsiung County planning 
authority would communicate with the Urban Planning Section primarily by means o f 
phone calls, although face to face communication was common. Thus both formal and 
informal methods o f communication were used (Interview with Section Chief Hsu,
43 When the researcher was conducting interviews, the KSP District Plan had just been approved by 
the RPC, and was about to go  through the detailed plan making process. During the preliminary plan 
making process, the Comprehensive Planning D ivision had been responsible for providing assistance to 
the local planning authority.
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Kaohsiung County Government).
Section Chief Hsu indicated that regular contact is mainly used between the Urban 
Planning Division o f the Kaohsiung County Government and the CPA. There are 
regular fortnightly meetings held by the UPC o f the CPA to which local authority 
planning officers are invited to attend when the meeting topic is o f relevance and 
interest. Like the Regional Planning Committee (RPC), the UPC is composed o f 
representatives from various groups, e.g. governmental organisations, institutes and 
interest groups. New urban plans or amendments cannot be implemented until they 
have been confirmed by the UPC and relevant planning authorities are invited to 
attend to present their points o f view. Therefore the UPC meeting are viewed as 
formal occasion for policy coordination in relation to urban land use.
6.6 Horizontal Policy Coordination in the Case of KSP
6.6.1 Coordination within the CPA: the relationship between the RPC and 
Comprehensive Planning Division
As the previous section indicated, the Comprehensive Planning Division o f the CPA is 
responsible for assisting the local planning authority during the plan review process 
undertaken by the RPC. What, therefore, is the relationship between the 
Comprehensive Planning Division o f the CPA and the RPC o f the CPA? As Dr. Chen, 
RPC Member, explained, the RPC is seen as a decision-making body in charge of 
planning review and decision making while the Comprehensive Planning Division of 
the CPA is the RPC's assistant unit providing planning analysis and administrative 
support. The Comprehensive Planning Division needs to prepare all relevant papers
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and reports before a RPC meeting is convened. The Comprehensive Planning
Division also makes a preliminary review for application to see if  all administrative
work has been completed, e.g. regulative requirements and bureaucratic procedure.
Hence the Comprehensive Planning Department is the first reviewer o f planning
m
application and filter out applications which do not meet central planning authority 
requirements. After applications have been reviewed by the Comprehensive Planning 
Division, the RPC is responsible for the approval decision (Interview with Director 
Wang, the Comprehensive Planning Division o f the CPA).
However, it is the RPC’s obligation to present its opinions if  it has rejected an 
application. Most decisions made by the RPC are based on common consensus and 
achievement o f  common consensus is viewed as a positive model. RPC member Dr. 
Chen contended that RPC decisions are usually based on professional concerns rather 
than central government planning policy. In fact, the central government has 
questioned some decisions made by the RPC which it has viewed as controversial (e.g. 
the CTSP case in Section 6.7.3).
The relationship between the Comprehensive Planning Division o f the CPA and the 
RPC is very close according to Director Wang o f  CPA. The Comprehensive Planning 
Division provides background details and makes suggestion to the RPC. Dr. Chen, 
RPC Member, agreed that the relationship between the two bodies is good:
mostly, members o f  the RPC will accept the advice o f  the Comprehensive 
Planning Division i f  it is thought to be an objective analysis. Otherwise, they 
will need to convince other members i f  the advice is considered controversial.
The coordination mechanism between the two bodies works very well. ’
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The RPC is also the platform where other central agencies can present their ideas 
about planning. For each single planning application, there is a RPC meeting at which 
all relevant departments are invited to express their opinions. Thus, the RPC meeting 
is a vehicle for sectoral coordination. According to Dr. Chen, the RPC can be viewed 
as a formal mechanism for policy coordination at the central level:
‘ There are individual representatives like me and representatives o f  agencies at 
RPC meeting. When a conflict occurs between representatives, a consensus o f  
opinion is usually reached after discussion. The RPC meeting p er  se is a place 
where coordination is facilitated not only agencies but also between central 
and local government. I f  an issue is particularly tough, a panel consisting o f  
voluntary members addresses it first, and then it is passed to the RPC meeting 
fo r  further discussion and deliberation. '
According to Dr. Chen, whenever a planning issue was particularly difficult to resolve 
or controversial, a panel would be convened to discuss it. The panel would consist o f 
RPC members who were interested in the issue and who had volunteered to discuss it. 
This is the plan review operation within the RPC.
6.6.2 Questioning of the water supply report for the KSP District Plan
Section 6.5.2 pointed to a gap between central and local planning authorities' 
population estimation in the KSP District Plan. Such difference in estimation was 
small in comparison to the challenge to the KSP District Plan which came from 
unprecedented requirement for a water supply report demanded by RPC members. 
The Urban Planning Section o f Kaohsiung County Government had submitted the
229
KSP District Plan to the RPC for confirmation in 2003, the Plan was not approved 
until 27th January 2005 due to the subsequent water supply report requirement.
Normally, such a report would not have be necessary until after approval o f the 
District Plan, however, KSP was the first case where a water supply report before 
approval o f  such plan. Given the circumstances, it was unreasonable to expect 
Kaohsiung County Government to predict the extent o f the needed water supply prior 
to detailed plan making because it was difficult to estimate what facilities might be 
placed in the district. The CPA asked the local planning authority to satisfy the 
requirement for the water supply report which had been requested by the Water 
Resources Agency (WRA) o f  the Ministry o f Economic Affairs (MOEA) as the result 
o f a decision made at a RPC meeting in 2004 (Interview with Section Chief Hsu, the 
Urban Planning Section C hief o f Kaohsiung County Government).
This was the first time in Taiwanese planning that a district plan for a science park 
had been requested to provide a water supply report in the preliminary plan making 
process. Section Chief Hsu believed this decision was made due to the diverse 
background o f RPC members and their lack o f knowledge o f the plan making 
procedure. She said:
7  think the cause was the various backgrounds o f  Members o f  the Regional 
Planning Committee. The Committee is comprised o f  members from different 
fields, including environmentalists and academics, who are not always 
conversant with the plan making process.
A member o f  the RPC, Dr. Chen confirmed that the existence o f varied interests can
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lead to difficulty in reaching a common consensus on important decisions. Moreover, 
due to lack o f  cohesion and awareness o f plan making procedures, RPC decisions can 
sometimes be impractical (Interview with Dr. Chen, RPC Member).
Thus, Section C hief Hsu argued there was a lack o f coordination between the WRA 
and RPC. Further, she revealed that whenever the local planning authority contacted 
the CPA for details as to how the water supply report should be presented and what it 
should contain, it always received conflicting information. Even information obtained 
from the WRA conflicted with information received from the CPA. Moreover, officers 
within the WRA itself provided conflicting information. Thus, drawing up the water 
supply report had been an extremely difficult task.
As a result, Kaohsiung County Government sought CPA assistance to resolve the 
matter. However, the CPA refused to help and argued that the problem should be 
resolved by the WRA. In January 2005, the WRA stated that the water supply report 
could be provided in stages, therefore the KSP District Plan was approved by the RPC 
in January and confirmed by the CPA on 18th February 2005 (Kaohsiung County 
Government, 2005). The whole affair gives rise to question, if there was no precedent 
for a water supply report in the preliminary plan making stage, why did RPC 
members request one? Section Chief Hsu provided the following answer:
‘. . . a  representative from the WRA expressed concern about water distribution 
throughout Kaohsiung County. Some RPC members interpreted his remarks as 
meaning that a water supply report was required and therefore the Committee 
decided that the KSP District Plan should be accompanied with such report. ’
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At the same time, there seemed to be problems with coordination within the WRA 
itself. For example, the representatives o f the WRA were differed at the two meetings 
and even provided divergent information. The field work findings suggest this 
problem may have led to misunderstandings between organisations, i.e. the RPC, 
WRA, and Kaohsiung County Government. According to Section Chief Hsu o f 
Kaohsiung County Government, a specific officer in the WRA, a Mr. Lin, was 
responsible for communication with Kaohsiung County Government, however, he 
was not the representative who attended the meeting with the RPC. The WRA 
appointed different persons to attend meetings, in contrast, the representative o f the 
CPA was always a Ms. Chang, who had a good communication with Kaohsiung 
County planning authority. The scenario described indicates that policy coordination 
in the case o f  KSP highly relied on communication between representatives o f 
organisations and coordination became difficult when representatives were changed.
6.6.3 Coordination at the local level: KSP Division and Kaohsiung County 
Government
Another interesting relationship is that between Kaohsiung Science Park (KSP) 
Division and Kaohsiung County Government. Unsurprisingly, each agency had 
different concerns. The KSP Division focused its attention on the development o f the 
science park and the local planning authority focused on the District Plan making 
process. In an interview with Ms. Chang, Section Chief o f the KSP Division, she 
stated that the KSP Division had offered 16 million Taiwanese Dollars (267,000 
sterling pounds)44 to the local planning authority to assist it with detailed District Plan 
making. The KSP Division's main focus was the capacity o f the site plan for future
44 The exchange rate o f  the British Pounds to the Taiwan Dollars was 1:60.52 according to the Yahoo  
Currency Convertor on 28th Apr 2008.
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expansion. She also contended, although the KSP Division usually attended 
coordination meetings for the KSP District Plan, its members offered few comments 
on the District Plan at such meetings, and left most suggestions and decisions to the 
local planning authority. Therefore, Section Chief Chang stated, ‘we have maintained 
a perfect relationship with Kaohsiung County Government
Local government staff appeared, however, to hold different views on the so-called 
‘perfec t’ relationship. According to Section Chief Wu o f the Industrial and 
Commercial Service Section, Kaohsiung County Government, the KSP Division 
always actively participated in meetings convened by the central planning authority, 
i.e. RPC, and such meetings were not held on a regular basis. She also indicated that 
the KSP Division did not often attend coordination meeting charged by the County 
Government. For example, Section Chief Wu mentioned regular Industrial Park 
Development Meetings convened by the County government, to which all relevant 
officers in the County Government, including the Magistrate, were invited. Such 
meetings presented an opportunity for participants to meet planners and developers in 
order to solve problems and they were a formal method used by the County 
Government to coordinate industrial development and land use planning within the 
County. Section Chief Wu questioned why the KSP Division did not attend such 
meetings convened by the local government:
‘It is a p ity  that the KSP Division has never attended these meetings. 
“Industrial Park Development Meetings ” have been taken place on a quarterly 
basis, since the previous Magistrate s administration, and is a form al 
coordinative platform to promote industrial park development. ’
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At the request o f  the researcher, Section Chief Wu provided several reasons for the 
KSP Division’s absence from these meetings:
‘First, the Industrial Park Development Meeting is chaired by a Magistrate 
who has not asked us to invite the KSP Division. Second, though I  told the KSP 
Division about this meeting, it d id  not show an interest in it... Third, the KSP 
Division thinks it is unnecessary to attend the meeting because not many firms 
have set up in KSP and the problems facing KSP differ from those facing  
traditional industrial parks.'
According to Section Chief Wu’s comments, on one hand, the Magistrate o f the 
County, as a chairman o f the meeting, has not invited the Division to attend the 
meeting and therefore no representative from the Division has attended it, despite 
being informed by Section Chief Wu through informal channels that the meeting is 
held. On the other hand, the Division seems not to view the meeting as useful for KSP 
and has accordingly absented itself from it. The question nevertheless remains 
whether the Magistrate intentionally did not invite the KSP Division to the meeting or 
simply neglected to inform it o f its existence. Whatever the reason for the Division’s 
absence, for some officers in County Government, the KSP Division’s absenteeism 
appears to reflect its indifference to coordination with the local planning authority and 
this has cast a shadow on the relationship between the KSP Division and the County 
Government as indicated by Section Chief Wu:
‘Although I do not know the precise reason fo r  the D ivision’s absence from the 
meeting, I am sorry that such absence has occurred. No matter whether KSP 
differs from a traditional industrial park, the Industrial Park Development 
Meeting offers a form al platform fo r  discussion and also presents an
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opportunity to build connections to local groups and corporations.
In short, the M agistrate's failure to invite, the KSP Division’s lack o f interest, and the 
developmental circumstance o f KSP all contributed to the KSP Division’s absence in 
this regular formal coordination meeting. The reason for the KSP Division’s absence 
was not entirely clear since Section Chief Chang o f the KSP Division did not mention 
any difficulty in coordination with Kaohsiung County Government.
The KSP Division’s absence from Industrial Park Development Meeting made formal 
coordination between it and the local planning authority difficult. Section Chief Wu 
suggested that their infrequent interactions might also have been leaders’ lack o f 
motivation. For instance, the Director General o f  the STSP Administration refused the 
KSP Division’s request to arrange a coordination meeting with Kaohsiung County 
Government when both the sides thought there was a need. Section Chief Wu stated:
'The Director General o f  the STSP Administration argued that such 
coordination meetings were not useful since they were merely an administrative 
routine. However, the local planning authority viewed such meetings as 
offering a platform fo r  policy coordination in relation to KSP development.
In the interview conducted with Section Chief Chang o f the KSP Division, she argued 
that the Division pays more attention to practical concerns, i.e. the development and 
construction o f KSP, that meeting attendance, nevertheless, this does not affect its 
relationship with the local planning authority. For local authority officers, holding a 
meeting is very important for coordination since all relevant persons can gather 
together to discuss the issue o f KSP District Plan. Nevertheless, the KSP Division
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would appear to think there are more efficient ways to facilitate coordination, for 
example, making contact through phone calls.
Accordingly, the question arises: if  a regular meeting is not attended by the KSP 
Division, how often did they attend meetings convened on an infrequent basis? 
Section Chief Wu?s comments in the interview would suggest the KSP Division was 
more inclined towards attending meetings convened by itself and held on an irregular 
basis. Kaohsiung County Government was always happy to attend such meetings 
arranged by the KSP Division. However, such meetings had not been held for nearly a 
year.
6.6.4 The different views of the relationship between the KSP Division and local 
planning authority
Although Section Hsu o f  the Urban Planning Section o f  Kaohsiung County 
Government argued that good communication existed between it and the KSP 
Division, it was the Industrial and Commercial Service Section o f the County 
Government that communicates most with the Division, according to interview with 
Section Chief Chang o f  the KSP Division.
The Industrial and Commercial Service Section is a significant department whose 
main responsibility is economic development affairs. Not only communication with 
the KSP Division, but also many other duties are among the responsibilities o f this 
Section. For instance, one o f  its primary areas o f responsibility is industrial and 
commercial management which includes the supervision o f public service industries 
owned by government and the development o f  industrial zones. Management o f 
traditional market is another o f  its assignments.
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The Industrial and Commercial Service Section as described above is a very busy 
section with limited human resources. For this section, the KSP project, which is 
managed by the STSP Administration, presents an additional workload due to 
repeated requests for assistance from the KSP Division. However, since nobody can 
deny the significance o f the KSP project to local economic development, the 
Industrial and Commercial Service Section is obligated to render its assistance to the 
KSP Division. As a result o f such context, conflict has occurred between the Section 
and the KSP Division. Section Chief Wu o f the Industrial and Commercial Service 
Section o f  Kaohsiung County commented on this situation as follows:
‘Basically; all developments and promotions o f  KSP are expected to follow  
central government policies rather than local government wishes. As a local 
authority, we are unlikely to interfere w ith its development. However, since KSP 
is such a big project, it is impossible fo r  the County Government to neglect its 
existence. I f  K S P ’s performance is not as good as expected, we will be 
. inevitably blamed fo r  lack o f  action. ’
As a result o f the huge local hope being carried on it, the local authority has been 
forced to support to the development o f KSP. The most useful forms o f  assistance the 
KSP Division needed from the local planning authority were public infrastructures, i.e. 
a transport network design, and the drainage works (Interview with Section Chief 
Chang o f  the KSP Division). Section Chief Wu from the Industrial and Commercial 
Service Section, Kaohsiung County Government confirmed that the local planning 
authority had assisted the KSP Division to obtain additional developmental land to 
link it to the N o.l national highway.
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However, Section Chief Wu indicated that the assistance required by the KSP 
Division usually involved cross-sectoral coordination. When the researcher asked if 
there was a coordination mechanism within the County Government to facilitate such 
coordination, she replied that the KSP Division had been told to directly contact each 
department it needed assistance from on an individual basis. Her words imply that the 
Industrial and Commercial Service Section seemed not to offer a one-stop window 
service45 to the KSP Division and there seemed not to be a unit within County 
Government dealing with coordinative work related to the KSP. It is worth noting that 
Section C hief Chang from the KSP Division indicated that the Industrial and 
Commercial Service Section o f Kaohsiung County Government was the unit they 
most frequently contacted for policy coordination.
According to Section Chief Wu, the KSP Division was very demanding in its requests 
for assistance. However, due to the limited number o f officers in the Industrial and 
Commercial Service Section, it was unable to deal with all the KSP Division's 
requests for assistance. As a local planning authority, Kaohsiung County Government 
is mainly responsible for local economic development and has its own work 
responsibilities. Section Chief Wu stressed that while the local planning authority was 
happy to assist the KSP Division, its repeated requests for assistance increased the 
authority’s already substantial work load.
An area o f  conflict between the two agencies is therefore uncovered, and the
43 A one-stop w indow  service means an integrated platform whereby the KSP D ivision presents all 
their needs to a single unit which then manages consultation and coordination within Kaohsiung 
County Government.
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relationship between the local planning authority and the KSP Division may not have 
been as perfect as suggested by Section Chief Chang o f the KSP Division, since some 
planners in the local planning authority viewed the Division’s requests for assistance 
as too demanding.
There is something else which irritated local planning authority officers. The KSP 
Division was accustomed to contacting the Magistrate o f Kaohsiung County directly 
instead o f  the Section first. The Magistrate ultimately transferred the requests made 
by the KSP Division to the Section. The Section felt slighted by the Division’s action 
and this had an impact on their relationship. Section Chief Wu o f the Industrial and 
Commercial Service Section suggested that the Division felt the relationship between 
it and the Section was so good that whether it did could not hurt that relationship. It 
was unaware that the Section felt belittled by its action.
There would therefore seem to be a gap between what the KSP Division expected of 
the relationship and how the Section viewed the relationship. The KSP Division 
appears to have assured the Section was always happy to meet its requests for 
assistance due to the significance o f the KSP project. In fact, nobody denied the 
importance o f  the KSP, however, the local planning authority felt there should be a 
distinct division between its responsibilities and those o f the KSP Division because of 
the Section’s existing heavy work load, and the KSP’s development not being the 
Section’s responsibility.
To the outsider, the relationship between the KSP Division and the Industrial and 
Commercial Service Section appeared to be harmonious. However, the findings of 
this research have revealed existing tensions between them. Since the outward
appearance o f  a good relationship assisted the development o f KSP and also enhanced 
the standing o f  the Magistrate o f the County. In spite o f complaints, local planning 
officers intended to maintain the apparent harmony between the two agencies 
(Interview with Section Chief Wu o f Kaohsiung County Government). Perhaps due to 
this intention, the KSP Division's view o f the relationship was one perfection whereas 
the Section held a very different view.
6.7 Key Themes in the Research
Although the TSP and KSP cases are both related to the development o f  science parks, 
the findings derived from both cases differ due to their different contexts.
6.7.1 A chasm between the planning concepts of central and local government
As mentioned in Section 6.5, the CPA, as the land use planning authority at the central 
level, seemed not to wish to intervene in local planning affairs and used to leave these 
to the local planning authority to deal with, which implies a cohesive relationship 
between central and local planning authorities was lacking.
Such lack o f  cohesion was apparent in the water supply report issue (see Section 6.61). 
In this incident, it seems that the CPA made the KSP District Plan making process 
more complicated, especially when the WRA, the authority responsible for the supply 
o f  water resource, had showed its willingness to assist the local planning authority in 
drawing up the water supply report. Thus, while other agencies were willing to assist, 
the CPA expressed its reluctance to do so.
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In this matter, Kaohsiung County Government obtained the WRA’s agreement to 
postpone the date for submission o f the water supply report in spite o f  the 
unprecedented request by the RPC. In this incident, the CPA seems to have been a 
hindrance rather than a help in the drawing up o f  the KSP District Plan. The water 
supply report issue thus highlights the lack o f the harmony within the land use 
planning system.
There was also a difference o f  opinion in the plan making process for the KSP District 
Plan. The Lujhu site lost its bid to become the site o f the STSP project in 1995 and its 
main disadvantage was its limited hinterland (see Section 5.3.2). However, even today, 
for Kaohsiung County Government, the result was not acceptable and planners 
continually question the central government's decision to select the Shinshi site due to 
its advantage o f being a big, empty developmental area. Regarding the central 
government’s apparent preference for large, empty developmental sites for the 
location o f science parks, most local authorities tend to offer large-scale land owned 
by state-owned corporations, e.g. Taiwan Sugar Corporation in the case o f TSP, in 
their bid for governmental investment (Interview with Section Chief Wu of 
Kaohsiung County Government).
However, the industrial structure in Taiwan has changed over the last decade since 
many factories have moved to China and there are many brown field sites which need 
to be developed (Interviewed with Professor Chou, National Taipei University, 
September, 2006). At the same time, since more and more companies are upgrading to 
R&D from manufacturing, a big development area should no longer the only criterion 
for site selection for science parks. Given this context, Kaohsiung County 
Government has stressed its intention to pay more attention to the regeneration o f
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current industrial parks in order to help firms upgrade their business because o f the 
benefit to the local economy. As a result o f the difference in planning concepts, when 
interviewed, Section Chief Wu of Kaohsiung County Government stated:
if  we review the case o f the first site selection in 1995, we might conclude 
the decision was wrong since it switched large farming lands to becoming sites 
fo r industrial parks. As a small island, Taiwan is no longer capable o f  
consuming its land resources in this way and regeneration should be placed at 
the centre o f industrial land acquisition. ’
For the local planning authority, the regeneration approach would be more beneficial 
for the local economy due to the low cost of redevelopment. However, due to the 
extra work necessary for demolition and site cleaning, it was obvious central 
government did not take the concept o f industrial park redevelopment into account for 
site selection of the STSP project since it had chosen Shinshi site as it offered a big, 
empty land space and development convenience.
6.7.2 A need for crosscutting and cross-territory coordination
In the interview with Section Chief of the Urban Planning Section o f Kaohsiung 
County Government, she pointed to the difficulties which faced the local planning 
authority in the plan making process of the KSP District Plan. She suggested most 
problems arose due to the lack of a crosscutting coordination mechanism. Further, she 
contended that such a coordinative platform would have been helpful in the incident 
of the water supply report where both Kaohsiung County Government and the WRA 
were keen to find a solution to the problem. The Director of the WRA had even 
visited Kaohsiung County Government to show how determined he was that the issue
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should be resolved to the satisfaction o f  all parties concerned. However, due to the 
lack o f  a crosscutting coordination mechanism, the problem was not resolved for over 
a year.
In fact, in South Taiwan, there is a newly set up coordination platform, the 
Kao-Kao-Ping (Kaohsiung City, Kaohsiung County and Pingtung County) Summit 
which has been established for regional cooperation. Unfortunately, in spite o f this 
innovative coordination mechanism, the Kao-Kao-Ping Summit was not able to 
contribute the water supply report issue. First, the Summit deals mainly with 
cross-territory issues, such as cross-border planning at the regional level, and does not 
focus on cross-sector planning affairs. Second, without a regional planning authority, 
water distribution in Taiwan is the central government's responsibility and local 
governments have no planning power to resolve water supply issue. Accordingly, in 
spite o f this cross-border coordination platform, in the water supply report incident, 
the local planning authority needed the assistance o f the central government agency.
The foregoing discussion indicates that land use planning in Taiwan is still very 
centralised and the only coordination mechanism that local planning authority has 
available to it is the RPC meetings. For the central planning authority, coordination 
issues are being increasingly highlighted in planning discourses. According to 
Director Wang o f  the Comprehensive Planning Division o f the CPA, an improved 
planning permission process model76 has been adopted in the plan review process o f  
the RPC. Its members now have more discretionary power when making decisions for 
planning approval. However, Section Chief Hsu expressed a different thought on this
46 Planning permission (HrlislrFoJ) in Taiwan means a discretionary decision which is not the same as
planning permission system adopted in the UK.
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view. In her opinion,
‘Local planning officers prefer a fixed standard fo r  all planning applications, 
otherwise there w ill be no guidance fo r  such officers to follow  when making 
plans
In the case o f KSP, RPC members used their discretionary power to insist that the 
water supply report was necessary and the use o f  such power delayed the plan making 
process o f  the KSP District Plan. Moreover, although not all RPC members agreed 
with the decision, the insistence o f the majority led to the decision that the water 
supply report should accompany the KSP District Plan.
The diverse backgrounds o f RPC members can also lead to many more difficulties for 
the local planning authority. As Section Chief Hsu contended, there were too few RPC 
members with land use planning background to reach an acceptable planning decision. 
Further, Dr. Chen, RPC Member, recalled the following in relation to the water supply 
report, when he wanted to support Kaohsiung County Government and go against 
other members' insistence on its provision, members with other professional 
backgrounds insisted on the water supply report was necessary. Therefore, it is argued 
that the planning permission model has made policy coordination more difficult in the 
KSP case and this was the reason why the local planning officers, i.e. Section Chief 
Hsu, contended the lack o f a crosscutting coordination mechanism.
6.7.3 Political intervention- the conflicts between central agencies in the case of 
CTSP
The recent development o f the Central Taiwan Science Park (CTSP) provides a good
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example o f how political interference operates in the Taiwanese planning process. The 
story, as described by Dr. Chen, RPC Member, interviewed in September 2006, 
started from the new development o f the Chi-Shing site as part o f the expansion o f the 
CTSP:
‘The development report fo r  the Chi-Shing site made by the NSC was totally 
unacceptable. I  understood that development o f  this site was considered 
essential by the local government based on promoting local interests. As RPC 
members, we were happy that the local economy should benefit from its 
development. However, the site location presented problems due to its 
proximity to a known earthquake zone.
Nevertheless, the central government ignored our concerns and put pressure on
the RPC to approve the site. We were forced to endorse the central
government s decision7 . ’
A significant reason for the RPC not endorsing the project was that both the 
Chi-Shing site and its neighbouring site, Ho-Li, which had already been developed,
are located within an earthquake zone. The local government argued that the
Chi-Shing site's proximity to the zone should not be a reason for rejecting the project 
as the Ho-Li site had already been approved by the RPC. However, Dr. Chen 
indicated that the reason that the RPC agreed to the development o f Ho-Li site was 
planning concern for regional balanced development and local economy was in need 
o f  stimulation. In other word, even though case for development o f Ho-Li site was 
weak, it was allowed for the sake o f promoting the local economy.
47 Som e wordings were revised in the request o f  Dr. Chen due to the sensitive content.
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For members o f the RPC, given that they had been forced to bend the rules to 
accommodate the needs o f the locafs needs o f  the local population in Ho-Li, 
Taichung County, it would be unbearable to be forced to approve a similar site, which 
was considered even more dangerous. Dr. Chen felt deep misgivings at the way safety 
considerations were being ignored. In his view:
the local government and the NSC obtained final approval fo r  the 
Chi-Shing site completely through political intervention. Local interest groups 
stood to benefit from enormous developmental gains, therefore, they expended 
every effort to promote the project despite the s i te ’s potentially dangerous 
location. ’
Due to his professional concerns, Dr. Chen requested that all RPC meetings in relation 
to the Chi-Shing site should be recorded and the recordings made available to the 
public. During the course o f the fieldwork between September and October, 2006, the 
researcher tried to access the transcriptions through the internet, but was unsuccessful. 
Time may have been required to edit them.
6.7.4 Personal networks
As well as the formal coordination mechanisms, such as meeting and visits, local 
planning officers use informal coordination mechanisms, such as telephone calls and a 
personal relationship network to contact their counterparts in the Comprehensive 
Planning Division o f  the CPA when in need o f CPA’s assistance. Although this kind o f 
communication is informal, it can be effective since, as Section Chief Hsu o f 
Kaohsiung County Government pointed out, local planning officers can obtain very
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useful information planning procedure, how plans should be presented before the RPC, 
and the professional backgrounds o f those members likely to be in attendance at the 
time o f  presentation.
In this case o f  KSP District Plan, Section Chief Hsu had a counterpart in the 
Comprehensive Planning Division o f the CPA, Ms. Chang. The assistance obtained 
from Ms. Chang included providing details o f forthcoming RPC meetings and 
keeping Section C hief Hsu informed o f  latest progress on the KSP District Plan. 
Section C hief Hsu and Ms. Chang kept in touch through frequent phone calls and 
emails.
The good relationship between Ms. Chang and Section Chief Hsu was apparent 
beneficial when making the District Plan, but the lack o f solid network for 
coordination between Kaohsiung County Government and the Water Resource 
Agency (WRA) made the water supply issue report hard to resolve. Since the 
representatives o f the WRA changed frequently, Section Chief Hsu did not know 
whom she could contact and therefore the lack o f personal network made coordination 
difficult (see Section 6.2.2).
Personal network also contributed to policy coordination between the KSP Division 
and Kaohsiung County Government. With regard to coordination at the local level, in 
order to support the development o f  KSP, County Government established the 
Industrial and Commercial Service Section as the counterpart to the KSP Division. 
When there was a need o f assistance, the KSP Division would contact Section Chief 
Wu o f Kaohsiung County Government first and she would offer her advice, otherwise 
she would suggest the Division to the relevant bureau from which they could get the
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assistance needed. Section Chief Wu remained on good terms with Director Lin o f  the 
KSP Division and they talked to each other on their personal mobiles when there was 
a need. ‘You can say we used a somewhat informal means to maintain our good  
c o m m u n ic a tio n Section Chief Wu stated.
When the interview was conducted on 13th October, 2006, Section Chief Wu had left 
her job a few days previously. Although she was no longer working in the same job 
position. Director Lin o f the KSP Division was still contacting her for assistance. 
However, because o f  the likely changes in job position and personnel. Section Chief 
Wu contended that communication based on an informal network should not be 
viewed as permanent since it will not last indefinitely. Therefore, a formal 
coordination mechanism to replace the informal contact based on a personal 
relationship network is essential. She then emphasised the importance o f regular 
‘policy coordination meetings' and her sorrow that the KSP Division does not pay 
attention to this institutional design.
6.8 Conclusion
The second case study reinforces the findings o f the first case in respect o f the 
influence o f powerful persons and the significance o f informal networks.
In its bid to become the location for the National Telecom Technology Centre in 2002, 
Section Chief o f the Industrial and Commercial Service Section o f Kaohsiung County 
Government gave a surprisingly honest account o f how Kaohsiung County 
Government used their 'political resource’, i.e. the Speaker o f Legislative Yuan, Wang,
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to achieve their aim (see Section 6.4.1). Section Chief Wu admitted that this was an 
important factor to their winning the bid, but she also pointed out that their rivals also 
attempted to win the bid through lobbying powerful persons. This implies the 
influence o f powerful persons is widely recognised and has become a useful ‘asset’ 
for local planning authorities to employ to affect policy making decisions. It also 
proves the influence o f  political intervention on Taiwanese planning even after the 
regime shift in 2000.
In addition, as in the first case, informal networks have played an important role in the 
case o f KSP. A solid personal network helps to make policy making go smoothly and 
improves cohesion between organisations. For instance, the good relationship 
between Section C hief Hsu o f Kaohsiung County Government and Ms. Chang o f the 
CPA led to stable cooperation in the for KSP District Plan making process. On the 
other hand, lack o f consistency in those representing the WRA resulted in a lack o f 
solid personal networks and difficulties in communication with Kaohsiung County 
Government (see Section 6.6.2). The importance o f personal networks was also 
highlighted when Section Chief Wu o f Kaohsiung County Government who was the 
main contact person for the KSP Division had left her position, yet the Director Of the 
KSP Division was still relying on her for assistance after she had relinquished her job.
The KSP case not only reinforces the findings o f the previous case but also suggests 
additional points for reflection in relation to the weakened role o f the CEPD and the 
increasing significance o f the local planning authority in economic planning. Section
6.4.2 revealed the absence o f the CEPD in the policy-making process for KSP 
(Interview with Senior Specialist Liao o f the CEPD) and Section 6.4.1 showed that 
vigorous local planning authorities were gradually becoming involved economic
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planning affairs which traditionally had been the sole duties o f  central government 
(Interview Dr. Chen, RPC Member). Further, the significance o f  the personal factor in 
Taiwanese planning was apparent in Section 6.4.1. As long as local governments had 
opportunities to become involved in economic planning, this factor was a useful 
instrument to achieve their goals, e.g. win the bid for site selection, and affect the 
RPC's decisions. Dr. Su, Assistant Professor o f Chung-Jone University, indicated that 
political intervention in planning has become more frequent in recent years (see 
Section 6.4.1).
Given the foregoing findings, does the influence o f the powerful person and personal 
network point to the lack o f a coordination mechanism in Taiwanese planning? In the 
KSP case, there is contradictory evidence to draw a firm conclusion in this regard. In 
the interview with Section Chief Hsu o f Kaohsiung County Government, she referred 
to the water supply report issue and contended that the difficulty in making the KSP 
District Plan resulted from the lack o f a coordination mechanism between different 
sectors (see Section 6.7.2). However, Dr. Chen, RPC Member, argued that the RPC 
meeting is a platform for crosscutting and sectoral policy coordination (Section 6.6.1). 
The difference in view between a RPC member and local planning officer 
demonstrates that a policy coordination mechanism does exist despite it is not fully 
operational and somewhat effective. The inconsistent justification about the existing 
coordination apparatus might be generated from different experience. The conclusion 
about the coordination mechanism is expected to be illustrated in the final chapter 
after the findings o f  the third case study.
The third case study in the following chapter offers a slightly different perspective on 
cross-sectoral coordination in relation to planning in Taiwan. It involved the re-use o f
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brown-field land, thus brought different policy sectors and interests into play. In 
addition, policy initiatives originating from local government rather than central 
government were involved.
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Chapter Seven Case Study 3: Kaohsiung Multi-Functional 
Commerce and Trade Park (KMFCTP)
7.1 Introduction
The KMFCTP project is part o f the Asian Pacific Regional Operation Centre (APROC) 
programme, a long-term national development project underway since 1994. The goal 
for the Kaohsiung Multi-Functional Commerce and Trade Park (KMFCTP) project is 
to attract 40% o f  the three million transhipment containers that come to Kaohsiung 
Harbour each year into the vicinity o f Kaohsiung City. The project is also expected to 
provide a place to re-process, manufacture and re-export containers after undergoing a 
value-added process. In virtue o f the development o f KMFCTP, Kaohsiung City is 
anticipated to attract international and domestic investments and the local economy 
will be regenerated. Kaohsiung City Government is determined to reorganise and 
transform its urban developmental strategy to assist the promotion o f KMFCTP.
As a complex project, a significant feature o f KMFCTP is it is a project undertaken by 
both central and local governments, since it contains various small projects across the 
sectors o f land use planning, economic development, urban renewal, and 
transportation. The participation o f a variety o f sectors offers an opportunity for the 
researcher to reveal their relations in the policy making process. Moreover, as the 
latest government project designed by a local planning authority and promoted by 
central government, the KMFCTP project presents an ideal case to explore policy 
coordination throughout the institutional change that took place in the late 20th
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century.
This chapter will present the historical context o f KMFCTP in Section 7.2 and give a 
detailed description o f policy making process in Section 7.3. The economic planning 
framework and land use planning role will be introduced in Section 7.4 and 7.5, while 
Section 7.6 focuses on policy coordination in relation to KMFCTP. Research findings 
derived from data generated from the field work and interviews will be presented in 
Section 7.7.
7.2 Historical Context and Background Details
7.2.1 Historical background and social milieu
In June 1995, due to the changing global economy, the Executive Yuan drew up a 
national strategy which included an ambitious economic project entitled the 
‘Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Centre' (APROC) programme in order to promote 
Taiwan's status as the gateway to the west Asia-Pacific region. The APROC 
programme was designed to contain six sub centres for air-transportation, media, 
manufacturing, sea-transpoliation, telecommunication, and finance.
Kaohsiung city is the most important industrial city in southern Taiwan. It is endowed 
with two significant industrial zones, Qian-Zhen Export Processing Zone and Nan-Zi 
Export Processing Zone. Moreover, Kaohsiung City owns Kaohsiung Harbour which 
is not merely an important transhipment centre o f the Asia-Pacific region, but was the
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third largest container port in the world in the late 1990s48. Due to all its merits, 
Kaohsiung was chosen to be the development site o f manufacturing and the sea 
transhipment centre o f the APROC programme. In addition, on the land o f Kaohsiung 
Harbour Zone has been created the Kaohsiung Multi-Function Commerce and Trade 
Park (KMFCTP).
After receiving the official document No. 17486 from the Executive Yuan in June 
1996, the Public Works Bureau o f Kaohsiung City began rigorously making KMFCTP 
a reality. Although central government did not approve this plan until the mid 1990s, 
the story o f KMFCTP can be traced back to the early 1990s when there were changes 
in the social context and planning concept as a result o f  the democratisation process 
which had begun in the late 1970s.
In the late 1980s, the relationship between the central government and Kaohsiung 
City Government had became strained because the citizens o f Kaohsiung City felt 
they had been poorly served by neglected by the central government since it had 
placed many heavy industrial facilities with high-pollution plants in Kaohsiung City 
rather than cultural and more pleasant infrastructures. Even more irksome was the fact 
that although government-owned factories had produced pollution in Kaohsiung, they 
had handed over taxes to the central government in Taipei. Accordingly, Kaohsiung 
had derived no benefits form the industrial facilities located within it but endured 
many disadvantages from such economic development. Therefore, local 
discontentedness inevitably appeared (Wang, W., 2006).
48 Facing severe competition from container ports on the coast o f  China, the ranking o f  Kaohsiung 
harbour had declined to the eighth largest container port in the world in 2007 (Port of. Kaohsiung, 
2008).
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At the same time, as a result o f the movement towards democratisation which had 
emerged in the 1970s, there was growing antagonism towards the central government 
and KM T’s autocracy. In the 1980s, President Ching-Kuo Chiang began to realise that 
it was time to loosen the authoritarian rule o f the KMT, adopted by his father, Chiang, 
Kai-Shek, with a more democratic rule. Such decision was, o f  course, also influenced 
by other factors, e.g. international pressure, increasing globalisation, etc, (Wu, N., 
2000).
Also in the late 1980s, uneven spatial development was becoming increasingly 
apparent in Taiwan. A gap between not only economic development but also social 
culture was emerging between the capital city Taipei and other areas (Interview with 
Professor Chou, National Taipei University, September 2006). Based on a somewhat 
sense o f superiority and misunderstandings, negative images about less-developed 
areas outside Taipei were continuingly being produced in the mass media, despite the 
many efforts local authorities made to counteract them. As in the other municipality, 
Kaohsiung, the people whether government officers or ordinary citizens began to 
display increasing resentment against the central government. As reported by 
Professor Ho, ex-Vice-Secretary-General of Kaohsiung City Government, interviewed 
in September 2006:
‘Councillors, whatever their political party, often asked Mayor Wu when he 
was going to challenge the central government fo r  its unfair treatment o f  
Kaohsiung C ity49. Their resentment against the central government was the
40 According to Professor Ho, Kaohsiung City Councillors often used intense language, such as ‘Tfj J§;,
f f r f f t o  express their anger.
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background against which the KMFCTP project was generated... Previous 
Mayors, fo r  example, Mayor Wang (1973-1981) and successive Mayors had all 
attempted to challenge the central government due to local citizen’s discontent 
with its seeming contemptuous attitude towards them. The KMFCTP project 
was as an attempt by Kaohsiung City Government to dampen local anger and 
improve the local economy ’
Apart from the social milieu, some institutional factors also played significant roles in 
the establishment o f KMFCTP. For instance, land owners in the area o f KMFCTP 
were mainly big businesses whereas Taiwanese society has inherited a culture o f 
Confucianism and an anti-business class tradition. Commenting on this, Professor Ho, 
also a well-known academic in the field o f institutionalism in Taiwan, said when 
interviewed in September 2006.
An anti-business culture is not a specific feature o f  social attitude in 
Kaohsiung City, but a common thought in Taiwanese society. It might be due to 
the traditional Confucian legacy which ranks occupation in order o f  academics 
at the top, fo llow ed by farmers, labourers, and then merchants30 ’
Behind this anti-business culture, there might also have been a political motive. Most 
landowners at that time were big companies owned by central government. It was 
never easy for the local planning authority to negotiate land acquisition with big 
corporations owned by central government and they generally refused acquisition 
proposal since it was central government not local government that own these
50 The occupation order in Chinese is i t H X ® .
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companies (Interviewed with Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu, the Urban Development 
Bureau o f Kaohsiung City Government in September 2006).
At the same time, due to the prevailing anti-business culture, local citizens tended to 
question whether there were private deals being made between the local planning 
authority and large landlords. To show that there were no private deals being made, 
Kaohsiung City Government established a strict standard that led to be followed in the 
land acquisition process (see Section 7.5.2) and argued it would ultimately benefit the 
local economy. The anti-business culture and anti-central government sentiment were 
used by Kaohsiung City Government to promote the KMFCTP project during the plan 
making process at the central government level. To against this background, the 
democratic movement was also gaining in strength and support. To maintain its rule at 
the central level, it was in the central government's interest in the long-term to support 
the project because it was aware o f Kaohsiung citizens' growing resentment against it 
(Interview with Professor Ho, ex-Vice-Secretary-General o f  Kaohsiung City 
Government).
Under such circumstance, the milieu had offered Kaohsiung City Government an 
excellent opportunity to bargain with the central government in order to achieve its 
goal for local economic redevelopment. There will be more discussions in Section 
7.5.2.
7.2.2 Land use plan and location
The areas Kaohsiung Multi-Functional Commerce and Trade Park (KMFCTP) covers 
was mostly a brown field site on which were located heavy industries, such as 
chemical factories, and a military arsenal. The land use plan for KMFCTP project was
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therefore for a redevelopment scheme to regenerate local economy.
The KMFCTP is located on the east side o f Kaohsiung Harbour (see Figure 7.1). It is 
surrounded by an excellent traffic network comprising Highways HI and H10, 
Provincial H ighwayTl and T17, a high speed railway and Kaohsiung Mass Rapid 
Transport System (MRT). Kaohsiung International Airport is only a few kilometres 
away. Due to its outstanding location, it is not surprising that Kaohsiung City 
Government has enthusiastically promoted the land use plan for KMFCTP as a means 
to drive the local economy.
Based on Kaohsiung Harbour’s unique attributes, Kaohsiung City Government has 
drawn up a detailed redevelopment plan for the port. The plan is to create a 
multi-functional marine transportation centre which will provide warehousing, 
transhipment, financial, commercial and other related services. According to the 
proposed plan (Kaohsiung City Government, 2000a), the KMFCTP will encompass 
587 hectares o f  land, most o f which originally belonged to Qian-Zhen and Kaohsiung 
Export Processing Zones, Middle-Island commercial harbour zone, and the 
commercial zones o f Pong-Lai, Yan-Cheng, and Ling-Ya. In other words, the 
KMFCTP project is a redevelopment plan o f  brown-field and its aim is to reuse 
abandoned industrial land for local economic restructuring. Therefore, the contents o f 
the KMFCTP project differ from ordinary industrial development. There are three 
zone divisions included in the KMFCTP project (Figure 7.2):
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1. A cultural & Leisure Special District (77 hectares)
2. A commercial & Trading Special District (210 hectares)
3. A warehousing & Transhipment Special District (300-hectare parcel o f land).
It is worth noting that properties in this area mostly belong to various agencies o f the 
central government, for instance, the Port o f Kaohsiung, the Ministry o f 
Transportation and Communication and the Ministry o f Economic Affairs. All land 
development plans in KMFCTP will be accepted only with the cooperation o f relevant 
central departments.
7.3 Policy Making Process of KMFCTP
7.3.1 A local strategic development plan which lacked the central government’s 
attention
In the early 1990s, Kaohsiung city suffered a serious depression while job 
opportunities were drastically reduced and inhabitants were forced to move elsewhere. 
In order to overcome the reduced circumstances, Kaohsiung City Government 
undertook a series o f actions, including the making o f a strategic development plan. 
Mr. Hsu, Deputy Chief Engineer o f the Urban Development Bureau (UDB) o f 
Kaohsiung City Government in September 2006, who was a senior planner at that 
time, was charged with drawing up the comprehensive plan for Kaohsiung City. 
According to the interview with Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu, what the city needed 
was an economic transformation as a result o f  the decline o f  traditional manufacturing. 
Therefore, the primary task facing him and his team was to look for an alternative 
approach for urban redevelopment.
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In 1993-1994, after referring to the development o f Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Rotterdam, the UDB submitted a proposal to make Kaohsiung port a regional logistic 
hub in order to take advantage o f  the national economic programme to establish an 
Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center (APROC). At that time, the central 
government was eager to promote the APROC programme, and Kaohsiung City 
Government successfully linked the KMFCTP project and APROC programme by 
making KMFCTP a sub-plan o f the APROC programme. Ultimately, the APROC 
programme was ineffective due increasing tension between China and Taiwan which 
affected direct trade between the two countries (Tu, 2008).
As soon as the goal was established, several projects were soon promoted, such as the 
T88 highway, port transport accessibility, and underground railway, etc. However, the 
local planning authority soon found implementing individual infrastructure projects 
difficult, highlighting the need for a strategic plan for the development as a whole. As 
a result o f working with several international planning consultancies, the strategy the 
UDB adopted was to upgrade local industries and place Kaohsiung Harbour in the 
centre o f the development plan.
However, management o f Kaohsiung Harbour is a central government responsibility. 
Without the cooperation o f  the relevant central agencies, the KMFCTP project could 
not be implemented. Although Kaohsiung City Government had presented the 
KMFCTP project to central government in 1995 through its connection to the APROC 
programme, the central planning authority, the CEPD, delayed in evaluating and 
assessing the project for two years. Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu o f the UDB o f 
Kaohsiung City government said: ‘They (the CEPD) seemed to adopt many methods,
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including panel meetings to slow down the plan making process for the KMFCTP project’.
Eventually, a milestone in the project was reached in 1997 when the Premier o f the 
Executive Yuan, Vincent C. Siew, instructed Ministries to assist the development o f 
the KMFCTP project (see Table 7.1). He thereafter appointed a KMFCTP 
Commission which was led by the Vice Premier. A Commission meeting took place in 
July in the same year and resolved some o f  the conflicts between local and central 
governments, though many problems with coordination still remained. (Interview- 
with Deputy C hief Engineer Hsu o f the UDB).
7.3.2 Central agencies’ attitude to the KMFCTP project
As mentioned in previous sections (see Sections 7.2.1 and 7.3.1), the KMFCTP 
project originated from the concept o f redeveloping the brown zones around 
Kaohsiung harbour, and there was *bottom-up’ policy making led by the Urban 
Development Bureau (UDB) o f Kaohsiung City Government.
In the early 1990s, the UDB had foreseen the rise o f China and ASEAN and realised 
the competition in East Asia would become increasingly tough, therefore Kaohsiung 
city had to increase its competitiveness by exploiting its good location and good 
transport linkage to three big economies, Japan, China and ASEAN. A panel was 
formed by Kaohsiung City Government to consider restructuring o f the local 
industries and local economic reform. It compiled a report which was submitted to 
Mayor Nan-Chen Su suggesting Kaohsiung should be developed as a gateway to the 
region o f East Asia (Interview with Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu o f the UDB).
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Table 7.1 Chronological Development of KMFCTP
Source: Kaohsiung City Government (2006); Interview transcriptions
Jun 1995
Executive Yuan announced the APROC programme.
Jun 1996
Executive Yuan instructed Kaohsiung City Government to embark on urban 
regeneration by means o f KMFCTP.
ju , 199?
The Premier o f  the Executive Yuan, Vincent C. Siew, instructed Ministries to 
assist the development o f  the KMFCTP project in order to promote the APROC 
programme. The KMFCT Commission led by Vice Premier convened a meeting.
1998.......... ..”.... "......
President Lee visited Kaohsiung and confirmed his full support for the KMFCTP 
project after a meeting with Mayor Wu.
Dec 1998 ~  ".....   : ~  "  .....~...."....... .........
Frank Hsieh (DPP) replaced Den-Yih Wu (KMT) as the Mayor o f Kaohsiung 
City Government.
14th Dec 1999
Urban Planning Committee o f  the CPA approved the District Plan for KMFCTP. 
20th Dec 1999
The KMFCTP District Plan released.
30th Sep 2002.............................................................................
The first phase o f regeneration for KMFCTP was undertaken.
1st Feb 2005.... ..............
Frank Hsieh became the Premier o f the Executive Yuan (2005-2006).
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The report suggested that manufacturing and re-exportation should be the strategy 
adopted. However, it would impossible to implement such a big strategy without the 
support from the central government. At that time, the attitude o f central government 
was vague- neither encouragement nor objection was shown clearly. In other words, 
central government was indifferent to the KMFCTP project at the beginning 
(Interview with Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu o f the UDB).
Planners and local politicians all understood manufacturing had suffered from the 
challenge o f  industrial restructuring. When the KMFCTP project was in the planning 
consultation process before the plan making process in the Urban Planning 
Commission o f  Kaohsiung City Government, the discussion focus was on how to 
obtain support from the central government instead o f its appropriateness for local 
economic development (Interview with Professor Ho, ex-Vice-Secretary-General o f 
Kaohsiung City Government). It was clear that the KMFCTP was a project related to 
a number o f stakeholders and many central agencies and there was a need o f the 
CEPD's assistance in order to coordinate with Ministries. As a result, it would be 
infeasible for a local government complete such a big project alone.
It was thought that the KMFCTP project would be difficult to get the attention o f 
central government, since it was rare for such an economic project at such a 
developmental state to be promoted by a local government (Interview with Professor 
Ho, ex-Vice-Secretary-General o f Kaohsiung City Government). The turning point 
came in the mid 1990s, when the APROC programme, a priority economic project, 
received the full support o f the Executive Yuan. This priority economic project 
provided an excellent opportunity for the KMFCTP project to fully catch the central 
government's attention. As regards the excellent location o f Kaohsiung city, the
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CEPD, the central planning authority, paid attention to development o f  the area 
around Kaohsiung harbour in order to promote the APROC programme.
Kaohsiung City government therefore grasped the opportunity to market the 
KMFCTP project as a sub-plan o f the APROC programme and received a positive 
response from central government. This positive response was based on the strategy 
o f connecting the KMFCTP project to the APROC programme, which was the priority 
economic policy o f  central government at that time. In fact, the KMFCTP per se was a 
redevelopment plan for local economic restructuring rather than a plan to promote 
national economic development. Accordingly, Professor Flo, 
ex-Vice-Secretary-General o f Kaohsiung City Government, described the KMFCT 
project as a redevelopment plan covered in beautiful wrapping paper to attract the 
central government's attention when interviewed in September 200631. Finally, the 
Executive Yuan approved the KMFCTP as a sub-plan under the APROC programme.
However, Kaohsiung City Government complained that it had received little support 
from the central government and pointed out that the CEPD still displayed hesitancy 
towards the project. Senior Specialist Liao o f the CEPD, who in charge o f the 
coordination work for this project, admitted the CEPD had reservation the KMFCTP 
project:
In the beginning, we thought it was a very innovative project with a too 
optimistic expectation o f  profit, therefore, we did not intend to offer a budget 
when Kaohsiung City Government asked fo r  money for future plan
51 Professor Ho’s original description in Chinese was 
&££’.
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making, . even though there was a panel, chaired by the Vice-Premier, set up for  
the promotion o f  KMFCTP. ’
However, as a central planning authority, the CEPD had another concern about the 
KMFCTP project as indicated by Senior Specialist Liao:
‘In fact, the plan was too ambitious and impractical. It is good to have a great 
vision fo r  local development, however, it is also important as well to take 
reality into account. Therefore, the problem was not whether we would support 
it but whether it could come true. A vision is fine but it needs to be completed 
step by step. Planning in Taiwan is still a government-dominated fie ld  although 
there is still room fo r  public participation. ’
Liao's words illustrate the difference in concept o f Kaohsiung City Government and 
the CEPD. The former was primarily concerned with local economic restructuring 
whereas the latter paid more attention to national economic development as a whole. 
Despite Kaohsiung City Government’s presentation o f the project to the Executive 
Yuan and its linkage to the APROC programme, the CEPD hesitancy in supporting it 
delayed the plan making process at the central level. It was not until Premier Siew 
appointed a Commission in 1997 (see Section 7.31) with the sole responsibility o f 
promoting the KSP that the central government’s attitude towards the project became 
more positive. .
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7.4 Economic Planning for KMFCTP
7.4.1 ‘City-Harbour combination9 and the President’s support
The KMFCTP project had undergone a difficult policy making process at the central 
government level. However, things did not go smoothly despite Premier Siew’s 
support in 1997.
One o f the points the local planning authority emphasised was the ‘City-Harbour 
combination’ to integrate port operation and urban development (this concept has 
been applied in many famous harbour cities’ planning). However, the Harbour 
operation before 1999 was the responsibility o f Taiwan Provincial Government and 
the proposed development o f the harbour had not taken city planning into account. 
Wherever Kaohsiung City Government needed to talk to Taiwan Provincial 
Government, the request would be passed on to the Executive Yuan which would then 
deliver the message to Taiwan Provincial Government. That is to say, there was no 
coordination apparatus between Taiwan Provincial Government and Kaohsiung City 
Government, although they were at the same level o f the planning institution 
hierarchy (see Figure 3.4).
It is not surprising that local planning authority encountered difficulty in the policy 
coordination process in relation to the harbour development. The lack o f connection 
between harbour management policy and the urban development plan resulted in a 
separation o f  the urban planning and port area planning activities. This was the reason 
Kaohsiung City Government argued that management o f the city and harbour should 
be combined to avoid policy fragmentation (Kaohsiung City Government, 2001).
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The lack o f  integration between harbour and city planning activities affected the 
development o f  the KMFCTP project. Moreover, in spite o f  the appointment o f the 
KMFCTP Commission by Premier Siew in 1997, the project did not progress as 
anticipated since the local planning authority experienced many difficulties in 
acquiring land around the harbour from central government agencies. In 1998, Mayor 
Den-Yih Wu was seeking re-election as Mayor o f  Kaohsiung City. Just before the 
election, President Lee visited Kaohsiung City and had a meeting with Mayor Wu and 
other City Government officials. For Kaohsiung City Government, this presented an 
opportunity to promote the KMFCTP project and win the President's support. Deputy 
Chief Engineer Hsu o f the UDB, who participated in the meeting, recalled:
‘We arranged a ten minutes presentation to President Lee in the Grand Hotel 
and gained his support. This project was fu lly confirmed then. Since the project 
could not get resources from the Executive Yuan, we turned to seek support 
from the President. Thanks to Mayor Wu’s political status, the KMT Central 
Standing Committeemen, and the M ayoral campaign, the KMFCTP project was 
eventually supported. ’
Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu’s comments above reveal, first the significance o f the 
President’s support, and, second, the role o f a political consideration in the planning 
decision. As mentioned there was a mayoral election taking place in 1998, and the 
President o f  the KMT, President Lee hoped the KMT candidate, Mayor Wu, would be 
victorious in spite o f Kaohsiung City being known as a metropolitan area with an 
anti-central government sentiment (see Section 7.2.1). President Lee’s support o f the 
KMFCTP project sent a clear message to the citizens o f Kaohsiung that the central
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government was concerned about the local economy.
7.4.2 Negotiation with central government
For the KMFCTP project’s success, assistance from central government was 
extremely important since not only it was formatted through the ‘bottom-up’ process, 
but also it was an economic project comprising o f a number o f brown field sites 
mostly belonging to central government such as the Taiwan Aluminium Company and 
Taiwan Sugar Corporation.
Despite most developmental land belonging to central government, due to the variety 
o f supervisor’ authorities, there had been fragmented land use planning in the area. 
For instance, most o f the land then was either in a very low-dense use category or 
empty whilst, next door, Kaohsiung Port Administration had suffered a shortage of 
developmental land. It is surprising that the policies o f  agencies under the same 
central administration were not coordinated and it should be noted that before the 
streamlining o f Taiwan Provincial Government in 1999, it owned much o f the land in 
the area o f the proposed KMFCTP project. However, the Provincial Government was 
unwilling to negotiate land use with Kaohsiung City government which made it 
difficult for the local planning authority to advance the planning process for the 
project. With regard to the indifferent attitude o f the central agencies and Provincial 
Government on local development, Kaohsiung City Government decided to include 
all the surrounding land o f Kaohsiung harbour in the KMFCTP project for an 
integrated land use planning (Interview with Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu o f the UDB 
in September 2006).
Moreover, the context o f fragmented land use planning also explains why the central
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government hesitated to assist, that is to say, the KMFCTP project was related to 
many sectors, e.g. the Provincial Government, MOEA, Ministry o f National Defense 
and so on. The MOEA, in particular, was a very ‘p ro u d ’ department and also a very 
large organisation. Most o f the public companies owned and managed by it in the 
KMFCTP area had refused to cooperate with Kaohsiung City Government according 
to Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu when interviewed.
In Taiwan, the MOEA is responsible for managing government-owned corporations 
such as Taiwan Sugar Corporation. Since the aim o f the KMFCTP project was the 
redevelopment o f  brown field land, mostly owned by government-owned corporation, 
there was inevitably a need to negotiate with their management body, the MOEA. 
Unfortunately, communication between the MOEA and the local planning authority 
seemed not to go well, as Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu o f UDB indicated:
‘All the MOEA concerned was about the loss o f  land control i f  KMFCTP were 
to be completed and it, therefore, as a central agency, disregarded what the 
local planning authority wanted. Departmentalism made the MOEA ignore our 
suggestions and view economic development as its business and something 
which the local authority> did not need to get involved in. We knew the problem  
o f the local economy and the solution as the local planning authority, but the 
MOEA disregarded this. ’
In fact, the MOEA was not the only central government agency the UDB needed to 
negotiate with during the project making process; The UDB had to negotiate with a 
number o f Ministries which owned large land areas in the project area, e.g. the 
Ministry o f Transportation and Communication, in order to switch parts o f their land
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to the land to the territory o f KMFCTP. Communication with other central agencies 
mostly centred on the same issue, land use switch, but the MOEA proved the most 
difficult Ministry with which to deal over the land use switch issue.
To resolve difficulties, Kaohsiung City Government’s strategy was to raise awareness 
o f the project at the central government level since most land in the project area 
belonged to the government-owned corporations managed by central government. The 
first step was to report the problem to the Executive Yuan, and by means o f this 
strategy, the Executive Yuan started to take note o f  this project and appointed a 
KMFCTP Project Commission led by Vice Premier. Two meetings took place to 
resolve the land switch issue. Due to the intervention o f  the Executive Yuan, some 
problems in relation to land use switch were solved (Interview with Professor Ho, 
ex-Vice-Secretary-General o f Kaohsiung City Government)
Although this strategy worked sometimes, it was not necessarily a panacea because 
the Executive Yuan would not often intervene in inter-agency coordination. That was 
more or less because the KMFCTP project was initially drafted and promoted by the 
local planning authority, therefore, the central government had not been very 
interested in it. However, Kaohsiung City’s status as a municipality, directly under the 
jurisdiction o f the Central Government in the administrative hierarchy, brought some 
advantages as recalled by Professor Ho (ex-Vice-Secretary-General o f Kaohsiung 
City Government):
‘Mayor Wu could attend the Executive Yuan Council (the regular Cabinet 
meeting) which presented him with the opportunity to talk to Ministers face to 
face. It actually offered a platform where the Mayor o f  the City Government
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[and the heads o f Ministries could reach conclusions, though this usually took 
some time. ’
It was argued the Executive Yuan Council offered a platform in which the KMFCTP 
project could be presented and it assisted policy coordination between City 
Government and central agencies.
7.5 Land use planning for the KMFCTP Project
7.5.1 Planning context for the KMFCTP project
As Section 7.3 illustrated, the KMFCTP project was a redevelopment plan covered 
with a beautiful wrapping paper, i.e. it was a sub-plan o f the APROC programme 
(Interview with Professor Ho. ex-Vice-Secretary-General o f Kaohsiung City 
Government). There were two dimensions to the KMFCTP project: it was a strategic 
industrial project, combining land use and economic planning, and also a brown field 
redevelopment plan which was a typical instrument adopted by local planning 
authority for urban regeneration. In other words, both economic planning and the 
redevelopment o f urban industrial land were two concerns in the policy making 
process for the KMFCTP project.
In the early stage o f  the KMFCTP project making process, there was a big debate on 
how to bring economic strategy and land use planning together, although the term 
‘spatial planning’ was not used in the planning discourse. At the same time, a working 
panel for comprehensive planning was set up. It was chaired by the Secretary-General 
o f Kaohsiung City Government to draw up a strategy for the future development o f
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Kaohsiung City. The working panel suggested that Kaohsiung City Government 
should refer to Dutch spatial planning system due to several known successful urban 
regeneration and local economic restructuring experiences (Interview with Deputy 
Chief Engineer Hsu o f  the UDB). However, this suggestion was not adopted by the 
central planning authority until the KMFCTP project became part of the APROC 
programme in the middle 1990s.
The year 1997 was also a key year for the KMFCTP project since Hong Kong was 
returned to China and many foreign investors began to look for alternative sites for 
their investment. That seemed to offer a good opportunity for KMFCTP to attract 
foreign investment, unfortunately, as stated earlier, central government recognised the 
significance o f  the KMFCTP project somewhat too late, in 1998 when Mr. Siew, 
Premier o f the Executive Yuan, asked Vice Premier Chiang to organise a KMFCT 
Commission to assist development o f the KMFCTP project. From that moment 
onwards, central government began to stress the importance o f this project. (Interview 
with Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu o f  UDB). Moreover, the anticipated direct trade 
between Taiwan and China was not released because o f increasing tension between 
the two nations, especially after 2000 when the DPP came to power and China 
became concerned that it would promote the independence issue (Wang, W-C., 2006). 
In spite o f the frustration at the lack of attention shown by central government 
towards the significance o f the KMFCTP project for local economic development, 
Kaohsiung City Government continued to promote the KMFCTP project, and in 1999 
introduced the concept o f a logistic centre into the land use plan (Kaohsiung City 
Government, 2006).
Although Kaohsiung City Government was understandably concerned about the local
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depression in the 1990s, and therefore the manufacturing industry restructuring 
became the focus o f the KMFCTP project, there were endless questions about the 
capacity o f Kaohsiung City government to promote such a big project and also doubts 
as to whether the local economy could be revived by a single developmental project 
(Interview with Senior Specialist Liao o f the CEPD).
7.5.2 The strategy adopted in the land use planning of KMFCTP
The reason Kaohsiung City Government combined the development o f the city and 
harbour has been explained in Section 7.4.1. The KMFCTP project was seen as a local 
economic development plan per se, and land use planning was a tool to promote local 
economic development (see Section 7.3.1). At that time, in order to use this 
instrument effectively, the local planning authority introduced the planning 
permission process to the development approval procedure in the project. Thus, the 
local planning authority retained the power to intervene if land owners submitted 
inappropriate development proposals (Interview with Senior Officer Chang, UDB, 
September, 2006)
After the KMFCT project obtained approval from central government, Kaohsiung 
City Government embarked on land use switch plan making in the area o f KMFCTP. 
It asked landowners who were mostly government-owned corporations to submit their 
development proposals. However, Kaohsiung City Government received several 
negative responses from these companies as indicated. For example, Taiwan Fertilizer 
Corporation stated that the chemical plant was unique in Taiwan, Taiwan Power 
Company argued that removal o f its power station located in the KMFCTP would 
impact negatively on the regional economy. In addition, the Ministry o f National 
Defense reported that it was an extremely difficulty relocating the 205 Military
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Arsenal. There were so many difficulties encountered by the planning authority in its 
negotiations with other central governmental organisations according to Deputy Chief 
Engineer Hsu o f  the UDB, Kaohsiung City government. He said:
‘The local planning authority faced  so many difficulties that it reported its 
problems to the Urban Planning Committee o f  the CPA and also to the 
Executive Yuan. There was a coordination meeting convened by the Executive 
Yuan attended by Executive Yuan officials, local planning officers and 
representatives from relevant agencies. In spite o f  this meeting, the problems 
were not resolved at that time. ’
With regard to planning practice, it is noticeable that in the current Taiwanese 
planning system, it is difficult to change the existing land use category (see Section 
5.5.3) unless land is to be used for developmental purpose. Accordingly, the KMFCT 
project also implied an opportunity for land use switch. Moreover, as a redevelopment 
plan, the KMFCTP project requires wide local support, including that from land 
owners (most o f which are government-own corporations), interest groups and 
politicians, to implement. Nevertheless, due to the atmosphere o f anti-business 
sentiment mentioned in Section 7.2.1, the City Government was cautious about 
undertaking a project in relation to land development since it was afraid o f being 
accused o f supporting ‘gold power’52. This forced the local planning authority to 
emphasise the importance o f the KMFCT project for local economic development and 
look for local support in the negotiation process with central government53.
52 Please see section 3.23 for more discussion about ‘gold power’.
53 The tension between central government and Kaohsiung City never relaxed until recent years (see 
Section 7.2.1).
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At that time, Professor Ho was a Chairperson o f  the working panel established by the 
City Government to support the development o f the KMFCT project. According to 
him when interviewed, to attract the support o f local peoples, the local planning 
authority adopted a high land return percentage after development in KMFCTP, 
therefore, this project would offer extremely high financial benefits to Kaohsiung City. 
This strategy, however, had a negative impact on large land owners, mostly 
government-owned corporations, since after development they would have to return a 
large portion o f  land to the Kaohsiung City Government.
Nevertheless, this strategy was successful in attracting local support for the project 
since the local planning authority would gain advantages at the central government’s 
expense. Thus, the central government would be the loser and the local government 
the winner in this strategy. Such strategy would compensate local citizens for the 
disadvantages they had had to endure from previous central government policies (see 
Section 7.2.1).
It was understandable that government-owned companies, i.e. large landowners, 
would be dissatisfied with this strategy. In other developmental areas in Kaohsiung 
City, the land return percentage was normally around 35%, whereas in KMFCTP, 
dependent on land use, it was on average 50% but could reach 68% (Kaohsiung City 
Government, 2000b). As mentioned, most landowners at that time were 
government-own corporations managed by central agencies. Accordingly, the City 
Government declared it was prepared to defend local interests, even fight against the 
central government, if there was necessary. It is worth noting that the attitude o f 
central government to this strategy was relatively mild, as Professor Ho
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(ex-Vice-Secretary-General o f Kaohsiung City Government) recalled:
‘Central government and its public owned corporations continued negotiations 
with Kaohsiung City Government in order to fin d  a solution to the high land 
return percentage issue. However, the City Government never gave way to 
government-owned corporations and maintained its stance on the issue ’
This suggests the City Government’s strategy was successful. However, how did the 
City Government deal with coordination work with local interest groups and central 
government-owned companies to achieve this success? The study findings revealed 
there were far less coordination problems with private landowners who generally 
supported the KMFCTP project. Other local interest groups were also happy to see the 
development o f KMFCTP, and included foreign investors from American and 
European Business Associations. This situation was unusual in that normally 
negotiations with private stakeholders were difficult (see the case o f TSP, Section 
5.5.2).
Referring to negotiations between the local planning authority and public stakeholders, 
Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu o f the UDB indicated that they were complex:
‘Government-owned companies did not welcome the project since once the 
project was approved, their use o f  land would be bound to the KMFCTP 
District Plan. Moreover, they disliked the high land return percentage which 
would result in a potential loss fo r  them. ’
The gap between Kaohsiung City Government and government-own corporations in
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respect o f  the KMFCTP project was very wide. While government-owned companies 
were concerned about the high land return percentage and the land use switch 
problem, the local planning authority complained that government-owned 
corporations did not realise the challenges facing the local economy. As a result o f the 
differing considerations, conflicts emerged and coordination became difficult.
7.6 Horizontal Policy Coordination in the Case of KMFCTP
7.6.1 The role of the CEPD in relation to crosscutting coordination
Since the KMFCTP project would affect the interests o f government-owned 
corporations under the supervision o f various ministries, during the planning process, 
the Urban Planning Bureau (UDB) o f Kaohsiung City government called many 
meetings to facilitate coordination with central authorities. As the economic planning 
authority and planning consultant agency at the central level, the CEPD has played an 
important role in policy coordination with central agencies.
Professor Tong-Po Ho, ex-Vice-Secretary-General o f Kaohsiung City Government, 
indicated there were three approaches the local planning authority had used for policy 
coordination. As long as the City Government and Ministries could reach consensus 
through the formal coordination mechanism, a decision would be made. This was the 
first coordination approach. The second was informal talks between the Mayor and 
Ministers prior to the Executive Yuan Council (Cabinet Meeting) at which a 
presentation would be made. Thirdly, crosscutting coordination could be facilitated at 
the meetings or the Premier would offer unwritten guidance. If  the issue under 
discussion was too complicated to resolve via the aforementioned two methods, the
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Executive Yuan would appoint the CEPD to take over policy coordination across 
departments. In the case o f KSP, normally the UDB would officially report the need 
o f  assistance to the Executive Yuan and the CEPD would be asked to coordinate 
relevant agencies to present a decision to the Premier. Professor Ho stated:
‘Due to the status o f  the municipality in the administrative hierarchy, 
Kaohsiung City Government stands at an equal level to other central 
departments (see Figure 3.4). Moreover, the M ayor can attend the monthly 
Executive Yuan Council (Cabinet meeting) at which he has the opportunity to 
talk with other Ministers. The Mayor can propose significant plans at Cabinet 
meetings and the Premier appoints the CEPD to carry out an assessment o f  
them. O f course, we have preparatory talks with our counterparts in central 
agencies prior to proposing any plan at Cabinet Meetings. ’
In addition to Professor Ho’s comments, other relevant interviewees mentioned that 
the CEPD played a significant role during the plan making process (Interviews with 
Senior Officer Chang and Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu o f the UDB) because for the 
KMFCTP to be successful, interdepartmental coordination at the central government 
and the assistance o f the CEPD were necessary.
However, there was no regular meeting between the CEPD and Kaohsiung City 
Government. Wherever Kaohsiung City Government needed to communicate with the 
CEPD, it would send official letters to the organisation, or sometimes the Mayor 
would make a phone call to the Premier or Vice-Premier or the M ayor’s assistants 
would contact them. Communication was not always by formal means, sometimes 
informal channels were used. Senior Specialist Liao o f the CEPD agreed that both
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formal and informal channels were used:
‘We would have meeting with local planning officers wherever there was a 
need. However, informal channels o f  communication were ju st as important 
prior to form al meetings. ’
It is worth noting that while the CEPD plays a consultative role in planning policy, 
policy director from the 'upper level', i.e. the Premier and President, are still the 
ultimate authority.
7.6.2 Personal factors
The significance o f personal factors in cases has been illustrated in former chapters, 
and they also played a role in the case o f KMFCTP. It is worth noting that some 
inter-agency conflicts have been resolved through informal networks, for instance, the 
issue concerning the extension to the T88 highway.
The extension to T88 highway is one o f the important traffic routes connecting 
KMFCTP to the main transport trunk route. While initially the extension to T88 
highway had not been supported by the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communication until a personal relationship exerted its influence. As a planner in 
charge o f the KMFCTP project, Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu o f the UDB had 
attempted to look for an alternative means to solve the problem. Ultimately, the 
problem was solved through a personal contact:
‘The Ministry o f  Transportation and Communication eventually supported the 
extension to the T88 highway after I convinced the Administrative Vice Minister,
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Mao o f  its importance. In fact, I have known Mr. M ao since he visited me fo r  
his PhD research many years ago. On the occasions o f  panel meetings for  
Kaohsiung development 2020, we had opportunities to talk and he agreed to 
help with the infrastructure that KMFCTP required. ’
The construction o f the extension to the T88 highway was not the only occasion 
where a personal network had been useful and constructive. Professor Ho, 
ex-Vice-Secretary-General o f Kaohsiung City Government, revealed that negotiations 
with the CEPD had been easy for Kaohsiung City Government because the 
Secretary-General o f the CEPD had been his senior at graduate school. Mayor Wu 
also had a good personal relationship with the Chairperson o f  the CEPD. Both these 
revelations suggest there is an informal network behind the formal government 
structure.
As a result o f useful personal relationships and solid informal networks in the case o f 
KMFCTP, there were no communication problems between leaders at the higher 
departmental levels, i.e. Section Heads or higher. However, communication problems 
arose when there was a frequent change in personnel in leadership positions and this 
made coordination difficult. For instance, the extension to the T88 highway was 
agreed by the Administrative Vice Minister Mao, but he left his position soon after he 
had made the agreement with Kaohsiung City Government. The agreement between 
the Ministry o f Transportation and Communication and Kaohsiung City Government 
still holds through, because it is based on long-lasting agency/departmental interests. 
The examples cited nevertheless illustrate how personal contacts have speeded up the 
coordination process.
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The significance o f  personal influence also appeared in a different way- the big 
person’s influence on the decision-making process. In spite o f the need o f policy 
coordination with a variety o f  central agencies in the case o f KMFCTP, Kaohsiung 
City Government tended to seek assistance from the Premier instead o f individual 
departments at the central level. For example, there was an unsolved problem with 
respect to the removal o f  205 Military Arsenal managed by the Ministry o f National 
Defense viewed as a 'hard’ department with which to negotiate by local planning 
authorities (Interview with Professor Ho, ex-Vice-Secretaiy-General o f Kaohsiung 
City Government).
The UDB did not obtain an agreement from the Ministry o f National Defense to 
remove the 205 Military Arsenal until the former Mayor Frank Hsieh (1998-2005) 
took over the seat o f  the Premier o f  the Executive Yuan (2005-2006). During the term 
o f his service. Premier Hsieh paid much attention to the development o f Kaohsiung 
City including the KMFCTP project. Not surprisingly, he indicated his full support for 
the development o f KMFCTP, and once the intention o f the Premier was clear, the 
CEPD no longer expressed reservation about the project and offered its full support in 
coordination with other central agencies. Since that time, agreement for the removal 
o f 205 Military Arsenal has also been reached (Interview with Senior Officer Chang, 
o f the UDB).
7.6.3 Coordination with local stakeholders
Compared with the other municipality, Taipei, Kaohsiung is relatively still a city with 
strong characteristics o f  the traditional society in which informal and spontaneous 
social institutions are respected (Interview with Professor Ho, 
ex-Vice-Secretary-General o f Kaohsiung City Government). Therefore elite groups
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play an important role in local affairs and are seen as major actors in the local 
planning process.
In order to smooth the development process for KMFCTP, a deliberate strategy 
adopted by Kaohsiung City Government was to bring elites’ voices into the planning 
process. In negotiations with private land owners, regular breakfast meetings were 
held and chaired by the Mayor to facilitate negotiations with private landowners. This 
official form o f  communication with private stakeholders has been the norm since the 
administration o f  the former Mayor, Frank Hsieh (1998-2005). Owing to this frequent 
form o f communication, Kaohsiung City Government did not encounter major 
difficulties in its negotiations with local community during the plan making process 
for the KMFCTP project (Interview with Professor Ho).
However, there are many key actors who belong to central government in the case of 
KMFCTP and, as Professor Ho indicated, it was public stakeholders rather than 
private landowners who had made policy making more difficult. For instance, 
Kaohsiung Port Administration belongs to the Ministry o f Transportation and 
Communication; the 205 Military Arsenal is a unit o f the Ministry o f National 
Defense and government-owned companies are responsible to the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. The example below further demonstrates the gap in coordination 
between central agencies and the local planning authority. It was given by Professor 
Ho when interviewed in September, 2006:
‘In order to promote the KMFCTP as the regional logistics centre in East Asia, 
there was a proposal made by Kaohsiung City Government fo r  the 
establishment o f  a free trade zone within the KMFCTP. However, this proposal
would have led  to conflict with existing taxation process under the supervision 
o f the Ministry o f  Finance which was worried about the proposal s impact on 
the traditional taxation system. The proposal was therefore rejected and its 
rejection reduced the KMFCTP s attraction to investors. ’
Local actors belonging to central agencies, i.e. Kaohsiung National Tax 
Administration under the Ministry o f Finance, were concerned about formal 
administrative procedures and regulations while the local planning authority intended 
to draw up more innovative proposals for the development KMFCTP. For the City 
Government, the rejection o f the proposal by Kaohsiung National Tax Administration 
was viewed as a non cooperation by a central government department. Professor Flo 
complained:
‘Central government pa id  no attention to the City Government 's suggestions, 
therefore, intense argument erupted frequently at meetings between central and 
local government officers ’.
In short, the KMFCTP project was a long-term economic development plan based on 
local expectations. On the one hand, the local planning authority grasped any 
opportunity to gain support from the central government. One the other hand, it 
sought local support during the negotiation process with central government. Good 
communication between Kaohsiung City Government and local elite groups facilitate 
relationships with local private stakeholders, whereas conflicts occurred in the 
coordination process between Kaohsiung City Government and the public actors 
belonging to central agencies.
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7.6.4 C oordination w ithin City G overnm ent
As a planning unit within in Kaohsiung City Government, the Urban Development 
Bureau (UDB) is a driving force o f  development strategy and planning policy. 
However, as a secondary organisation under city governmental structure (Figure 7.3), 
the UDB has found itself unable to address crosscutting issues, such as strategic 
development planning and the KMFCTP project. As a result o f this difficulty, Deputy 
Chief Engineer Hsu o f  the UDB suggested that the Deputy Mayor should take over 
the Director-general o f the UDB so that all relevant development plans and planning 
policy can be coordinated more easily.
In the current system, the UDB is only a subsidiary organisation and its level is equal 
to that o f other departments in the City Government, such as the Economic Affairs 
Bureau. Accordingly, the success o f policy coordination in relation to the KMFCTP 
project depends on the communicative skill o f and relationship between officials in 
the UDB and the counterparts in other bureaus (Interview with Deputy Chief Engineer 
Hsu). When there is an unsolved conflict between the UDB and other departments, 
the UDB will report to the Mayor who will make a decision which resolves the 
conflict o f  hand responsibility for resolving it to the Deputy Mayor, the 
Secretary-General or even the Vice-Secretary-General 54 . Thus, there is no 
coordination mechanism within the City Government and most coordination work 
relies on communication and relationship networks between departments.
54 The Secretariat is an administrative unit under the M ayor’s O ffice. Its main task is to assist 
Kaohsiung City Governm ent team to achieve city administration goals.
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Therefore, it suggests a formal coordination platform within City Government lacks 
though coordination work can also be undertaken by the Deputy Mayor, 
Secretary-General or the Vice-Secretary-General under the M ayor’s direction.
7.7 Key Themes in the Research
7.7.1 A centralised planning system
In the past decades, referring to the economic planning system in Taiwan, local 
planning authorities had been responsible only for policy implementation, since 
policy making had been thought o f as the responsibility o f central government. As a 
result o f this model, in the early planning process, the central planning authority did 
not think Kaohsiung City Government capable o f planning such a huge economic 
project as KMFCTP, which was seen as an instrument to facilitate the central 
government's economic strategy (Interview with Professor Ho). However, with the 
rise o f global competition, regional competitiveness and local economic development 
globally became the focus o f planning discourses from the mid 1990s onwards, 
therefore, local governments in Taiwan began to find it necessary to promote the local 
economy to compete against global rivals.
The making o f the KMFCTP project occurred at that time when local planning 
authority started to get involved in economic development plan making. However, at 
the same time, the central planning authority still viewed economic planning as its 
responsibility only. Referring to the developmental state strategy (see Section 3.6.1), 
economic development projects were used by the central government as an instrument 
to boot national economic performance. It was thus inevitably that the KMFCTP
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project would be neglected by the CEPD for years since, unlike the previous two case 
studies, the science park projects were drawn by the NSC, a significant central agency. 
The KMFCTP project proposed by Kaohsiung City Government was thought o f  as an 
‘impractical project’ based on exaggerated local optimism (see Section 7.4).
Under such circumstances, even the CPA, a central agency superior to the UDB, 
seemed not to have played a big role in land use planning, partly because o f the status 
o f  Kaohsiung city as a Municipality directly under the Executive Yuan had led to 
benefits in the coordination process with other central Ministries due to the fact that 
the Mayor o f Kaohsiung City is at the same hierarchical position as central 
government Ministers and can attend the Executive Yuan Council where he can 
present local opinions and planning thoughts from the local authority (Interviews with 
Senior Officers Hsueh and Chang o f the UDB).
The study findings suggest Kaohsiung City Government did not face challenges from 
the central land use planning agency, CPA during the plan making process for the 
KMFCTP project. As Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu o f the UDB said:
‘Regarding this project, the CPA could not have its says until the Executive 
Yuan approved KMFCTP. Therefore, the CPA could only agree with the 
KMFCTP District Plan we submitted, since its superior, the Executive Yuan, 
had already supported this project. ’
However, this was not the case in negotiations with the central economic planning 
agencies, i.e. the MOEA and the CEPD. To the local planning authority, the CEPD 
was hesitant to offer assistance. Section 7.3.2 has shown the CEPD’s hesitancy
towards the project, since it viewed it as a local economic project, and this delayed the 
policy making process. The cautious attitude o f  the CEPD is also seen as the 
difficulties for the development o f the KMFCTP in the early phase.
However, the KMFCTP project suddenly gained the attention o f the central 
government when the former Mayor o f Kaohsiung City, Frank Hsieh took over the 
Premiership o f the Executive Yuan, and as a UDB official pointed out, from that time 
onwards, the CEPD was happy to assist the KMFCTP project (Interview with Senior 
Officer Chang, the UDB).
7.7.2 Significance of the personal factor in the planning process
During the plan making process lasting years, there were so many difficulties 
encountered by the local planning authority due to conflict between Kaohsiung City 
Government and central agencies. The study findings suggest the personal factor 
played a significant role in the coordination work during the plan making process for 
the KMFCTP project. It is worth noting that the personal relationship network can be 
very helpful in the policy making process. Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu, UDB, 
Kaohsiung City Government, explained:
‘To be frank, most planning officers whether at the central or local, know each 
other because many o f  them were classmates or college mates at the same 
planning schools or universities. We maintain very good relationships with 
each other despite different departmental interests
Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu’s comments imply there was already a solid personal 
relationship network behind the formal planning system.
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Not only planning officers used their personal networks but politicians also 
endeavoured to take advantages o f  theirs to promote policy coordination in the 
planning process. AS mentioned in Section 7.4.1, Mayor Wu’s strategy was to bring 
the KMFCTP issue to the central government’s attention and therefore sought to gain 
President Lee’s support at the meeting which took place some months before the 1998 
Kaohsiung City Mayoral Election. The ‘big person’ factor was apparently effective in 
this case because President Lee’s endorsement o f  the KMFCTP project facilitated 
policy coordination between Kaohsiung City Government and the central government 
(Interview with Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu, the UDB). Due to the President’s support, 
Kaohsiung City Government was able to negotiate with central agencies with respect 
to several tough issues, including the issue o f the 205 Military Arsenal. This issue was, 
however, put aside for a time after Mayor Wu’s defeat in the 1998 mayoral election 
and not resolved until Mayor Frank Hsieh became Premier o f the Executive Yuan in 
2003. The aforementioned shows that it really was the personal factor which 
facilitated policy coordination.
Moreover, as a result o f  Mayor Wu’s personal relationship with the Chairperson o f the 
CEPD, Dr. Pin-Kung Chiang, a powerful man in the Cabinet, policy coordination was 
facilitated through telephone calls or informal meetings (Interview with Professor Ho, 
ex-Vice-Secretary-General o f Kaohsiung City Government).
In addition, the foregoing points to the M ayor’s wish to play a main role in internal 
coordination within City Government. Mayor Wu had called a weekly coordination 
meeting with relevant departments under the City Government to discuss the 
development process o f the KMFCTP project. Unfortunately, despite these meetings,
progress o f the development was still slow due to lack o f support from the central 
government (Interview with Professor Ho). Subsequently, unlike Mayor Wu who paid 
close attention to every planning detail o f the KMFCTP, his successor, Mayor Hsieh, 
was not interested in every minor detail and concentrated on the strategic dimensions 
o f the development plan. Therefore, the Deputy Mayor, Secretary-General and 
Vice-Secretary-General took on policy coordination responsibilities during his 
mayorship
As a result o f  the significance o f the personal factor, the change in Mayor affected 
KMFCTP policy. It not only led to different planning concepts but also the model o f 
implementation undertaken. For instance, the first two Mayors, Mr. Wu and Mr. Hsieh, 
focused on industrial development, whilst their successors, Mr. Chen and Ms. Yeh, 
paid more attention to urban design (Interview with Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu o f the 
UDB).
In spite o f such difference, in general, the main goal has not changed, although with 
change o f  Mayor, prioritisation o f work has differed (Interview with Senior Ofiicer 
Chang o f the UDB). This implies there has always been still a solid mechanism which 
has kept the policy on track.
7.7.3 Political concerns within central government and local government’s 
strategy in plan making
As mentioned in previous sections, the central govem menfs disregard o f the 
significance o f KMFCTP resulted from the developmental state strategy adopted by 
the Taiwanese government over decades (Section 3.6.1) in which economic planning 
is thought to be the sole responsibility o f the central government. Although the CEPD
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contended that its hesitancy towards the KMFCTP project was based on the over 
optimistic expectations o f  the project, this study shows that there was a huge 
difference between the local and central government with respect to the 
developmental concerns during the plan making process for the KMFCTP project.
In fact, even agencies at the central government level had had conflicting views o f the 
natural development strategy over previous decades (Interview with Senior Officer 
Chang o f the UDB). Therefore, the conflicting views at the central government level 
may have affected the support for this project. For example, the divergent opinions on 
the China Policy led to a difference in attitude between the Mainland Affairs Council 
and the CEPD regarding Taiwan's relationship with China. While the former has 
hesitated to lift the ban on direct trade with China, the CEPD has promoted the setting 
up o f Taiwan as a logistic centre in East Asia but without direct trade between Taiwan 
and China, this strategy is likely to be unsuccessful. At least two interviewees (Senior 
Officer Chang o f the UDB and Deputy Chief Engineer Hsu o f the UDB indicated that 
the restriction on trade with China made central agencies hesitant in supporting the 
KMFCTP project, nevertheless, without free trade, the KMFCTP project is viewed as 
unrealistic and too ambitious.
In addition, while political concerns at the state level focused on national strategic 
development, the local planning authority viewed the KMFCTP project as a tool to 
facilitate local interests. Professor Ho, ex-Vice-Secretary-General o f  Kaohsiung City 
Government, said:
‘In my opinion, KMFCTP is a beautiful wrapping paper covering a
redevelopment plan. When industries in Kaohsiung City were affected by the
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programme. Through this linkage, Kaohsiung City Government obtained central 
government agencies' assistance and a large area o f developmental land owned by 
government-owned corporations. Section 7.5.2 indicated that in the case of KMFCTP, 
Kaohsiung City Government gained enormous financial benefits and enhanced 
planning power from the high land return percentage. The situation gives rise to 
several questions: H ow  d id  the C ity governm ent gain  so much and w hy d id  the 
central governm ent allow it to do so? ’
Both questions can be answered through an understanding o f the social milieu 
existing at that time. The strategy used by Kaohsiung City Government was 
embedded in a unique social context: an anti-central government sentiment and 
anti-business culture existed at that time. In such circumstance, the local planning 
authority was expected to promote local economic development to meet the high 
expectations of the local community. Kaohsiung City Government therefore used high 
local expectations to force the central government agree to land acquisition and hand 
over planning power to the local planning authority. As a result o f such successful 
bargaining process, the pressure on Kaohsiung City Government from local 
community was removed (see Section 7.52).
As mentioned in Section 7.6.3, in the case o f the KMFCTP project, communication 
with local interest groups was unusually relatively easy because Kaohsiung City 
citizens were convinced the City Government was actually promoting local economic 
development. When the City Government encountered difficulties in the negotiations 
with central agencies, local interest groups supported the local planning authority. 
Professor Ho described the influence o f the social milieu on the plan making process 
for the KMFCTP project as follows:
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‘Under such circumstances, in the policy coordination process, Kaohsiung City 
Government was always very active, whereas central government agencies 
were always slow to react. In my view, this was due to pressure from the c ity ’s 
citizens resulting from discontentedness with poor economic performance and 
previous unfair treatment by the central government. Unlike other cities, 
Kaohsiung City citizens are known fo r  being candid and straight, and not 
afraid to express their views. This affected the plan making process. ’
As a result o f the social context, the strategy o f emphasising the KMFCTP project as a 
solution to unequal regional development adopted by Kaohsiung City Government 
was therefore effective. Consequently, the combination o f economic depression, 
expected economic benefits from future economic development in Southern Taiwan 
and disparity between regional development in the north and south o f Taiwan forced 
the central government to take note o f the situation as indicated by Professor Ho:
‘Growing disparity between the north and south and difficulties in the 
coordination process between central and local governments forced the central 
government to pa y  attention to the social and economic differences between 
north and south Taiwan. M ayor Wu o f  Kaohsiung City Government suggested 
the Executive Yuan should set up a South Taiwan Office o f  the Executive Yuan 
in Kaohsiung to make the central government more aware o f  the concerns and 
needs o f  citizens in Southern Taiwan ’.
The proposed South Taiwan Office o f the Executive Yuan was set up within a few 
years. The study findings suggest Kaohsiung City Government’s strategy to
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emphasise the local context in its bargaining with the central government was 
successful. The establishment o f the KMFCTP and the setting up o f the South Taiwan 
Office o f the Executive Yuan confirm the effectiveness o f the strategy adopted by 
Kaohsiung City Government.
7.8 Conclusion
Unlike the previous case studies, the KMFCTP project emerged as the result o f a 
‘bottom-up’ plan making process. Moreover, under the developmental state strategy, 
the project initially received scant attention from the central government when it was 
first drawn up in the early 1990s because it was a plan made by a local planning 
authority. Due to its special planning context, the KMFCTP case provides another 
perspective from which to investigate the relationship between the economic planning 
sector and land use planning sector.
Particularly noticeable was the indifferent attitude o f the central planning authorities. 
As a project promoted by the local planning authority, the KMFCTP had been seen by 
central government as an impractical proposal based on an over optimistic expectation 
(see Section 7.3.2). The indifference o f the central government to the KMFCTP 
project implies the concept o f centralised planning based on the developmental state 
strategy adopted by the Taiwanese government over decades (see Section 3.6.1) was 
still influential in economic development plan making. The central government’s 
disregard o f  the KMFCTP project made inter-sectoral coordination at the state level 
more difficult, especially when it involved non-economic and non-planning agencies 
(e.g. the Ministry o f  National Defense). The situation did not improve much, even
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after the KMFCTP project had been included in the APROC programme in the mid 
1990s.
The turning point for the KMFCTP to obtain full support from central government 
was President Lee’s endorsement o f the project before the 1998 Kaohsiung Mayor 
Election and former Mayor Hsieh’s appointment as Premier o f the Executive Yuan. 
The latter in particular made the central planning authorities pay attention to the 
KMFCTP project and his influence helped to resolve many tough challenges that the 
local planning authority had faced for years, e.g. the removal o f the 205 Military 
Arsenal (Section 7.6.2). It is therefore argued that the influence o f a ’big person’ is a 
significant factor in the policy coordination process.
At the same time, the case o f  KMFCTP also suggests the personal network provided a 
platform for policy coordination. From the routine communication between central 
and local governments, i.e. the personal friendship between Mayor Wu and 
Chairperson Chiang o f the CEPD, to the occasional coordination, i.e. that between 
Deputy C hief Engineer Hsu and Vice Administrative Minister Mao that facilitated the 
extension to the T88 highway, the informal personal network has played a decisive 
factor in policy making, affirming the importance o f the personal factor in policy 
coordination in relation to planning in Taiwan.
Finally, it is worth noting that there seems to be little evidence to suggest the 
institutional change in 1999/2000 had a direct impact on the KMFCTP project. 
Although the appointment o f Mayor Hsieh as Premier o f the Executive Yuan as a
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result o f  the D PP’s victory in the Presidential Election in 200055 appears to have 
helped to raise the profile o f the KMFCTP project in the central government’s 
priorities, unlike the first two cases, the shift in central political power appears not to 
have had a direct impact on the operation o f policy coordination in this case. Further 
discussions on how institutional change has affected the operation o f policy 
coordination in the three cases will be presented in the next chapters.
55 Mayor Hsieh belongs to the ruling party, DPP.
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Chapter Eight Overview of Study Findings and 
Implications
This chapter presents a brief overview o f the findings generated from the three case 
studies analysed in this thesis in respect o f the operation o f policy coordination in 
relation to land use planning; changes in planning institutions over the last decade due 
to the movement towards democratisation; and the importance o f informal 
institutional elements in policy coordination. Findings in relation to these three 
dimensions will help to answer the research questions set out in Chapter Four.
8.1 The Operation of Policy Coordination in Relation to Land Use 
Planning
8.1.1 Cross-sectoral coordination at the central level
As mentioned in Chapter Three, there are many departments in the Council for 
Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) and they have various responsibilities 
ranging from sectoral planning to urban development. It is the Department of Urban 
and Housing Development under the CEPD which addresses policy in relation to land 
use planning. After receiving planning proposals, the Department o f Urban and 
Housing Development coordinates with relevant departments within the CEPD for 
professional knowledge. For example, the Department o f Sectoral Planning can offer 
advice on industrial development. It is worth noting that the term ‘sectoral planning’ 
in Taiwan refers to planning relating to individual industries, e.g. the electronic 
industry, the automobile industry, rather than planning for an individual sector, e.g.
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transport planning, environmental planning as in the UK. Thus, in Taiwan, the 
Department o f  Sectoral Planning o f the CEPD is in charge o f planning industrial 
policy.
If  consensus cannot be reached between Ministries, for instance the conflict between 
Kaohsiung City Government and the Ministry o f Economic Affairs regarding the 
removal o f many government-owned corporations in the case of Kaohsiung 
Multi-Functional Commerce and Trade Park (KMFCTP) (see Section 7.5.2), the issue 
will be discussed at the CEPD Council Meeting attended by Ministers. Senior 
Specialist Liao o f the Department o f Urban and Housing Development under the 
CEPD described the coordination process with regard to the case o f Tainan Science 
Park (TSP) (see Section 5.42) in detail as follows:
‘Almost all Ministries related to the project will express their opinions at the 
coordination meeting and not only offer technical suggestions but also request 
amendments to the project. The process described above is the preparation 
work which is directed by Vice-Chairpersons o f  the CEPD, and those in 
attendance at such meetings are usually Section Chiefs o f  Departments. Once 
agreement has been reached, the project will be presented to the Council 
Meeting, a very significant meeting, which relevant Ministers o f  the Executive 
Yuan w ill attend in order to reach a final decision on the project proposal. The 
decision o f  Council Meeting, whatever positive or negative, will then be 
reported to the Executive Yuan, which will inform the applicant o f  the decision 
reached. In the case o f  Tainan Science Park, the applicant was the NSC and 
once it had received planning permission, it started detailed plan making. This 
is the form al mechanism at the central government level fo r policy
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coordination.
Normally, most policy coordination at the central level is generated by the process 
described above, though there have been cases where the proposals were rejected 
during after discussions during the CEPD Council Meeting. However, according to 
Liao, it is worth noting that the final decision is still made by the Premier o f 
Executive Yuan, not the CEPD (Interview with Senior Specialist Liao o f the CEPD) 
and Liao's comments were confirmed in the case studies of this thesis (see Sections
5.4.2 and 7.5.2).
With regard to sectoral planning policy, the CEPD will sometimes offer suggestions to 
the relevant authorities in charge o f planning at the central level, if it finds specific 
economic planning or land use planning is inactive or controversial, e.g. problems 
relating to the KMFCTP project (see Section 7.3.2). However, as a consultant unit, the 
CEPD is like a think-tank which deals with planning and assessing policy sent from 
different Ministries. Compared to major Ministries, e.g. the MOEA and MOI, the 
CEPD is a very small organisation with few personnel and resources because it is not 
in charge o f  policy implementation and is only responsible for policy making and 
coordination (Interview with Senior Specialist Liao o f the CEPD).
Further, at the upper level, due to respect for the CEPD’s authority, normally the 
Premier and Vice-Premier do not intervene in the policy making process until the 
suggestions presented at the Council Meeting are submitted to the Executive Yuan. 
Accordingly, this suggests most policy coordination at the central level is completed 
in the CEPD and then the Premier makes a final decision, which is then delivered to 
the relevant Ministries for implementation.
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8.1.2 Criticisms of the current regional planning mechanism
As mentioned in Section 3.6, there have been many criticisms about the current 
regional planning mechanism and this study confirmed the lack o f coordination 
between plan making at the regional level. Unfortunately this study underlines the 
disability o f  regional plans in the issues about coordination.
Interviewees in this research admitted to the weakness o f the existing regional 
planning mechanism and agreed it is a pity that regional plans today do not play a 
stronger role in planning integration (Interviews with Senior Specialist Liao, the 
CEPD and Professor Lin, National Taiwan University). Senior Specialist Liao 
suggested that this situation might be partly due to a lack o f awareness o f the 
significance o f  regional identity in the planning discourse. Moreover, as a result o f the 
lack o f a coordinative strategy, regional plans have not offered industries a clear 
direction as to future development in each area within a region, which is thought to be 
their main function.
The lack o f an integrated strategy for regional development leads to uncoordinated 
plan making at the regional level even though regional plans are the highest statutory 
plans in the existing planning system. The shortage o f the coordinative function has 
therefore made regional planning more divergent and fragmented. Hence, as Senior 
Specialist Liao contended, ‘as a blue print plan, the regional plan is a very 
disappointing case. ’
In addition, according to the ‘Regional Planning A c f , a regional plan should be drawn 
up with a development strategy and spatial planning in mind, to enable it to offer a
direction for local development. However, currently, in contrast, all regional plans 
have been amended after the development o f certain developmental projects, e.g. the 
TSP and CTSP, and even conflict with policy directions in existing regional plans 
(Interview with Professor Lin, National Taiwan University). In other words, regional 
development has not been led by a developmental strategy; rather, regional plans have 
frequently been revised to match the existing facts. For instance, in the case o f the 
development o f both the Southern Taiwan Science Park (STSP) and Central Taiwan 
Science Park (CTSP), amendments to the regional plans were made after approval of 
these projects. It is therefore inevitable that the validity and reliability o f regional 
plans are called into question.
In order to resolve current problems with regional plans, Dr. Chen, Member o f the 
Regional Planning Committee (RPC), suggests local planning authorities should be 
given the responsibility o f implementing regional plans and central government 
should be given the duty o f making the planning framework. The existing system 
empowers sectoral planning authorities to deliver sectoral plans (see Section 3.4.1 and 
Figure 3.6), as a result, a discord between horizontal planning (sectoral authorities) 
and vertical planning (local planning authorities) is clearly seen. The three cases in 
this thesis illustrate the lack o f coordination between the land use planning sector and 
economic planning sector (see Sections 5.6.2, 6.6.3 and 7.6.3). The existing sectoral 
planning system has led to divergent regional planning and a fragmented planning 
policy. In addition, the lack o f integration between vertical and horizontal planning 
has made policy coordination more difficult (see the dispute concerning the water 
supply report for the KSP in Section 6.6.2).
With reference to the cases o f  TSP and KSP, Dr. Chen, RPC Member, argued that the
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lack o f a regional planning authority might be the cause o f un-coordinative plan 
making at the regional level and also contended that it be better if local authorities 
take over planning implementation since they are local administrations and are most 
familiar with local needs. Dr. Chen’s suggestions would, in fact, appear to be 
happening, since this thesis found local planning authorities taking over works in 
relation to regional planning, facilitating communication with economic planning 
bodies on behalf o f  the CEPD and NSC, and directly negotiating with central agencies, 
for instance, Kaohsiung County Government’s negotiation with the Ministry o f 
Transportation and Communication in the bid for the National Telecom Technology 
Centre (see Section 6.4.1).
8.1.3 The significance of the Regional Planning Committee (RPC) in policy 
coordination
Regional planning appears to be dysfunctional due to the lack o f a regional planning 
authority and partly because o f the neglect o f the strategic dimension in regional plans. 
As a result, there does not appear to be any joined-up thinking or integrated action, 
thus planning coordination at the regional level is virtually non-existent. Under this 
circumstance, a question emerges with respect to the role o f RPC: if regional plans are 
not effective, how is the central planning authority in charge of regional planning 
(RPC) fulfilling its responsibility now?
The research found the main function o f the RPC is to grant ‘planning permission’. Dr. 
Chen, Member o f  the RPC, stated: ‘you  cou ld  sa y  the whole planning review  an d  
consultation m echanism  is sim ply managem ent o f  planning perm ission  ’. Based on the 
planning system, the need for planning permission applies not only to developments 
promoted by the public sector, e.g. science parks and industrial parks (see the review
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and approval process for TSP and KSP in Sections 5.5.3 and 6.6.2), but also 
developments run by the private sector e.g. theme parks and housing.
Developers are required to submit applications to the RPC for their developmental 
projects, including land use plans. A problem therefore emerges from the conflict 
between the non-statutory National Comprehensive Development Plan (NCDP) and 
the adoption o f  the zoning planning system. For instance, zoning applications do not 
necessarily have to confirm to guidance shown in the NCDP, yet must satisfy zoning 
regulations requirements. A gap thus appears between the non-binding NCDP and the 
legalised planning regulations. To resolve the gap, zoning applications will be 
reviewed and discussed by RPC members before receiving approval from the RPC. 
This is the function o f the planning permission model (Interview with Dr. Chen, RPC 
Member, September 2006).
In other words, due to the lack o f a regional planning authority, the RPC plays the role 
o f  gatekeeper for planning applications in relation to regional planning. However, 
members o f  the RPC are selected from different fields and inevitably pay more 
attention to those issues connected with their field o f professional interest. For 
instance, members with an environmental protection background usually insist that 
applications meet high environmental requirements, even though there is the EIA 
(Environmental Impact Assessment) procedure through which all applications for 
development are examined. The research found the diverse backgrounds o f RPC 
members usually led to endless discussions, making it difficult to come to a final 
conclusion (Interview with Section Chief Hsu o f Kaohsiung County Government). 
The diverse backgrounds o f RPC members also resulted in inconsistent standards for 
the plan review and approval process as occurred in the case o f the water supply
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report for the KSP District Plan (see Section 6.6.2).
8.2 Planning Institutions in Transition due to the Institutional 
Change
8.2.1 The CEPD’s weakened role after institutional change
The CEPD has been seen as one o f the ‘smoothing mechanisms’ over past decades. It 
is said, inside governmental bureaucracy, that smoothing mechanisms are in place to 
facilitate reciprocity and trust among departments, and between departments and 
bureaux. The reciprocity and trust in turn provide the foundation for agencies to 
engage in policy coordination.
At the top o f  the bureaucracy, the CEPD provides an arena for generating policy 
coordination within the Executive Yuan. As mentioned in Section 8.1.1, the CEPD 
Council Meetings are chaired by the Chairperson and attended by major Ministers. 
Meanwhile CEPD Council Meeting is convened regularly and is the highest-level 
platform for policy coordination inside the governmental bureaucracy. The Council 
Meetings mainly provide an arena for discussion and sometimes bargaining between 
senior officials representing their agencies. In the time o f KMT’s rule prior to 2000, 
despite being prevented from making formal decisions, the CEPD’s opinions and 
advice were often viewed as the final words o f  the Executive Yuan when there were 
divergent views among Ministries. The Chief Secretary o f the CEPD therefore played 
a dominant role in policy coordination at the central level.
Although this thesis suggests the CEPD is still a significant actor in policy
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coordination, in particular at the central level, its declining role in the generation of 
policy coordination cannot be denied. The CEPD had been viewed as an independent 
think tank which presented developmental strategies to the Executive Yuan and also 
the platform from which departmental conflicts were conciliated through coordination 
meetings. However, recently there have been increasing questions asked about the 
function o f  the CEPD, and, given the changing political climate over the past decade, 
it is contended that the role o f the CEPD has diminished. Some even mock the CEPD 
as ‘the second Secretariat' which only deals with general administrative work. In 
other words, it has lost the significant function o f coordination (Chuang, S., 2006, 
p. 116).
The findings o f  this study provide some systematic evidence about the weakening role 
o f the CEPD in policy coordination which can be attributed to institutional change. 
The rise o f local government as the democratisation movement progressed saw 
political intervention driven by aggressive local political power and the weakness of 
the CEPD's response (see Section 6.4.2). In the past, the CEPD could devote itself to 
policy making without political intervention since governmental operation was 
authoritarian and local governments were not allowed to participate in national policy 
making. The CEPD did not need to face local politicians directly and all local requests 
were reported to the relevant central authorities However, the CEPD today is usually 
asked to address many local affairs, thus it is not capable o f focusing on strategic 
policy and coordination which are thought to be its primary functions in the 
institutional design. This change has definitely resulted from  the progress o f  
democracy since there has been a rise o f  local po w er’, said Senior Specialist Liao o f 
the CEPD. Liao further described the effect o f dealing with local affairs:
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‘The extra work has cost us much time. The CEPD is happy to assist local 
government, however, the fact is that due to limited human resources the CEPD 
is unable to effectively deal with the extra work imposed on us by it. The extra 
work load has resulted from institutional change when the old administrative 
order collapsed. ’
In order to obtain the assistance o f the CEPD, local planning authorities even contact 
the Premier, who will direct the CEPD to assist local planning authority. Such 
phenomena became common after the DPP became the ruling power in the 2000 
Presidential Election. Due to a shortage o f DPP politicians and officers at the central 
government level (see Section 3.2.2), the DPP administration promoted a number of 
ex-mayors and ex-magistrates to Ministerships, and even Premiership56. ‘It is no 
longer a surprise when a Magistrate is appointed as a new Premier, since the 
traditional hierarchical bureaucracy has been broken \  said Liao, Senior Specialist o f 
the CEPD. This fact was demonstrated in the case o f KMFCTP when several 
problems were soon resolved after the ex-Mayor Hsieh was appointed to the 
Premiership (Section 7.6.2).
While it would seem that the weakness o f the CEPD has resulted from the change in 
ruling party in 2000, some argue there was a series o f reasons not a single event 
which caused weakening role o f the CEPD. The CEPD had been gradually weakening 
before 2000, from, in fact, the latter part o f  the KMT's rule, from the time o f Premier 
Lien's administration between 1993 and 1997. The CEPD was at that time 
transformed from a unit for decision making to a think-tank o f the Executive Yuan.
56 During the DPP’s administration, many Premiers appointed by President Chen were Mayors or 
Magistrates at the local level.
IHowever, the research findings suggest it is also true that the CEPD became far 
weaker after 2000 (Interviewed with Professor Chou form National Taipei University 
in September 2006).
When interviewed, Senior Specialist Liao o f the CEPD gave a specific example o f the 
weakening role o f  the CEPD. He referred to the development o f Central Taiwan 
Science Park (CTSP) which led to a controversial decision. In that case, there was a 
problem with inter-departmental integration and the EIA process. The CTSP 
Administration had faced difficulties coordinating with other central agencies due to 
departmentalism and had also encountered internal competition with other science 
park Administrations under the NSC. The CTSP Administration was eager to promote 
further expansion, even though the development project did not meet up the CEPD's 
planning requirement. According to Senior Specialist Liao, when the CEPD tried to 
facilitate coordination with other Ministries to assist the project to meet its 
requirements, the CTSP Administration refused this assistance and adopted political 
intervention to ensure the project was approved (see Section 6.7.3).
For the CEPD, the case o f CTSP illustrates its failure to coordinate with the planning 
authorities. The CTSP Administration itself looked for a solution to the land 
expansion problem instead o f using the coordination platform provided by the CEPD 
which had been employed over decades. This case shows the fragmentation o f plan 
making at the central level, which was due to departmentalism according to Senior 
Specialist Liao o f  the CEPD. Both the NSC and the CEPD had their own thought on 
the development o f  CTSP. The NSC did not like the proposal suggested by the CEPD 
o f locating the CTSP's expansion in land provided by the Industrial Development 
Bureau therefore the CTSP Administration resolved the matter in its own way.
310
The example illustrated above and findings derived from the three cases appear to 
confirm the weakening role o f the CEPD in policy coordination, although its role in 
seeking to resolve conflicts between Ministries at the central level cannot be denied.
8.2.2 The rise of the local planning authority’s power
In contrast to the declining importance o f the CEPD, there was a rise in the local 
planning authority's power due to the collapse o f authoritarianism.
The relationship between central and local government before the late 1990s had been 
based on authoritarianism in an authoritarian state. As a result o f drastic institutional 
change in the late 1990s, Taiwanese politics has gradually transformed from 
centralised authoritarianism to election-oriented decision-making (Interview with 
Professor Chou, National Taipei University). Moreover, the movement towards 
democratisation not only led to local governments having more authority but also 
resulted in inconsequent planning policy. When local governance replaced unitary 
planning political power, due to inconsistent plan making as result o f frequent change 
in leadership, this inevitably led to planning fragmentation. When interviewed, 
Professor Chou stated, ’ the most common problem in local planning is that planning 
policy has shifted as local leadership has changed, since each politician has his own 
concerns’. However, although this research suggests the change o f leadership may 
well have affected local planning policy in practice, the primary direction in general 
has been kept thanks to a solid bureaucratic culture (see Sections 5.7.4, 6.7.4 and
7.6.4).
Another significant change in institutional design was the streamlining o f the Taiwan
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Provincial Government in 1999. In the past, central government had full control over 
local politics through the distribution o f developmental gains. However, the removal 
o f the Provincial Government in 1999 left a vacuum in political power because the 
middle administrative level had been removed. Accordingly, local governments 
replaced the Provincial Government as new powers and can compete with the two 
municipalities o f Taipei and Kaohsiung City and also bargain with the central 
government. Prior to 1999, they were under the Provincial Government and 
municipalities and could not bargain o f their own accord (Interview with Professor 
Chou, National Taipei University). For example, the ‘floating zoning' in the case of 
TSP (see Section 5.5.3) and the competition to bid to be the location for the National 
Telecom Technology Centre in the case o f KSP (Section 6.4.1) showed local 
governments’ capacity to bargain with the central government. Previously, both o f 
these would have been dealt with by the Provincial Government. The vacuum in 
political power at the middle level has also seen the rise in power o f the local planning 
authority.
The impact resulting from the rise o f local power has been a fragmented plan making 
process. No matter what problems are encountered, the local planning authorities 
always request assistance from the CEPD to resolve them. In fact, most problems 
could be resolved by local planning authorities themselves. Senior Specialist Liao of 
the CEPD complained:
‘The CEPD has taken on too many responsibilities dealing with local issues 
instead o f national development strategy. The CEPD should devote its energies 
to national strategic policy rather than problem resolution at the local level.
The local planning authorities should take more responsibility for local
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planning affairs.
As a result o f  the rise in their power, local planning authorities have also influenced 
decision-making made by the central government. In response to local requests to 
speed up the plan making process at the central level, there has been a noticeable 
change called ‘parallel supervision’, in the planning process recently. In the past, 
planning supervision had been a linear process since one step would not commence 
until the previous one had been completed. However, in ‘parallel supervision’ every 
relevant authority can embark on several different stages in the plan review process at 
the same time. In addition, a development project would not have been discussed by 
the RPC until it had received approval from the El A in linear planning process. This is 
no longer the case in planning supervision today. It is argued that such significant 
change in the planning process will shorten the time taken in the plan review stage 
and lead to economic competitiveness (Interview with Senior Specialist Liao of the 
CEPD).
Thus, institutional change over the last decade has affected policy making including 
planning process. That is to say, democratisation has led to the rise o f local power and 
the rise o f  local power has led to more political intervention (see the political 
intervention in the case o f  KSP in Section 6.7.3).
8.2.3 The increasing significance of the RPC
Since the streamlining o f the Taiwan Provincial Government in 1999, there is no 
longer a planning authority at the regional level. The findings from the case studies 
indicate that planning control for all non-urban areas which was supervised by the 
Provincial Government prior to 1999 became the responsibility o f the Regional
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Planning Committee (RPC). Similarly, the Urban Planning Committee (UPC) o f the 
CPA has taken over urban planning affairs managed by Taiwan Provincial 
Government before 1999. In the current planning system, from land use planning in 
national parks to riverside development, once developmental areas are over 10 
hectares, it is the RPC’s job to review and approve them (Interview with Dr. Chen, 
RPC Member).
Intense competition between local planning authorities for limited resources is another 
phenomenon which has emerged from the rise o f local government power and 
illustrates the lack o f coordinated regional planning (see the competition between 
Kaohsiung County and Taoyuan County to become the location for the National 
Telecom Technology Centre in Section 6.4.1). This competition showed planning in 
Taiwan faces challenges not only from vertical but also from horizontal dimension. 
Professor Chou from the National Taipei University also confirmed such challenges.
Moreover, as a member o f RPC, Dr. Chen expressed his opinion on the role o f RPC in 
the rise o f  local authority power as follows:
7 do not deny the significance o f local participation in the plan making process. 
However, since a new development plan inevitably results in winners and losers, 
local interests must be coordinated in order to resolve conflicts. In such 
circumstance, we cannot meet the needs o f all. Thus, as members o f the RPC, 
we need to weigh various concerns carefully and keep a balance between local 
interests. Top-down decision-making is most effective for integrating public 
interests. ’
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It is inevitable that more conflicts between local governments will occur due to the 
rise o f  local planning power competing for limited resources. Such increase in 
competition and conflicts makes the role o f  the RPC even more important since there 
is no regional planning authority in Taiwanese planning system to coordinate 
development at the regional level.
8.3 The Importance of the Informal Institutional Elements
8.3.1 The legacy of developmental state planning
In previous decades, it had been the CEPD which had drawn up the national 
development strategy and played a dominant role in the planning process at the 
central level. A typical development plan made by the CEPD at that time was the 
National Economic Development Plan. Based on developmental state planning 
strategy, the CEPD released the National Comprehensive Development Plan in 1996. 
These two significant plans illustrate the importance o f the CEPD at that time.
Despite the CEPD’s domination in economic planning, it is worth noting the role o f 
the National Science Council (NSC) in the plan making process for science park 
projects. The study findings suggest it is the NSC 's duty to put forward development 
proposal for science parks and present them to the Executive Yuan, which will then 
pass the proposals to the CEPD for policy appraisal (Section 5.4.2). Representatives 
from relevant Ministries and the local planning authority will then be invited to attend 
coordination meetings convened by the CEPD (Interview with Senior Specialist Liao 
o f the CEPD).
315
Professor Chou, National Taipei University, commented that the policy making 
process for science parks is a legacy o f the developmental state strategy, in which the 
central government is dominant in the plan-making process. Since the promotion o f 
science parks has become the priority policy for economic development, there has 
been a coalition formed between central government, local governments, investors 
and Science Park Administrations in Taiwan (see Sections 5.3.2 and 6.3.2), which has 
made such development more efficient and effective.
This phenomenon has resulted from the inherited development-orientation strategy 
which believes economic growth is the primary concern o f government, and it should 
devote its efforts to promoting it even through an authoritative mechanism (Section
3.6.1). Taiwan has been eager to find a position in the global economy hence central 
government has adopted the electronic industry as the strategic industry for economic 
development. The cases o f TSP and KSP show that local governments have embraced 
science parks enthusiastically, since such development meet everyone's need, i.e. they 
bring economic benefits and generate confidence in the local economy. Land 
acquisition was always thought to be the toughest problem for the development of 
industrial parks in Taiwan, however, the study findings suggest that due to the high 
expectations o f  local citizens, this is not the case for the development o f science parks 
(see Chapters Five and Six).
In addition, Senior Specialist Liao admitted that economic development planning 
takes precedence over land use planning:
‘It cannot be denied there might occasionally be a need for fast development in
some circumstances where development is the priority for government. In such
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situation, economic development will be fully supported, even at the cost o f 
land use planning. This is indeed the difficulty for land use planning authorities 
in Taiwan, economic development has always been the main concern. ’
Accordingly, this study argues that in spite o f the increasing weakness o f the CEPD, 
the legacy o f the developmental state strategy still remains. As a result o f this 
inheritance, economic development planning is not only given priority but a 
centralised planning system dominated by the central government still exists in 
Taiwan (see Section 7.7.1).
8.3.2 The role of the ‘big person’ in planning
Section 3.2 demonstrated the historically significant influence o f  personal factors 
embedded in traditional culture. Through the case study approach, the importance o f 
personal factors in Taiwanese planning was proved in every single case.
As mentioned in Chapter Two, there are at least two aspects o f institution which need 
to be taken into account: the formal aspects, e.g. legislation and hierarchy, and the 
informal aspects, e.g. cultural context and political contingency. Such consideration 
also applies to Taiwan’s planning system as pointed out by Professor Chou from the 
National Taipei University:
‘Both aspects are included in neo-institutionalism which recognises individual 
behaviour does matter in the discourse o f the institution. It is important to note 
the impact o f unofficial factors on the institution and this can be found 
especially in the horizontal network in Taiwan. ’
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In the case studies, the impact o f the personal factor first appears with the influence o f 
the ‘big person’. In the case o f KMFCT, there were many examples where powerful 
politicians played a role in policy coordination for the KMFCTP project (Section
7.6.2). A similar circumstance can be found in the case o f Kaohsiung Science Park 
(KSP), in which there was a powerful person, the current Speaker Wang (KMT) o f the 
Legislative Yuan who lobbied for the Lujhu site since Lujhu is his constituency. 
Commenting on this, Professor Chou from National Taipei University stated:
‘Without Wang, I  do not think Lujhu would have had another opportunity to bid 
for selection as a science park and eventually be approved as Kaohsiung 
Science Park. ’
Not only politicians have an influence on the planning process, persons from big 
business can also have an influence. In the case o f TSP, two well-known business 
persons complained in the mass media about the flooding problem in the park. As a 
result o f these complaints, the central government immediately found a solution to the 
problem (Section 5.7.1). RPC members can also be influential in the plan review and 
approval process. RPC members have their own viewpoints based on their 
professional background (Section 6.6.2). Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the central 
government sometimes shows its dominant attitude in relation to specific issues, e.g. 
it forced RPC members to approve the plan for CTSP in which the influence of 
powerful business persons could also be seen. A RPC member, Dr. Chen, explained:
‘Whereas specific outcome has been decided in advance, there will not be any 
coordination in such kind o f case. Moreover, members will be exposed to strong 
political pressure. I  suppose some members might be influenced in such
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circumstances.
These cases above demonstrate the importance o f the ‘big person’ factor and show 
how this factor affected policy decision-making. The study findings therefore confirm 
the influence o f ‘rule o f human’ culture (see Section 3.2.2) on policy coordination 
process.
8.3.3 The significant personal network behind the formal administrative 
framework
A strong personal factor is not always negative. Although the research findings 
suggest institutional change in the last decade has affected policy making, the findings 
also suggest that the primary planning policy has been kept on track.
Due to its very weak control o f the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan, there were six DPP 
Premiers in the eight years 200-2008. Each new Premier inevitably introduced his 
own policy manifesto, however, due to a solid bureaucracy, most policies remained 
unchanged in spite o f a change in leadership. As Senior Specialist Liao stated, 
‘...many "new ” policies are in fac t old ones packed with some amendments. 
Therefore, the spirit o f  the old policies still exists. ’
His words were supported in the three cases where officials tended to hold to the main 
direction through the solid network within bureaucracy (Sections 5.7.4, 6.7.4, and
7.6.4). Inevitably, there might be some slight difference as a result o f the change o f 
leadership, but staffs and assistants making policy will attempt to put the old policy 
into a new ‘bottle’ hence it will remain essentially the same in spite o f a different 
name. As result o f the solid personal network, the impact o f the governmental shift in
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2000 on policy coordination was minimised. In addition, with regard to policy 
coordination, the informal personal network has played a significant role.
As illustrated in the case o f KMFCT, there are several ways in which the personal 
network can help coordination, for example, information exchange, conflict resolution, 
coordinated action (see Section 7.6.1). There is much evidence in the three cases to 
prove the significance o f the personal network (see Sections 5.7.4, 6.7.4 and 7.6.2). It 
is believed the solid personal network is founded on the philosophy o f Confucianism 
which emphasises harmony in personal relationships (see Section 3.2.2). While the 
cultural context has given the ‘rule o f human' (Section 3.2.2), it has also contributed 
to the stable personal network which appears in the governmental structure as a strong 
bureaucracy. This thesis therefore concludes that the interaction between 
policy-making participants within institutions deeply depends on personal 
relationships and determines whether the planning process goes smoothly or not.
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Chapter Nine Conclusions
This chapter provides direct answers to the research questions established in Chapter 
Four. Based on the literature review in Chapters Two and Three and research finding 
generated from three cases, Section 9.2 will suggest four research conclusions which 
link the case study material to the earlier conceptual material that structured the thesis. 
Some suggestions for further research will be indicated in Section 9.3 and it is argued 
that these points are especially helpful for studies o f planning processes in 
Chinese-culture societies.
9.1 Answers to the Research Questions
9.1.1 Taiwanese planning institutions in transition
With reference to the question: ‘How does coordination operate within the planning  
system fo r  economic project planning, the research findings found cross-sectoral 
coordination at the central level still relies on the coordination meeting held by the 
CEPD which has been used as a platform for inter-ministry negotiation over decades. 
At the local level, local planning authorities have taken over most coordination work, 
even communication with the central economic planning authorities (see Sections
6.4.1 and 7.6.3). The thesis also reveals the increasingly significant role o f the RPC in 
planning coordination. The RPC's importance in regional planning affairs is seen in 
the TSP and KSP cases (see Sections 5.5 and 6.5).
Although some argue that the role o f the CEPD had gradually been weakening before
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2000, the cases in the thesis suggest institutional change in the late 1990s has made 
political intervention more frequent, and this has led to the weakened role o f the 
CEPD. As regards the question: ‘How have the roles changed in the planning sector, 
given institutional change?’, findings from the TSP and KSP cases suggest the 
CEPD’s weakness was exacerbated by the rise o f local planning authorities’ power, 
which resulted from the movement towards democratisation, in particular, the regime 
shift in 2000 (see Sections 5.5.3 and 6.7.3). Although there is no clear evidence o f  a 
change in roles in the planning sector in the third case, the KMFCTP project, 
nevertheless, the benefit gained from ex-Mayor Hsieh’s Premiership, i.e. full support 
from the central planning agencies, was apparent and reflects Senior Specialist o f the 
CEPD Liao’s concern about the rapid promotion o f local leadership to the central 
government (see Section 8.2.1).
After the streamlining o f the Taiwan Provincial Government in 1999, regional 
planning affairs transferred to the responsibility o f  the RPC o f the CPA. The case 
studies o f TSP and KSP indicated that the RPC is increasingly becoming a key actor 
because o f the necessity o f the RPC’s approval for regional planning activities (see 
Sections 5.5.3 and 6.6.2). As a result o f the changes illustrated above, this thesis 
contends that the institutional change in the late 1990s has impacted on the 
relationship between actors and the way in which coordination is conducted in the 
policy making process.
9.1.2 The interaction and operation in policy coordination
The thesis also suggests that findings in relation to the other two research questions: 
W hat is the interaction between policy participants among and within institutions 
and how does it affect policy outcome?’ and ‘After the significant institutional
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changes in the late 1990s, has there been any change in bureaucratic operation in 
relation to coordination then and now ?’ show that these two questions are in fact 
related to each other. All three cases presented showed that the interactions between 
actors among and within institutions are highly dependent on informal networks. 
While the case o f KSP demonstrated the significance o f personal networks based on 
informal communication between planners (Section 6.7.4), the TSP and KMFCTP 
cases showed that the informal network can be based in friendship, even extending as 
far back as early school days (Sections 5.5.3 and 7.6.2). Moreover, the issue o f the 
extension to the T88 highway in the case o f KMFCTP revealed that in spite o f the 
formal administrative framework, the personal network showed its effectiveness in 
policy coordination (section 7.6.2). The importance o f the informal personal network 
became apparent since a formal mechanism for policy coordination was lacking. For 
instance, the lack o f  solid personal networks between Kaohsiung County Government 
and the Water Resource Agency made inter-agency communication more difficult and 
affected the policy coordination process in relation to the water supply report for the 
KSP District Plan (Section 6.7.4).
The personal network is frequently found in government bureaucracy because many 
policy makers know each other and many o f the relationships are between senior or 
junior graduates from the same university (Section 7.7.2). Owing to the solid network 
within the bureaucratic system, the impact o f the change o f leadership was reduced 
and the thesis therefore found the main policy direction was maintained by planners 
(see Sections 5.7.4 and 7.7.2), although the character o f the leadership did indeed 
influence the way that policy coordination was conducted, for instance, the difference 
between Magistrate Chen and Magistrate Su in the case o f TSP (Section 5.7.4).
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With regard to the change o f ruling power, the solid network also minimised the 
impact o f  the institutional change. Although it cannot be denied the DPP 
administration affected the relationship between actors and the operation of 
coordination in the policy making process, the findings generated from case studies 
demonstrated that the change in bureaucratic operation in relation to coordination was 
limited. In spite o f more political intervention resulting from the institutional change, 
it is argued the primary policy was still on track due to the substantial bureaucratic 
networking (see Section 5.7.3), and this was supported by Senior Specialist o f the 
CEPD, Liao (see Section 8.3.3). Hence, findings in this thesis suggest that in spite o f 
its impact on the policy making process, the institutional change in the late 1990s 
resulted in few changes to the bureaucratic operation.
9.2 Reflections on the Findings
The Taiwanese planning system is rooted in a distinctive cultural tradition, notably 
Confucian humanism and Sun Yat-Sen's philosophy. In encountering drastic 
institutional change over the last decade, e.g. the trend toward to market-based 
planning system under economic globalisation, the planning process in Taiwan has 
offered a valuable subject for understanding the changing planning landscape under 
the pressure for institutional change, yet within a broader cultural-historical context. 
Through the cross analysis o f three cases, the change and unchange in policy 
coordination process has been revealed and explained. As a result o f the foregoing 
analyses, several reflections are suggested in the end o f this research.
9.2.1 The distinctive cultural and political context of Taiwanese Planning
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Based on research findings, the thesis contends that the cultural and political context 
contribute a decisive influence in the policy making process and have made 
Taiwanese planning distinctive from those o f western experience.
The influence o f context can be identified in two dimensions. On the one hand, the 
importance o f personal factors such as the ‘big person’ factor and personal 
relationships in the three cases selected reflect the significance o f the concept o f ‘rule 
o f human’ which has its origin in an ancient Chinese philosophy, Confucian 
humanism, which stresses the importance o f maintaining social order and 
harmonising relationships.
As a result o f  this circumstance, formal institutions, e.g. law and legal process, are the 
least favourable resorts for solving problem, since maintaining relationship become a 
concern in order to keep social harmony (Liang, 1930). Due to the concern o f social 
harmony, resistance in the public sectors is unusual because public officers tend to 
follow orders and keep good relationship to each other even if sometimes such orders 
conflict with regulations (Liao and Hsu, 2002). This intention o f keeping harmony has 
also reduced the significance o f formal institutions since people are reluctant to solve 
their problems through legal process, rather they look for resolution through personal 
networks. This was observed in the three cases in this research study, for instance 
when ‘political interventions’ were adopted openly in the competition for the National 
Telecom Technology Centre (see Section 6.4.1). Such concern for harmony indicates 
a distinctive cultural context which influences the relationships between individuals in 
institutions and particularly made personal factors, such as networking and the ‘big 
person’ decisive in policy making processes.
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On the other hand, its unique political context has also affected Taiwanese planning 
especially the movement towards democratisation which has resulted in a series of 
impacts on not only political institutions, e.g. the streamlining o f Taiwan Provincial 
Government, but also political culture, e.g. the appearance o f ‘gold power’.
As a result o f  the democratic movements since the 1980s, Taiwanese society has 
changed from being ‘an intellectual guided society ' to ‘a preference or volition 
guided society’ (Chu, C.-H., 1991, p. 163). The last twenty years saw a drastic political 
change from authoritarianism to democracy in Taiwan which it is argued resulted in 
the rise o f black-gold politics due to the rise o f local political power (Chao, Y. 1996; 
Kao, Y. 2003). The three cases selected have demonstrated the impact o f political 
change in the planning process as the local planning authority has increasingly played 
a role in not only land use planning but also economic development planning, and 
political intervention has been more frequent in recent years, e.g. political intervention 
in the case o f CTSP in Sections 6.7.3 and 8.2.2.
Moreover, the research findings indicate that increasing local power has resulted in 
more political intervention in the planning process and it also confirms the assumption 
in Section 3.2.3 that the influence o f local interest groups has not decreased with the 
development o f democracy on the contrary it is transferred to a more sophisticated 
interlocking network which was found in the vivid operation of the coalition o f local 
interest group in the making o f the KSP District Plan in Section 6.3.2.
As discussed in Chapter Three, over the last two decades, Taiwanese planning has 
transferred from being plan-led planning to market-led planning which implies a 
lower central control and more local planning powers. With regard to the rise o f local
power in the democratic movement, the research shows the weakening role o f the 
central planning authority in Taiwan and contends that there has been a growth o f 
local political power resulting from deepening democracy in the 1990s. The case 
studies illustrated this change has led to more political intervention in planning 
processes in Taiwan.
It is important to note that the cultural context and political context are connected. 
The significance o f relationships has been embedded in Chinese culture for over two 
thousand years, and it is important in politics to offer an arena in which personal 
relationships and networks are highly exploited. The research also contends that the 
collapse o f authoritarianism has not decreased the importance o f the personal factor in 
planning processes on the contrary it confirms the connection between political 
intervention in policy making and personal relationships which was shown in Sections 
5.7.1, 6.7.3 and 7.7.2.
9.2.2 The influence of Sun Yat-Sen’s philosophy on Taiwanese planning 
institutions
Chapter Three illustrated that the Taiwanese planning system is based on a hybrid 
planning context and mixed with multi-cultural elements which have made it a 
distinctive subject for planning research. The hybrid planning institution has firstly 
inherited a legacy from land use planning founded in the Japanese occupation 
between 1895 to 1945 and then has received a huge administrative structure based on 
Sun Yat-Sen’s theory, Three Principles o f  People, which was initially designed for 
great China and was transferred by KMT government after 1945. As a result o f  the 
written status in the Constitution and many other official Laws and Acts, Sun, 
Yat-Sen's philosophy is widely seen as the foundation o f the Republic o f China’s
327
governmental institutions.
With respect to land use planning, Sun, Yat-Sen’s theory has affected land use policy 
in Taiwan, especially those in relation to property rights and fanning land (Su, 1991). 
Sun argued the property rights can be owned privately but the developmental gains 
should be shared with the whole society. That is to say Sun’s theory stresses the 
significance o f government control in land use planning which is also the fundamental 
basis o f land use control system in Taiwan. It is believed that his land use theory was 
influenced by American political economist Henry George and it is reflected as the 
land value tax in Taiwan (Tsai, C.-Y., 2001).
Regarding the planning system, the legacy o f Sun Yat-Sen’s philosophy can also be 
found in the strict regulation o f land use change in order to prevent capitalisation o f 
property rights. Yet, notwithstanding that this land use control contributed to clear 
land use guidance, the case study revealed that its stress on how to avoid planning 
abuses rather than exploiting the merits planning can achieve has resulted in criticism 
o f what some perceive as an inflexible system (Lee, Y., Lan, I. and Juang, H., 2005). 
It is therefore suggested that the restrictions imposed by land use planning have 
particularly limited alternative use on framing land and has led to a huge difference 
between the price o f agricultural land and that o f other land, i.e. industrial, 
commercial and residential land, which was discovered in Section 5.5.1.
When land use switching becomes difficult and the difference o f the price o f various 
land use increases, the land use control based on Sun, Yat-Sen’s philosophy has 
encountered challenges from the changing context, e.g. market-led planning concept 
and the rise o f local political power which was reflected in conflict between central
and local planning authorities in Sections 5.5.3 and 7.6.3. The former stresses the 
developmental control, while the latter - suffering from economic competition - prefer 
a more market-led resolution in the land use planning process. In spite o f its 
decreasing influence, the thesis argues that the philosophy o f Sun, Yat-Sen has still 
been important in farming planning institutions in Taiwan, especially those in relation 
to land use change in development control.
9.2.3 Critique of the application of neo-institutionalist approach
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the neo-institutionalist perspective offers a very 
flexible justification for the definition o f institutions. Accordingly, compared to 
classic institutionalism, it provides a broader viewpoint with a non-specific focus to 
explore an undiscovered area. Moreover, neo-institutionalism is thought o f as a theory 
emphasising developing a sociological view o f institutions and the relationship 
between institutions while it also focuses on the effect o f interaction among actors and 
argues this reciprocity affects institutional activities and decisions. That is to say 
institutions operate within, and are shaped by an operating environment.
Nevertheless both the traditional institutionalism or neo-institutionalism stress the 
significance o f institutions (variously defined) (Alexander, 2005), and the research 
findings generated from three cases indicated that personal factors and networks 
might be more significant than government institutions in the planning process in 
Taiwan. While political intervention could affect policy outcome (see Sections 5.7.1 
and 6.7.3), personal networks also facilitated policy making progress and helped 
maintain main policy directions (see Section 7.7.2). It therefore implies that there 
might be another important mechanism behind the formal planning institution, i.e. 
networks based on personal relationship, and this raises the question o f the capacity of
the neo-institutional approach to analyse policy coordination in the Taiwanese 
planning system. If  the institution is not the key factor, there might be some theories, 
i.e. power relation and network theory, suitable as the conceptual framework in this 
research.
However, it is worth emphasising the value o f the neo-institutional approach for 
understanding the underdeveloped research area which was the subject o f this thesis. 
In response to the criticism o f classic institutionalism, the neo-institutional approach 
respects the significance of individual behaviour and takes a broad perspective on the 
definition o f institutions. This inclusive viewpoint benefits the research undertaken in 
this thesis. First, through the adoption o f the neo-institutional approach, the thesis 
explores planning institutions in Taiwan and proves that the policy making process 
has been affected by the institutional changes which have occurred over the last 
decade. The evidence for this is found in the discussion about the weakening role of 
the CEPD and the rise o f local authority powers.
Second, the research findings revealed that although the policy making process has 
been affected; the direction o f policy outcome has generally been maintained due to 
the solid tradition o f  bureaucracy. In each case study, planning officials agreed that the 
primary planning policy had remained on track despite leadership change. The 
research analysis points out that a strong bureaucratic culture and the solid personal 
networks have reduced the impact o f institutional change on policy implementation.
Third, the study therefore suggests that institutions do matter in policy making and 
coordination since the institutional change has affected the policy making process; 
however it is also worth noting that cultural factors, personal relationships and
networks must be taken into account in any research on policy making in Taiwan. 
From the site selection for STSP to the final approval o f the KMFCT project, the 
importance o f the personal relationships is obvious.
Finally, such personal networks, as mentioned in Chapter Three, are embedded in the 
cultural context and as such can be viewed as a part of the institutional context. As a 
result, the findings from this study support the neo-institutional argument that 
informal elements o f institutions cannot be ignored. The study findings also point to 
specific areas which need to be taken into account in further research in relation to 
Taiwanese planning, i.e. personal networks and the cultural context.
Owing to the broad viewpoint o f the neo-institutionalist perspective, the research did 
not exclude the significance o f  informal institutions and, as result o f research findings, 
it further confirms the importance o f informal factors such as personal factors and 
networks. The thesis would therefore not deny the critique o f the neo-institutionalist 
perspective in relation to its 'vague’ (i.e. broad) definition o f institutions in policy 
analysis because precisely this ‘vague’ definition contributed to an inclusive 
exploration and helped indicate the specific area for further research.
It must be remembered that the primary purpose o f this research is to explore the 
operation o f policy coordination in Taiwanese planning and the impact o f institutional 
change over th e .la s t decade. Moreover, at this stage, the neo-institutionalist 
perspective has proved its contribution in generating an initial picture and analysis of 
how policy coordination operates in Taiwanese planning and, most importantly, 
pointing out the specific field, personal networks, and cultural elements as focuses for 
further research. This thesis therefore suggests the neo-institutional approach may not
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be suitable for further specific research though it has contributed the preliminary 
understanding o f planning coordination in Taiwan.
9.2.4 The limitation and question of linkage between the neo-institutional 
approach and the research strategy of using the snowball sampling technique
As the neo-institutionalist perspective takes a broad viewpoint to explore the 
relationship between economic development and land use planning, and the case 
study method engaged with snowball process strategy provided a specific focus on 
policy networks, some questions arise about the linkage between a wide conceptual 
knowledge and the project-based approach.
The first question comes from the narrow range o f interviewees, which were mainly 
from administrative organisations with none o f them drawn from the political elite. 
Second, the research argues that the snowball technique is useful for identifying 
interviewees but this does answer the question o f who might be excluded. The thesis 
focuses on a particular type o f networked interviewee which may not fully encompass 
all those who operate in an institutional context. The two questions above are related 
and both point out the potential limitation o f methodological method in this research.
The range o f interviewees is indeed limited; however this does not conflict with the 
aims o f this research. With regard to the focus o f the research mentioned in Section 
1.2.4, the purpose o f this thesis is to discover the interactions between the land use 
planning and economic planning sectors through an exploration o f policy coordination 
in three economic projects, and to evaluate the changes after 2000. To accomplish the 
purpose, four research questions were generated to answer how coordination operates 
and the change in planning process after the institutional change in the late 1990s
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(Section 4.2.1). The research questions intended to understand policy making process 
and put bureaucratic operation in the centre o f  this study. This therefore explains the 
lack o f  political elite in the interviewee list since political operation was not the 
original focus. Nevertheless, interviews undertaken through the snowball process 
indicated the significant role of important politicians which appeared as the factor of 
‘big person'.
t
According to the snowball process strategy, before conducting field research, the 
researcher could not predict the final informant list and would only have supposed 
some categories in which potential interviewees might fall. The snowball process 
strategy eventually illustrated the very weak connection between the plan making 
process and private planning consultancies and the significance o f academic groups as 
well as public institutions in the planning process, since some academic respondents 
held positions in government.
With regards to the literature review chapters, this result o f interviewee selection 
based on a snowball strategy was unsurprising, since Sections 3.3.2 and 3.6.1 pointed 
out the planning process in Taiwan is dominated by the public sector and Section 2.5 
indicated the significance o f institution in which academic groups have their influence. 
The thesis hence contends the final informant list as a result o f the snowball process 
was unlikely to have overlooked key sectors influencing the planning process.
Because o f the limitation o f any single research method, this study did not intend to 
include every participant in each case; instead it attempted to focus on the group 
selected by a well-considered research strategy and to refine the interaction and 
relationship between policy makers. The rich empirical material reflects that in spite
of the narrow range, interviewees selected by a snowball process strategy have 
revealed valuable resources to answer the research questions o f the research.
Third, some may question the boundaries o f the case studies: as a neo-institutionalist 
perspective would suggest that case studies should be wide ranging, can a narrower 
project-based approach adopted is capable to explore the panorama? This was indeed 
an issue during the stage o f research design.
With reference to the planning context, the Taiwanese government has adopted a 
developmental state strategy and has focused on economic growth over decades. As a 
result o f the developmental strategy, it is argued that there has been a dominating 
economic policy led by flagship economic projects. Hence, economic projects 
inevitably become a significant subject for the understanding o f policy coordination in 
relation to economic planning. Once the economic project had become the subject of 
the case studies, the question then was how to select proper projects to answer the 
research questions generated. In order to obtain rich sources to explore policy 
coordination between the economic planning sector and the land use planning sector 
in both vertical and horizontal dimensions, three flagship economic projects were 
selected and more details o f case study selection was described in Section 4.4.
In this research, a neo-institutionalist perspective provides a broad view to understand 
the issue o f policy coordination in Taiwanese planning which had not been discovered 
before. The inclusive and open-minded neo-institutional approach has contributed the 
flexibility to explore the operation o f  the planning process. Given a broad 
understanding o f institutions, the research method which consists o f case study 
strategy, semi-structured elite interview and documentation offers rigorous discipline
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to analyse and explain the relationship and interaction between institutions and policy 
makers.
This research argues a broad conceptual approach does not conflict with rigid 
methodology, for instance interviews through snowball process sampling has 
discovered plenty o f evidence o f the significance o f institutions and the impact of 
institutional change to support the earlier neo-institutionalist framework revealed in 
Chapter Two.
Nevertheless the successful linkage between neo-institutionalism and methodology 
adopted in this thesis heavily depends on the condition where the research is dealt 
with. As an empirical study to explore an unfamiliar study area with few academic 
resources, the employment o f neo-institutionalist perspective and specific 
methodology, e.g. snowball technique has shown its value in this study and indicated 
some important points which can not be ignored. In spite o f its successful 
achievement, it is worth noticing that neo-institutional approach is not necessarily 
suitable for the further research and a more specific conceptual framework and 
different research methods may be more beneficial.
9.3 Suggestions for Further Research
The research findings in this study lead to the following suggestions for further 
research. First, the neo-institutional approach could be used to assist multi-cultural 
planning research. Owing to the flexible and inclusive definition adopted by the 
neo-institutionalist perspective, this thesis has obtained a panoramic view of policy 
coordination in the Taiwanese planning system and discovered the significance o f
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personal networking behind the formal planning framework. This thesis therefore 
endorses the contribution o f the neo-institutional approach and suggests personal 
networks could be an area to focus on in further research in relation to Taiwanese 
planning.
Second, this study has shown the significance o f the social context and cultural 
influence in the planning process. In Taiwan, many tend to adopt Western planning 
theories in the planning system and practice. This neglects the importance o f the 
cultural context which has been shown to be significant in this research. For instance, 
New Town projects in Taipei and Kaohsiung based on British planning practice have 
proved impractical. All three case studies in this thesis confirmed the considerable 
influence o f  tradition and culture on policy coordination in the plan-making process. 
In particular, this study revealed the importance o f the 'big person’ factor, based on 
the ‘rule o f human’ culture in Chinese-culture society. This suggests, the influence of 
the ‘rule o f human’ needs to be taken into account in all planning research undertaken 
in a Chinese-culture society e.g. Hong Kong, Taiwan.
Finally, the outstanding success o f the snowball process strategy to identify and 
access research participants was unexpected. Many interviewees provided 
surprisingly frank responses to the researcher’s questions due to the trust developed 
between the researcher and interviewees based on this strategy. Moreover, the trust 
generated introductions to other informants. Such information might not otherwise 
have been obtainable if the snowball strategy had not been used. As a result o f the 
aforementioned advantages, it is suggested that the snowball strategy be used in 
further research focusing on relationships and networks in the planning process. The 
snowball strategy would be particular useful in society which are known to be
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conservative and traditional, e.g. Chinese society.
In general, the thesis has confirmed the significance o f institutions in the policy 
coordination process and proved increasing political intervention in the plan making 
process has resulted from the institutional change in the late 1990s. The unexpected 
discovery o f the significance o f informal elements o f institutions in the Taiwanese 
planning system leads to a new understanding o f how policy coordination operates. 
This is a major contribution o f this thesis.
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